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ABSTRACT

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the Canadian government has played an
increasingly significant role in influencing the direction of sport in Canada. The current
Canadian high performance sport system, Own the Podium (OTP), was preceded by
various attempts at establishing a competitive Canadian Olympic Team. Oftentimes, the
justification for the significant distribution of money in high performance sport funding
was that international victories would promote nation building and nationalism. As a
result of the high priority placed on international sporting victories across the globe,
Canada currently has a merit-based Olympic funding program, that exemplifies the
encouraged competitiveness and win at all costs attitude existent in the high
performance sport system. This dissertation examines how interpretations of nationalism
represented through the media have developed throughout the past 20 years, from
Calgary 1988 to Vancouver 2010. Further, the dissertation examines how the
investments made in high performance sport by the Canadian government, particularly
its most recent Own the Podium program contributed to a version of Canadian winter
sport nationalism that helped to legitimize public spending on high performance sport.

Keywords: Canada, nationalism, sport, Olympics, policy
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CHAPTER ONE – Introduction

The current sport system in Canada is the result of more than a century long
government interest in developing and improving high-performance sport and
international sporting performances, oftentimes for the promotion of nationalism and, a
more harmonized society. There are various forms of nationalism historically evident
across the world; in particular, this dissertation will examine modern nationalism as it is
specific to Canada. Researchers claim that, though ethnic groups comprise nations,
nationalism is created by the forces of modernization.1 Modern nationalism, then,
defines the emergence of separate nations as recent historical ideologies that privilege
the power of nationalism and its ability to exert control over the population.2
Nationalism therefore, is promoted by the social and political elites of the time,
particularly if they rely on the participation of the people through such cultural forms as
sport. In short, nationalism can be a convenient tool for generating mass support and is
therefore a politically-induced cultural phenomena. Nationalism is historically
congruent with dominant political ideologies as it mobilizes social communities around
new politico-social realities.3 In Canada specifically, this nationalism has emerged
particularly strongly through the Winter Olympics. From 1988 to 2010, narratives in
newspapers surrounding the Olympic Games contributed to an identity for Canadians
that was strongly linked to success in winter sports. This thesis examines the effects that
shifts in sport and policy in Canada have had on sport narratives of Canadian
nationalism from 1988 to 2010. Furthermore, this thesis demonstrates that the twentytwo year period examined experienced a development of a form of Canadian
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nationalism unapologetically saturated with messages of encouraged competitiveness
and confidence.

Nations and Nationalism
Modern nationalists endorse the axiom that nations and nationalism are intrinsic
to processes such as capitalism, industrialization, urbanization, and secularism,
underpinning the emergence of the modern bureaucratic state, clearly evident in western
nations such as Canada. As capitalism became the dominant mode of economic
organization in powerful nations, other countries experienced its socially and
economically invasive effects.4 Therefore, older forms of organically-based cultural
nationalism, such as those experienced in an ethnically synchronized nation (i.e. where
members of the nation share the same ethnic background), became displaced or altered
by the forces of modern capitalism.
Nationalism has been employed for many purposes among nation states in the
modern era. Modern nationalists specifically see national unity as a resource employed
by groups of individuals for the pursuit of common interests.5 For example, nationalism
can be deployed in the defence of power disparities, or when communities and authority
structures are being disrupted, in order for governments to regain control, and the
support of the population.
Modern nationalism is a specific form of civic nationalism, meaning that
individuals in nations where modern nationalism exists have made a conscious decision
to pledge themselves to the nation, even though the ethnic culture may not be theirs.6 It
is a solidarity formed around the symbols that have emerged to be of importance to the
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nation. In the context of civic nationalism, there is a shared sense of national identity,
community, and culture, and those that choose to adopt this identity are considered part
of the nation. In these cases, it has been the role of the state to homogenise these
individuals and, thus, form them into a single, unified entity, a process referred to as
identity hegemony.7 Due to the various ethnicities that combine to create the Canadian
nation, modern nationalism is the most accurate description of the nationalism existent
in Canada, as not all members come from the same ethnic background. This means that
the state coordinates identities by serving as a unique focal point, but it reinforces
natural psychological tendencies, such as the need for acceptance and belonging, by
rewarding supporters, suppressing proponents of alternative nation-state projects, and
propagating official projects through public ceremonies and public education. This
means that, ultimately, governments act at the behest of elites invoking nationalism to
impose cultural forms on societies that are already organized by shared culture.
Nationalism is an amalgam of political ideas and processes positioned within a power
matrix. The public face of this matrix is government. Invocations of collective character
or identity serve to mobilize the citizenry to influence or effect cultural change.
Ozkirimli summarizes John Breuilly’s argument that individuals justify their
desire for state power and legitimize their political movements through nationalism.8 For
Breuilly, a nationalist political movement will be successful if the following criteria are
fulfilled: 1. A nation with a unique character (ethnicity), 2. The interests and values of
this nation must take top priority, and 3. The nation is as politically independent as
possible.9
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Mobilizing Forms of Culture: Sport
International sport events often provide an ideal venue for displays of
nationalism as athletes perform under a symbol of Canadian nationalism, the Canadian
flag. Therefore, these events provide an opportunity for members of the nation to be
brought together by a common reference point. This dissertation examines the ways in
which the Canadian government has used sport, and the subsequent nationalist
sentiments that accompany sport and particularly sporting victories to legitimize itself.
Since the second half of the 20th century, the Canadian government has played
an increasingly significant role in influencing the direction of sport in Canada and,
eventually, establishing a formal sport system. Unsurprisingly, the current highperformance Olympic sport system in Canada, Own the Podium (OTP), was an
improvement to the former sport systems preceded by various attempts at developing the
Canadian Olympic Team into a top competitor on the international stage. The initial
stages of high levels of financial support for high performance athletes came through
Game Plan ’76 leading to the multi-million dollar programs of financial support
provided by the federal government today.
Recent Canadian history has seen a high priority placed on international sporting
victories. As a result, what is currently in place in Canada is a merit-based Olympic
funding program, heavily directed towards supporting athletes with the potential to win
Olympic medals and, therefore, diverting attention from grassroots sport, sport for
development, and sport for all. Oftentimes, and with the threat of globalization to unique
national identities blurring the lines between individual nations, the justification for the
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uneven distribution of money placed towards funding high-performance sport is that
international victories will promote nation building and nationalism.
Particularly in regards to international sporting events, there has always been a
strong link between nationalism and sport. Internationally, current trends in high
performance sport, such as significantly increased funding and hosting international
sport events, have been rationalized through nationalism. Sport itself became a political
tool to guide national competitiveness and survival of individuality through a unique
identity (often intended to be associated with sport victories) in a changing world. The
capacity for sporting victories to contribute to national unity has been promoted
consistently in recent Canadian history and it is clear that the phenomenon of
nationalism accompanies international sporting events.

Purpose
This study provides an historical review of the development of the Canadian
sport system from the 1988 Calgary Olympics through to OTP, to understand the ways
in which the government shaped its direction through the management of nationalism.
The study examines reflections of Canadian nationalism through this time period,
particularly the emphasis on high-performance sport, through the lens of select Canadian
media. Primarily, the study examines how the federal government effectively used the
media to manage the phenomenon of nationalism to legitimize increased priorities on
athletic performance over emphasis on the more developmental or cultural aspects of
sport, buttressed by significant increases in public and private funding.
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Specifically, this dissertation examines how nationalism experienced through
sport developed in Canada from the Winter Olympic Games in Calgary in 1988 to the
Winter Olympic Games in Vancouver in 2010. The study is bookended by these Games
as the issue of nationalism assumes a heightened sense of importance for host countries.
For this reason, there is an element of importance particularly at these Games placed on
Canadian advantages, performances, and victory on home soil, that contribute to media
reports on nationalism through the dissertation. Further, the dissertation examines,
through the lens of the national media, the overtly neo-liberalist manifestation of high
performance sport in Canada through the Canadian federal government’s Own the
Podium program, which established the most fundamentally ‘capitalist-based sport
model’ in the country’s history.

Review of Literature
The current role of sport in Canada, developed alongside more international
movements, perhaps the most important of which was the establishment of the modern
Olympics Games which transformed from early limited international gatherings into the
politicized event that it is today. As the Olympic Games became increasingly more
commercialized and corporatized, so too did the attention paid toward the creation of the
Games as a grand spectacle, where billions of dollars are spent on sport and non-sport
infrastructure. From sponsorships, to funding programs, to television and advertising
rights, expenditures directed toward the staging of the Olympic Games have reached
unprecedented heights.
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Consequently, the Olympics have offered an opportune venue for the expression
and demonstration of nationalist and anti-nationalist sentiments, particularly since the
Cold War Era following the Second World War. Subsequent to World War II, the
increasing commercialization of sport drew attention to the politicization of sport,
particularly the ability of sport to promote national unity and sentiment. Frequently,
national sporting occasions create an imagined community of individuals within the
nation in support of a common reference point, typically, the national team of athletes.10
National sporting occasions afford members of a nation an emotionally-charged
opportunity to embrace and express a common identity.
The connection between nationalism and sport has been a topic of interest,
particularly in the modern era, as both have become ways of identifying oneself with the
nation and the popularity of sport has paralleled the growth of nationalism. Over time,
sport has become increasingly more institutionalized, bringing with it formal structures
designed to shape not only participation in sport, but the role that sport plays in the life
of the individual.
When Prime Minister Diefenbaker was elected into office in 1957, he saw the
potential for sport to promote national unity and in the role of the government to provide
social support. Upon his election, Diefenbaker appointed J.W. Willard as the Minister of
Welfare who, along with Waldo Monteith as Deputy Minister of Health and Welfare,
created a policy on sport and fitness for Canadians.11 Before this time, sport was
strongly considered school and community-based and, as a result, control over it fell to
the provincial and municipal governments. However, the advent of television allowing
for access to athletes, the opportunities presented through urbanization and
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industrialization, and changing socioeconomic conditions (where individuals were
working less, for more pay, resulting in economic resources), presented an opportunity
to create a program aimed at promoting a more active population. At a speech to the
Canadian Medical Association in 1959, the Duke of Edinburgh expressed concerns over
the health of Canadians, Canadian international performances, and post-war sport
internationalism. Two years later, in June of 1961, Willard and Monteith presented a
policy at a National Conference on Sport and Leisure, which was later passed as
Canada’s first official federal government policy on sport, also known as Bill C-131 An
Act to Encourage Physical Activity and Fitness.12 This was also the first time the
government took a lead role in assuming responsibility in Canadian health and fitness.
Bill C-131 was not initially effective. Alongside international factors that
developed during the creation of the Act, such as the loss of the amateur ideal,
professionalization, commercialization, and changing economic circumstances, in
Canada specifically, the Act led to confusion over cost-sharing agreements and funding
distribution. Eventually, this resulted in provinces, municipalities, and the National
Advisory Council (a body originally established in the 1960s that was responsible for
advising the Minister of National Health and Welfare on the implementation of the
program) ceding some of their initial control over sport to the federal government.13 At
this point, there were five levels of structure taking control of Canadian sport: 1) the
federal government; 2) federal sport bureaucracies; 3) National Sporting Organizations
(NSOs), the Canadian Olympic Association (COA), and Sport Federations of Canada; 4)
members of the National Sport and Recreation Centre in Ottawa (that had been
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established in 1971); and 5) athletes who have participated and those who continued to
participate in sports.14
However, the Act did successfully allow for the establishment of national sport
governing bodies. In hopes of creating successful administrative structures within sport,
one of the first initiatives implemented in the Act was the allocation of grants and
funding to each province and the development of programs to “advance amateur sport
nationally and Canadian athletes’ capacity to compete internationally.”15 Though the
Act was arguably unsuccessful for the first few years, the election of Prime Minister
Trudeau and the subsequent Proposed Sports Policy for Canadians, eventually resulted
in a policy framework that was solely focused on sport. The policy allowed for more
direct government involvement in the sport system, giving national organizations access
to financial support and facilitating the development of improved methods of training
and competing, with the intent of maximizing international sport success.
In the mid-twentieth century, Canada, alongside most of the western world
experienced a crisis of nationalism immediately following the Second World War, due
to the growing presence and strength of Eastern Bloc countries in international sporting
competitions during the Cold War Era. Additionally, the isolation of Ottawa and Quebec
in the mid to late 1960s threatened Canadian national unity. Anglophone nationalism in
Canada in turn was energized by the growing threat of separatism by Quebec, as well as
another perceived threat to national unity, which was the domination of the Canadian
economy and culture by the United States, due to direct American investment. Canada
quickly became viewed as a branch plant of American capitalism.16
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This national crisis caused the federal government to adopt a firmer stance on
provincial/federal relations. In 1967, the first inaugural Canada Games were held in
Quebec, with the motto, “Unity through Sport.” The effects of these Games’ success in
promoting national unity and demonstrating athletic skill extended into the next election
campaign in 1968, where Pierre Trudeau promised that, if elected, his government
would evaluate and place a stronger focus on sport. With the landslide Liberal victory of
1968, Prime Minister Trudeau won on a federalist platform, giving French-Canadians
representation at the highest policy-making levels.17 However, Trudeau’s view of
federalism was that Canadians should unite under a strong federal government that was
not sympathetic to French-Canadian or any other form of intra-nationalism. As a result,
there would be no special status for Quebec; however, federal authorities had to respect
provincial jurisdictions.
Trudeau’s first order of business was to appoint as John Munro Deputy Minister
of Health and Welfare. As Deputy Minister, Munro initiated a Task Force with the
responsibility of evaluating Bill C-131 and sport in Canada in general. The resulting
Task Force Report (1969) and the P.S. Ross Report (1969), aimed at analyzing elite
sport and mass participation in sport in Canada respectively, led to A Proposed Sport
Policy for Canadians in 1970.18 In this same time frame, several arms-length agencies
(including the Coaching Association of Canada, ParticipACTION, Hockey Canada, and
the National Sport and Recreation Centre referred to earlier) were established. Specific
to the Task Force Report, the COA was criticized for its lack of support to elite level
athletes and, as a result, the Olympic trust [money to travel], broken time payments,
Athlete Assistance Fund), and Hosting Programs were established. Similarly, an

11

Intensive Care Program was established to provide funding directly towards high
performance sport.
Additionally, the Montmorency Conference on Leisure and recommendations
made by the National Advisory Council, in Ottawa in October 1971, resulted in the
federal Government’s realization that a broad-based sport program and an elite athlete
program in Canada were necessarily linked. The initiative of the conference was to
conceive of ways in which Canada could improve its international sport performances,
most specifically at the Olympics. The Intensive Care Program would provide financial
support to athletes who had the potential to win Olympic medals.19 Eligible athletes
were determined by sport governing bodies in collaboration with Sport Canada.
Consequently, the result of the decisions made by the federal government
throughout the 1970s was that there would be more direct financial support for Canadian
athletes. Due to the increasing level of commercialization and professionalization in
sport, the amateur ideal was gradually becoming less enforced and relevant on the
international sport stage, and in 1974, the International Olympic Committee announced
that it would permit payment to athletes for lost time while training for Olympic Games.
In 1974, when the International Olympic Committee changed its eligibility criteria to
allow athletes to receive compensation for lost-time income, the Canadian Olympic
Association provided almost $600,000 to athletes.20 This, along with the Intensive Care
Program, resulted in the development of Game Plan ’76.
In the summer of 1976, Montreal hosted Canada’s first ever Olympic Games. By
this time, the Intensive Care Program had been renamed Game Plan ‘76, with the intent
of helping the Canadian team improve to the top ten in the medal table. Game Plan ’76
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placed the responsibility of judging athletic potential into the hands of the sporting
organizations; athletes were classified into A, B, and C brackets based on their ability to
perform and win medals.21 Those with higher potential received better support and
funding and the sport governing bodies developed training programs. By 1976, with the
Olympics approaching, the budget for Game Plan ’76 was $3,700,000. The Canadian
Olympic Team won no gold medals, however, and only 11 medals in total.
In 1976, the Liberal government created the position of Minister of State for
Health and Physical Fitness, and appointed Iona Campagnolo to the position.22 Her
responsibility was to review the Canadian Sport Policy again, and to make necessary
adjustments to ensure that Canadian athletes had the resources to achieve excellence on
the international stage. The impetus came from the disappointing Canadian showing at
the 1976 Olympic Games in Montreal. Again, separate task forces were designated to
evaluate the elite sport programs and programs for sport development. In 1977, the
Green Paper: Toward a National Sport Policy on Amateur Sport: A Working Paper
(focusing on mass sport) was completed, critiquing the government for providing too
much structure to sport participation, placing too much emphasis on elite sport, and
asking that more money be directed toward mass participation. The White Paper
(Partners in the Pursuit of Excellence: a National Policy on Amateur Sport) was
completed under Campagnolo’s supervision and led to the request for more money from
the private sector.
In 1982, as a result of Partners in the Pursuit of Excellence, a new Olympic
Sport Program, Best Ever ’88 and, in 1983, the Athlete Assistance Program (AAP) were
approved. The AAP enabled upcoming generations of athletes to devote significant time
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to both training and competing, while continuing their education. Athletes received
broken-time payments, better training facilities, access to coaches, and the sport
governing bodies created training programs designed specifically for them. Athletes
requiring financial assistance were classified, again, based on their level of competition
and commitment to their sport, and again, those competing at the international level, i.e.
Olympic athletes, were still given the highest level of funding. This program was a
direct attempt to further improve Canadian successes in sport and, most importantly, to
achieve a good showing at the 1988 Olympic Winter Games in Calgary, and thus
emerged the Best Ever 88 campaign.
The goal of the Best Ever ’88 Olympic Team program was for the Canadian
Olympic Team to give its best performance up to that point, at the 1988 Calgary Winter
Games. The $25 million budget set aside for the program was directed toward the
improvement of training, facilities, and administrative involvement, and it defined the
role of Sport Canada for the four years leading up to the Games, in collaboration with
the National Sporting Organizations of ten Olympic sports.23 Based in Ottawa, Sport
Canada, in collaboration with other Canadian sport bodies, was responsible for the
distribution of most of the funding from public and private sectors, offsetting the costs
of coach and staff salaries, travel, staging events, and other expenses.24 Similarly, it
directly administered programs for training and setting performance targets, while also
distributing funds for biomechanical, physiological, and psychological research and
therapy.
The results of the 1988 Calgary Olympics were far from desirable in the minds
of Canadians. With a total of five medals, none of them gold, Canada placed thirteenth
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in the medal standings.25 In addition, the men’s hockey team, typically a strong source
of Canadian pride, finished only fourth overall. Unfortunately, the high level of
emphasis placed on winning had repercussions that would leave a permanent stain on
the reputation of Canadians at the Olympics. At the summer Olympic Games, held later
in that same year, 1988, Canadian sprinter Ben Johnson tested positive for steroids and
was stripped of his gold medal in the 100-metre final, which may have been the result of
increasing pressure to be the best, or risk losing both funding and endorsement deals.
Following the 1988 Ben Johnson catastrophe, the Canadian Government asserted that
such a scandal would never happen again, and commissioned a public inquiry, the
Inquiry into the Use of Drugs and Banned Practices Intended to Increase Athletic
Ability (The Dubin Inquiry).26 The inquiry was completed in 1990 culminating in the
establishment of FairPlay Canada, the Canadian Anti-Doping Organization, and the
Canadian Centre for Drug Free Sport.
The drug scandal of the 1988 Summer Olympic Games raised questions about
the government’s investment in sport and challenged the Canadian reputation in
international sport, leading to more stringent contingency-based funding for athletes.
Started in 1995 and completed in 1996, the Sport Funding and Accountability
Framework (determined by NSOs and Sport Canada) delineated all programs that would
be eligible for funding from the federal government. In addition, the government made
sport programs more accountable through the 1988 Mills Report: Sport in Canada:
Leadership, Partnership, Accountability: Everybody’s Business.27
From 1998-2001, the Mills Report and various National Summits on Sport
(Toward 2000) led to the eventual development of the Canadian Sport Policy in 2002,
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which outlined goals of enhanced participation, enhanced excellence, enhanced
interaction, and enhanced capacity. Since then, extending from this policy, Canadian
Sport for Life, the Long Term Athlete Development Program, the Own the Podium
Campaign, and Road to Excellence programs have been created.28 Additionally,
Aboriginal sport was included in 2005 and sport policies for persons with disabilities
were created in 2006 and from 2008-2011, policies regarding hosting, women in sport,
and doping in sport have also been reviewed and revised. The Canadian Sport Policy
itself was revised as recently as 2012. As mentioned earlier, the current elite sport
program in Canada is titled Own the Podium, developed in 2005, by Sport Canada,
WinSport Canada, the Canadian Olympic Committee, the Canadian Paralympic
Committee, and the Vancouver Organizing Committee. OTP’s targets are to ensure
podium excellence, system excellence, and research/innovation/medical excellence for
all upcoming Olympics. The responsibility of the National Sporting Organizations, that,
under OTP monitor each individual sport, is to define sport targets for athletes, set
podium goals, assess the likelihood of those athletes winning medals in the Olympics
and, consequently, determining who is eligible for funding.
The government is responsible for the allocation of funding and the requirements
that must be fulfilled in order for different organizations to receive funding. Between
1997 and 2001, in order to receive funding through the National Sport Organizations
Support Program, organizations had to fulfill their duties based on a signed
Accountability Agreement with Sport Canada.29 Specific objectives included: high
performance athletes (where the greatest level of importance is placed), sport
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development, women in sport, athletes with disabilities, and official languages (meaning
that both the French and English languages needed to be included).
In 2004, various sport organizations from across Canada collaborated to formally
begin developing Own the Podium (OTP) in an effort to combine all parties and support
high-performance programs with the aim of finishing in the top three of the gold medal
count in the 2010 Winter Games. OTP was formally established in 2005. The hope was
to strengthen national policy, programs, and sport delivery for high performance sport.
The campaign generally centred strongly on three spheres: (1) podium excellence; (2)
system excellence; and (3) sport science, medicine, innovation, and research excellence,
which would in combination achieve overall organizational excellence.30
In 2010, the Canadian city of Vancouver played host to the Winter Olympic
Games, 22 years subsequent to the Calgary Games. OTP placed the greatest emphasis
on winning medals and portraying Canada as both a competitor and a sporting
powerhouse internationally. The mission of OTP is for Canada to be a “world leader in
high-performance sport,” with the hope that it will rank among the top in the world in
podium performances during both Olympic and Paralympic Games.31 OTP assumes
responsibility for assessing the potential of individuals and teams in Canada’s high
performance sport system, determining podium targets for Olympic and Paralympic
Games, and for making recommendations regarding the allocation of funds from
national funding sponsors.32 Currently, “Own the podium, a not-for-profit organization,
prioritizes, and determines investment strategies to national sport organizations in an
effort to deliver more Olympic and Paralympic medals for Canada...[to] advance the
excellence goal highlighted in the Canadian Sport Policy.” 33
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Interestingly, the goals for OTP differ between Winter and Summer Olympic
Games with the hope of finishing first overall and top three in gold medals for the winter
count, and finishing top 12 overall and top eight in gold medals for the summer count.
Similarly, as mentioned, the funding for OTP is distributed according to athlete
potential, rather than being divided equally among the provinces as it was for the
Calgary Olympic Games.
Canadian athletes won an all-time record 14 gold medals at the 2010 Vancouver
Olympic Games, proving the success of the OTP campaign. The Canadian team finished
third overall in the medal count, nine positions higher than Calgary in 1988, and brought
home both the men’s and women’s gold medals in ice hockey. Divided between the
Olympic and Paralympic sports of that season, OTP contributed almost $80,000,000
total to funding Canadian athletes.34
The new leading Canadian sport policy was a push toward the active
involvement of all stakeholders in making sport an accessible and engaging component
of society for all Canadians. The policy claims to strive towards actively involving all
members of society that have not yet had the opportunity to contribute to the Canadian
sporting environment. Furthermore, the policy not only intends to engage more
Canadians, but to enhance their sporting experiences by ensuring “the harmonious and
effective functioning of their sport system.”35 It is evident here that there has been a
slight move towards developing sport for all Canadians, rather than a select group of
high performance athletes, from the governing bodies involved in the Canadian sport
programs.
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It is clear then that the federal government supports high performance athletes,
coaches, and sport system development through providing direct financial aid to its
athletes. Furthermore, the government supports and encourages the hosting of Olympic
Games with the hope of promoting Canadian sport and its values in international
contexts. For this precise interest, the Government of Canada has in place a sport
funding program entitled Hosting Program to promote the international profile of
sporting organizations in Canada by ensuring that international events are held here. The
intent is that this investment will result in “significant sport, economic, social and
cultural legacies.”36
On March 13, 2012, the Harper Conservative Government announced additional
support for Canadian athletes leading into the 2012 London Summer Olympic Games
through Canada’s Sport Support Program. President of the Canadian Olympic
Committee Marcel Aubut asserted that “the funds announced today are part of ensuring
that Canada’s outstanding athletes are ready to compete at their best in the Olympic
environment.”37 Following this announcement, CEO of the Canadian Paralympic
Committee Henry Storgaard stated, “this enhancing funding will no doubt help our top
medal-potential sports gain an extra edge as they strive for the podium and make Canada
proud, which will in turn inspire more Canadians with a disability to be active in
sports.”38
The funding invested in 2012-13 included: $27 million through the Athlete
Assistance Program, distributed to 1800 athletes who had achieved world class results;
$146 million through the Sport Support Program to Canadian sport organizations to
strengthen the national sport system and benefit athletes and coaches [$62/$146 million
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goes as enhanced excellence funding for targeted sport and athletes with medal
potential]; and finally $20 million to the Hosting Program.39 The justification for these
funds was that “Canada is proud to be a LEADING SPORT NATION – both at home
and abroad – where all Canadians can enjoy, value and celebrate the benefits of active
participation and excellence in sport” and the program objectives were to “to increase
opportunities to participate in quality sport activities for all Canadians, including
underrepresented groups, to increase the capacity of Canada’s sport system, and to
advance Canadian interests, values and ethics.”40 The general Sport Support Program of
Canada’s current economic action plan asserts that “sport strengthens our communities
and is a powerful means of enhancing the lives of Canadians of all ages, particularly
children and youth, by enabling them to become more active and healthy. Sport
contributes to our sense of national pride through the pursuits of excellence by our high
performance athletes.”41
Since 1984, there has been an international trend toward devoting large sums of
money to the Olympic Games. Since sport is readily considered an instrument of
economic development, the involvement on the part of the government is crucial,
particularly for international relations as well.42 Ultimately, the media perpetuates the
ability of sport to promote national unity, the degree to which sport can foster social
inclusion, the hope that hosting international competitions will contribute to the
Canadian economy, and the idea that medal performances in elite sport will encourage
the Canadian population at large to participate in sport and recreation for purposes of
health promotion. The role of the media will become increasingly relevant for this study.
In 2012, Canada’s Minister of State, Bal Gosal stated, “Canada’s Olympic and
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Paralympic athletes are a source of inspiration and great pride. The accomplishments of
the Canadian team may inspire young people across the country to participate in
sport.”43 The Government of Canada is the single largest contributor to sport in Canada
and with the inception of Own the Podium, the government reached a record level of
investment in sport. Oftentimes, the justification being used is that performance at elite
levels results in the participation in sport at lower levels as Sport Canada’s mission is to,
“enhance opportunities for all Canadians to participation and excel in sport.”44
It is undeniable that since OTP was instituted, Canada has been more successful
on the Olympic podium. The expectations have been raised for everyone, from athletes
to governing bodies and the nation has jumped up the medal table even though more
nations are currently competing. New and innovative approaches to training and
performance have been put into place and OTP’s approach to excellence has resulted in
more Olympic medals being brought home. However, there are no indications that
investments in high performance sport have had any permanent impacts on Canadian
pride following the Olympic Games or the participation of average Canadians in sport.
Rather, it seems as if this is more an ideological ruse to rationalize significantly
increased spending on elite sport.45
Events such as the Olympic Games are typically linked to major aspects of
nationhood, including the waving of flags, singing of anthems, and creating distinction
from other countries. The Own the Podium program has taken this to a new level. The
intent of this study is to examine reflections of Canadian nationalism through the
Olympic Games to determine the role that the media, the federal government, and

21

programs such as OTP and those that preceded it, played in creating and perpetuating
this nationalism.

Methods
Review of the Canadian Sport Policy has demonstrated the increase in funding
allocated to high performance sport in Canada. The policy also outlines the criteria
standards for programs to be eligible for funding by the Canadian government. Whitson
et al. and Macintosh & Whitson have used sport policy analysis to explain power
structures in Canadian society. Using a narrative descriptive analysis of sport policy as a
background to understand changes in the Canadian sport system, this study will use
newspaper articles to analyze the production and reproduction of national narratives to
demonstrate the ways in which the phenomenon of national identity and the promotion
of nationalism positioned positive images of the sport system to Canadian citizens,
alongside its development. The policy background here lends support to and interact
with the more specific findings from the media accounts. Narratives help us to imagine
things, having a potentially hegemonic effect on the establishment of imagined
communities. The hegemonic effects of promotion are evident in the value placed on
high performance sport which, in turn, validates Canadian sport policy and capitalist
relations more broadly, making alternatives to high performance sport ever more
marginalized. We may also observe how changes in policy led to an increase or decrease
of nationalistic expressions, and, from a hegemonic standpoint, the type of nationalism
that the state promotes, including the competitive nationalism that the press invoked
through OTP.
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This research examines the twenty-two year period from the 1988 Calgary
Olympics, through to Vancouver 2010, when Canadian athletes first formally performed
under the OTP program, focusing on those years when Winter Olympic Games were
scheduled. In short, case study research is “an examination of a specific phenomenon
such as a program, event, person, process, institution, or social group.”46 For this
particular research, the case study analysed is the process of the development of winter
sport nationalism in Canada. Historical information has the potential to shed light on
social environments. The attempt to place social events in their proper historical context
involves “a process of systematically searching for data to answer questions about a past
phenomenon for the purpose of gaining a better understanding of present institutions,
practices, trends, and issues,”47 which is highly relevant for understanding Canada, its
current sport system, and the form of competitive sport nationalism that exists today.
The primary source materials used for this study are newspaper archives.
Selected articles were those leading up to, during, and following each set of Winter
Olympic Games that Canada participated in from 1988 to 2010, specifically from the
two weeks prior, the two weeks during, and the two weeks following each Games. This
selection was based on the recommendations of Willis, who suggests that because the
context of the research is so valuable, optimal data sources tend to be those that are
close to the point of application.48
The author used major Canadian English-language newspapers and focused
solely on the opinions of Canadian reporters. The newspapers were selected according
to highest readership levels in the present era and location in order to get a more
widespread viewpoint across Canada. Therefore, the newspapers chosen are The
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Toronto Star (Toronto), The Gazette (Montreal), and The Vancouver Sun (Vancouver).
The elimination of the Globe and Mail from the selection of newspapers was due to it
also being a Toronto-based newspaper with lower readership levels in comparison to the
Toronto Star. Though the Globe and Mail is considered a national newspaper as it is
circulated on a larger scale, the journalists for the paper are still Toronto-based.
Furthermore, the convergence of newspaper ownership in the mid-1990s did not seem to
directly influence newspaper reports on the Olympic Games. Though newspapers will
reflect the interests of the journalists, the intention is to use narrative analysis to
organize information that may help us understand the different perspectives that shaped
our understanding of the Canadian sport system.
Original newspaper documents were accessed through microfilm roles at the
Western University library. Though research came from sources from three different
cities, the accounts of the Olympic Games were strongly similar among them. In total,
Team Canada competed in seven Winter Olympic Games from 1988 to 2010. The
intention was to analyze all relevant newspaper articles and select those that best
illustrate the development of Canada’s high performance sport system and nationalism
during this time. All articles written within the six-week period that encompassed each
Games were reviewed in search of consistency through repetitive themes or emergent
ideas.
Once articles were collected, searches were made in reference to the following
list of key terms that was generated according to their relevance and application to the
research. Terms were selected based on locations of Winter Games, definitions of
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nationalism and nation building, programs, organizations and structures that support the
Olympic team, events at the Games, and result-based terms:
Olympics, sport, nation, identity, pride, nationalism, nation-building,
alpine skiing, biathlon, bobsleigh, cross country skiing, curling, figure
skating, freestyle skiing, ice hockey, luge, Nordic combined, short
track speed skating, skeleton, ski jumping, snowboard, speed skating,
funding, policy, Canadian Olympic Committee, Calgary, spectacle,
future, Albertville, Lillehammer, Nagano, Salt Lake City, Turin,
Vancouver, Winter, Games, medal, success, support, government,
officials, legacy, fans, system, training, coaching, Canada, Canadians,
athlete, team, excellence, podium, Best Ever, Own the Podium,
performances, culture, victory, program, winning, investment,
memory, world-class, promote, spending, cost, economy, power,
expectations, disappointing, financial, gold, money, National Sport
Organizations, Sport Canada, Olympic Organizing Committee,
history, competition, inclusion, accountability, hope, international,
image, criteria, negative, selection, representation, results,
commitment, recommendation, organization, production, projection,
targets, contribute, nostalgia, sentiment, tradition, leadership, hosting,
potential, anthem, flag, participation, partnership, controversial,
legitimate, Maple Leaf, opportunity, supremacy, benefit, pressure,
stakeholder, science, inspiring, resources, mission, vision,
development, symbols, sponsorship, unity, criticism
Data were organized into units based on events, sentences, paragraphs, comments or
observations regarding Canada’s involvement in the Olympic Games. The list of key
words emerged inductively out of the newspaper search and were selected based on their
relevance to Canada’s role in the Olympics and the subsequent effects the Games had on
representations of Canadian nationalism. Overall, 2,510 newspaper articles were found
and reviewed. Following this, the list of terms and the articles linked to them were
categorized to examine links, associations, and relationships between data components.
The following tables demonstrate the number of newspaper articles found from
each newspaper, for each chapter. The tables further show how many articles were
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found as relevant and reflective of the research, as well as how many articles were
quoted directly.
Table One: Tabulation of Articles Used in Chapter Two
Toronto Star
Found
Used
Quoted
Not Quoted

144
77
44
33

Montreal
Gazette
73
12
6
6

Vancouver Sun

Total

96
17
8
9

313
106
58
48

Table Two: Tabulation of Articles Used in Chapter Three
Toronto Star
Found
Used
Quoted
Not Quoted

467
110
26
84

Montreal
Gazette
380
47
1
46

Vancouver Sun

Total

313
24
0
24

1160
181
27
154

Table Three: Tabulation of Articles Used in Chapter Four
Toronto Star
Found
Used
Quoted
Not Quoted

301
62
17
45

Montreal
Gazette
204
50
0
50

Vancouver Sun

Total

176
24
0
24

681
136
17
119

Table Four: Tabulation of Articles Used in Chapter Five
Toronto Star
Found
Used
Quoted
Not Quoted

152
30
17
13

Montreal
Gazette
74
19
0
19

Vancouver Sun

Total

130
21
0
21

356
70
17
53

As mentioned, articles selected for use and quotation were selected based on the
prevalence of key terms and their relevance to research. Though not directly quoted, all
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articles read and analyzed helped to outline and highlight the major events, moments,
and other contributing factors to Canadian nationalism throughout the 22-year period
while quotations that were directly used were those that best illustrated and expressed
this. Upon further application of the key terms to the selected articles, similarities and
repetitive links between terms became apparent, allowing for organization of articles
based on broader themes. Each key term could be categorized beneath its own umbrella
theme. Ultimately, four major themes emerged from this research:









Legacy, changes and developments in Canadian sport
o Spectacle, future, success, legacy, excellence, podium, culture,
medal, world-class, gold, hosting, mission, vision, accountability,
inclusion, organization, leadership, potential, participation,
opportunity, supremacy, victory, winning, performances, benefit,
results, competition
Funding, support, and structure
o Funding, policy, support, government, officials, Best Ever, Own
the Podium, system, training, coaching, sponsorship,
stakeholders, science, resources, financial, money, spending, cost,
investment, program, partnership, Canadian Olympic Committee,
National Sport Organizations, Sport Canada, Olympic Organizing
Committee, targets, projection, development, production,
recommendation, criteria, legitimate, commitment, selection
Expressions of Canadian nationalism, pride and identity
o Nation, identity, pride, nationalism, nation-building, fans, Maple
Leaf, memory, nostalgia, sentiment, tradition, history, inspiring,
image, unity, symbols, anthem, flag, hope, representation,
contribute, promote
Challenges faced by Canada at the Games
o Pressure, controversial, negative, power, disappointing, economy,
criticism, expectations
Key words relevant to all themes:
o Olympics, sport, alpine skiing, biathlon, bobsleigh, cross country
skiing, curling, figure skating, freestyle skiing, ice hockey, luge,
Nordic combined, short track speed skating, skeleton, ski
jumping, snowboard, speed skating, Calgary, Albertville,
Lillehammer, Nagano, Salt Lake City, Turin, Vancouver, Winter,
Games, Canada, Canadians, athlete, team, international
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Methodology
The study was conducted using the framework of hegemony. This framework
underscores the ways in which those with political and social capital have used their
power to influence and structure society to serve their own interests. With regard to the
development of Canada’s high-performance sport system and its relation to greater
social concerns, the concept of hegemony as a theoretical framework is particularly
beneficial in helping demonstrate the power relations extant in society. At its most basic
level, the concept, hegemony is used to understand a society in which the dominant class
gains the control of its subordinates by obtaining their consent. For this study on sport in
Canada, this concept can help us understand the ways in which sport has been used as a
tool for shaping society in a way that would articulate the interests of those in positions
of power. Hegemony as a theory was conceived by Italian theorist, Antonio Gramsci,
who wrote about power, class, and society in the early twentieth century. Through this
time, there was, as Gramsci notes, a shift towards a state that educates society rather
than forcing it into a bourgeois way of thinking and acting.49 In the Canadian capitalist
economy, based largely on commodification, commercialization, and rationality, the
forces that shape political society, i.e. the government, has also played a role in shaping
sport, and vice versa. Hargreaves states that sport is considered a microcosm of
capitalist society since it is highly commercialized and driven by consumer and market
tendencies.50
Jackson-Lears defines hegemony as the spontaneous consent of the masses to the
general direction imposed on social life by the dominant class.51 This means that, in
society, the dominant class has the means and resources to convince subordinates into
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believing that their experiences, impressions of life, and ways of living are “common
sense.” As a result, subordinates become naturalized towards it and accepting of their
circumstances. Historically, this dominant class enjoys the privilege and consequent
confidence of setting this direction because of their ability to obtain control of capital.
Gramsci argued that having control is not only a question of being able to secure capital,
but that there was also a coercive element on the part of the dominant class that fosters
the support for subordinates by influencing them to believe that their interests are
congruent with those of the state.52 In capitalist societies such as Canada, the media
plays a large role in eliciting consent of average citizens by reproducing messages and
feelings to the level of civil society. Through media and myth-making, historical notions
become ideological truths and, oftentimes, history is transformed into nature, providing
a coercive power to the media and therefore making it the perfect ally for ruling
factions.53 Often, ruling factions have control over media outlets such as newspapers, as
well as other means of message production and transmission, that offer them the ability
to selectively create representations of the past and future, deciding what is presented
and excluded or neglected from public narratives.54
The hegemonic class must be able to create a national popular will, which is
achieved through the attainment of capital (or power), gaining control of ideological
state apparatuses, such as the media, so as to promote their values and messages, and
then diffusing their ideologies to the masses. Those who control the means of media
production also control the messages propagated through them. Gruneau states
metaphorically that power is a commodity or resource, particularly of the ruling class,
and the state is the central bank responsible for the distribution of this resource.55
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Additionally, the power of statements and symbols rest in their ability to become
naturalized as common sense.56
Cassar references Althusser by explaining that while political society provides
more direct domination through the use of repressive state apparatuses (laws and
legislature), self-management occurs at the level of civil society, of which media is one
source, through ideological state apparatuses that allow for self-surveillance.57
Ideological state apparatuses use techniques that at their fundamental levels do not
present themselves as forms of domination, but rather are coercive tools, thus making
them more difficult to challenge and oppose.58 Civil society, such as media, then is an
ideological state apparatus that creates the conditions necessary for the dissemination of
messages and ideologies to society, much as its reproduction relies on them.
Jackson-Lears defines ideology as the spontaneous philosophy that is proper to
everyone and expressed through language, common and good sense (empirical
knowledge), and proper religion, i.e. the actions and experiences of everyday life. 59
Ideologies are both formal and articulated systems of meanings, values, and beliefs, and
the hegemonic function is to control and incorporate them into one dominant ideology.60
Furthermore, Jackson-Lears states that public discourse has the ability to decide which
information and experiences to make public to consciousness and which not to.61 For
this reason, we understand that ideas are not intrinsic, but generated, or socially
produced. This is evident in Stuart Hall’s theory of articulation, disarticulation, and
rearticulation, which reminds us that ideas come from a combination of production and
social relations.62 For Hall, messages sent to the public are first encoded with the
intentions of the hegemonic class, disseminated into society, often through media, where
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they are decoded by society and open to interpretation and polysemy.63 At this point,
society either accepts the messages as the dominant hegemonic form, they take a
negotiated version of the messages where they may disagree with certain components,
or they take an oppositional view point, and challenge the message they are receiving.64
According to Harvey and Proulx, the capitalist state has three functions: the
accumulation of capital, the preservation of social harmony, and coercion.65 Capital
refers to the economic power of bourgeois society based on their ability to secure
control over economic resources. Therefore, in capitalist societies, people are placed in
positions of authority based on the rights that come with power over the deployment of
capital. This ultimately creates a separation between the state and the working class who
are forced into the hands of the dominant class by reason of economic necessity. As a
result, there is a widening gap between the rich and poor in such a system. Social
inequality and stratification then is inherently tied to the distribution of social wealth.
Gruneau warns us that social harmony cannot be achieved if the state does not
appear neutral and if its interests are too closely aligned with those of the ruling class.66
Hargreaves references Gramsci in saying that a successful dominant class, when
creating a hegemonic society, must make concessions, accommodate various ideologies,
form alliances, pre-empt alternatives to the social order, and decide which combination
of force and persuasion are necessary.67 The concern here is that capitalism exists to
serve the values and interests of a minority ruling class, with an underrepresentation of
individuals from lower income levels, thus alienating the working class and providing
agency to the rich, who have a heightened concern for their own interests. They use the
state system to appropriate these interests, neglecting not only opposing interests, but
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more importantly the needs of the subordinate class. A capitalist society then is
ultimately one of corporate greed, lopsided state-working class relationships, inequality,
and mechanisms of social power. A successful hegemonic class must provide rewards,
care, support, and structure to society, while demonstrating intellectual and political
leadership.68 A social class comprises the individuals who experience life and activities
similarly in the world of production.69 As a result they can build solidarity, which may
eventually lead towards a counter-hegemony.
Sport rests in the third of hegemony’s three components, material and political
(which are more difficult to challenge because they are susceptible to reward and
punishment) and cultural (which are seemingly easier to challenge due to voluntary
participation). In the past, sport has provided not only a medium for the transmission of
common sense but, historically, a site where it is constituted.70 For Wamsley, cultural
terrains such as sport are used by ruling factions to help create a national popular will, as
sports provide areas where ideologies are contested and hegemony is produced or
reproduced.71 As a cultural terrain, sport has conveniently provided a site where those in
positions of political, economic, or societal power can impose their interests on
subordinate classes. Congruently, sport allows for an illusory kind of freedom, since
characteristics of sport such as the emphasis on efficiency and profit demonstrated a
clear reflection of the priorities and rationality of a capitalist society and a site where,
ultimately, the participants had little to no control, particularly in regards to high
performance sport. Therefore, sport activities may be a metaphor for an ideal society
since they present themselves as spontaneous and independent while actually being
highly structured.72 In addition, sport is controlled by market measurements and
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performances are judged based on conditions set by that market. Ultimately, sport plays
a role in the cycle of production and consumption, the orchestrated use of time and
space, and our dependence on science and technology, and this is occluded by the
subjective percipience of voluntary participation.73
Often, sport is a clear reflection of its social environment and often reinforces the
political ideology existent in a particular society. For capitalist societies then, sport can
contribute to reinforcing class inequalities by naturalizing values such as competition,
self-discipline, and obedience to authority figures. Furthermore, Hargreaves states that
sport is defined by its, “specialization and standardisation, bureaucratised and
hierarchical administration, long term planning, increased reliance on society and
technology, a drive for maximum productivity, a quantification of performance and,
above all, the alienation of both producer and consumer.”74 In this sense, sport
developed much in the same way that work and production has, emphasizing discipline
and order. In Canada, the high performance sport system is based on an elitist
meritocracy with emphasis placed on individual achievement, record breaking, and other
performance imperatives, reproducing capitalist values. Therefore, sport under the
direction of the state could be perceived as controlling the populace through the praise
of capitalist values.
In unequal, capitalist societies, such as Canada, positions of power need to be
negotiated, and sport often provides a site for this negotiation. However, as with other
economic, political, and cultural components of society, individuals do not negotiate
from positions of equal power. Those in dominant positions have the resources
necessary to shape the direction of life and cultural practices, such as sport. As
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discussed, of particular importance is the ability of the dominant class to persuade
subordinated groups that decisions are being made in their best interests, and that
concessions are to be made when necessary. In order to properly critique sport, we must
pay attention not to the space that the dominant cedes to the subordinate, but the ways in
which this ceded space has already been shaped by dominant values. Morgan references
Gruneau, who calls them strategically manipulated concessions in which the dominant
concede to the subordinate on the margins, but retain the core principles.75
The ideology of excellence in Canada demonstrates that sport is, historically,
created and controlled by upper middle class white males, making it difficult to
challenge because they predominantly exercise control over the Olympics and express
neoconservative ideas as common sense. Therefore, the philosophy of excellence in the
Canadian sport system still reflects an ideology that reinforces state capitalism.76
However, though seemingly self-empowering and socially-validated, there are strong
inequalities within Canada’s sport system, but since the government legitimates and
institutionalizes it, the power relations stay in the hands of those already privileged,
while limiting resources for those without influence.77 For example, athletes sign
contracts and concede control over their product into the hands of team owners and
managers. Similarly, they are judged by a system created by the market. Nor do
taxpayers and those who participate in sport for pleasure, have control over the ways
that their money is spent, they are taxed for sport, and ultimately rules are created to
determine the conditions under which they are allowed to participate in sport. Therefore,
a proper understanding of concepts such as hegemony and ideology and the ways in
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which they can contribute to an understanding of sport in capitalist society, can be quite
useful for further evaluating and critiquing Canada’s sport system.
Again, sport is organized to serve the material interests of a minority few rather
than the prosperity of a larger population. It is based on skill and glorifies a meritocratic
hierarchy; politicians, and the media promote competition and this helps to justify
inequalities that exist as a result of it (i.e. winners should be rewarded). Similarly,
participating athletes create the product, for example the Olympic Games spectacle, and
yet are alienated by having limited control over the ways in which they participate in it.
In Canada, the money expended on the Olympic Games and the athletes has only served
to intensify the ways in which training and participation have become strongly related to
the labour process. Furthermore, the increasing commercialization of sport and the
sponsorship and professionalization that have become critical components of high
performance sport have led to its capitalist structure. Just like the athletes, taxpayers
who help fund these events have no control over their production. Ultimately, the state
and ruling classes have used sport in order to mobilize support for their government.
Ritchie argues that “the state’s role in all of this is simply to help in coordinating and
popularizing sport while surrounding its involvement in mystifying notions of the
collective good that mask its class bias.”78 This indicates that the structure of capitalist
societies has become internalized and natural due to the values and interests of those
with power that are continuously reinforced through ideological constructions.
With regards to the construction of nationalism in Canada in particular, modern
nationalism is an ideal way to describe sentiment, because its existence has been
politically and socially constructed, rather than being a natural phenomenon that arose
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as a result of existent ethnic solidarity. Due to Canada`s largely multicultural population,
nation-building is heavily reliant on the construction of national institutions by the state,
through influence and coercive forces, favouring the integration and ultimate
assimilation of ethnicities.79 Therefore, hegemony can help to explain how the state in
Canada has constructed nationalism for Canadians, through institutions such as sport.
Nationalism is an ideology defined as the “attainment and maintenance of
identity, autonomy and unity on behalf of a population, some of whose members deem it
to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation.’”80 Commonly, nationalism asserts that all
individuals have a basic human need to belong to a group, a need that the ideology of
nationalism fulfills, alongside providing a strong sense of security to members of a
nation. The success of nations relies heavily on the state creating coherence within its
population through the synchronization of beliefs, values, and societal structures.
Benedict Anderson’s notion of “imagined communities” is helpful in
understanding the success of nationalism in a nation of Canada’s size and diversity.
Anderson states that, “members of even the smallest nation will never know most of
their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives
the image of their communion.”81 Nations are strong communities brought together over
strategically produced common origins and histories that have been experienced and
understood by all members and constituted by shared belief and mutual commitment.
Thus, people imagine themselves as cohesive communities, allowing them to experience
strong comradeship that, often makes individuals willing to sacrifice their lives for the
nation (for example, in times of war), and the source of this comes from nationalism.82
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The role of the state is to coordinate and unify individuals around these common
beliefs and values. Due to the inherently political nature of international sport, the use of
national sport teams can be a viable way of accomplishing this. For example, politicians
and world leaders use sport to further their careers or political interests, often with
disregard for the material conditions of people’s lives.83 According to Belanger,
spectacles like the Olympic Games, form façades of fantasy to facilitate private sector
and government spending which would not otherwise be forthcoming.84 For those in
dominant positions of government and Olympic Committees, addressing collective
memories and nostalgia in the orchestration and reception of sport spectacle is key to the
success of selling places (for example, new arenas and stadiums), “not only as a
resource for economic gain but, in a Gramscian sense, as a way of generalizing
hegemonic interpretations of history and society so that these interpretations come to be
widely seen as a matter of common sense.”85 Often, occasions such as the Olympic
Games are ideal venues for the creation and demonstration of national sentiment, as
Olympic teams provide common reference points for members of a nation. Additionally,
Belanger discussed how the present day sport spectacle works to transform and sanitize
urban spaces and the experience that accompanies them.86 Through their use of sights,
sounds and activities, these entertainment and consumption spaces offer upscale target
markets for a spectacular urban experience, but one that is meticulously orchestrated and
ultimately far removed from the realities of daily life. This inevitably obscures the
underlying reality of calculated exchange values and profit taking. Particularly relevant
in the case of the Olympics in general are the ideologies of collective memory and
nostalgia that contribute to the orchestration and reception of this sporting spectacle, and
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thus its role in the construction of nationalism. The role of high performance sport in
promoting and constructing national identity is a specifically important view for this
thesis. Sport offers an important contribution to this idea of imagined communities
because it creates an environment of emotionally-charged interaction. Flags present at
these events orient people to a single idea – the nation which is ruled under this flag, and
sports played for this flag take on heightened importance.87
Anderson’s theory of imagined communities is reinforced by Hobsbawm’s idea
of “invented tradition.” Hobsbawm defined invented tradition as “a set of practices,
normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature,
which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which
automatically implies continuity with the past.”88 Those in powerful positions use
history to legitimate action and cement group cohesion. This becomes relevant in the use
of national narratives to analyze the hegemonic effects of using high performance sport
to establish nationalism. Historically, research on sport and national identity invokes
both concepts of imagined community and invented traditions. Major international
sporting events create an imagined community of people across the country that come
together in support of a national team, representing a common reference point, upon
which individuals can reflect their national sentiment.89 In fact, Hobsbawm studied the
influence of sport and labelled such events as sites for the construction, expression, and
imagining of national identity.90 Similarly, as sport becomes increasingly popular, it
congruently becomes an increasingly popular tool for fostering national sentiment,
particularly in an increasingly globalized world.
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With the emergence of print media, the ability of sport to produce national
sentiment was compacted with its ability to pervade larger populations. The emergence
of newspapers and mass print have not only made the world and information more
readily accessible to wider populations, but they are oftentimes responsible for,
“organizing public debates and persuading readers to a particular point of view.”91 As
Hackett and Gruneau state, “no other mass medium offers the same combined
possibilities for accessibility, in-depth analysis, potential diversity of viewpoints, and
sustained reflection on important political and economic issues.”92
In the late twentieth century, in the face of an economic recession, newspaper
chains struggled to be profitable, combined with the pressure brought on by the
popularity of television and the internet, newspapers were forced to report more
dramatic stories, feature head turning scandals, and devote sections to specifics, where
lines between news and advertisement were blurred.93 However, with the competition
between newspapers to stay current and relevant came criticisms of the bias of
journalists, over-emphasis on trivial issues, and an obsession with scandal and
negativity. Newspapers are responsible for selecting important issues and subsequently
constructing stories around them. As a result, news is an active, not passive
representation of the world.94 Therefore, the question is, what factors influence the
process of selecting content to be reported?
For state-owned media, the government has the ability to restrict freedom of
speech and therefore the press. This is done through the stifling of information or
viewpoints, oftentimes ones that would embarrass the authorities or provoke political
opposition. Other reasons include the interest of public security or social order.95
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Governments are also capable of applying economic pressure to media outlets by
withholding government advertising. Additionally, as governments provide such a
valuable source of information, they can decide what news is made available to the
public and to left- or right-wing news outlets, as fits with their agendas.96 However,
since media in Canada is generally privately owned, and because the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms offers constitutional protection, the media in Canada legally has
freedom to report the truth for public interest and to provide alternative voices.97
Having said this, not all institutions are equal. Some have more money, power,
credibility and cultural capital, allowing more control over the press, and less critical
attention. By the same token, reporting journalists do not want to “bite the hands that
feed them,” so to speak, “from the relatively direct influence of advertising and
corporate ownership to the more subtle ways in which free market ideology has come to
dominate public discourse the media are so highly integrated into and reliant on the
economic system.”98 Along with the government and corporate interests, censorship in
the media can quite simply come down to a matter of reporting what the audience wants
to hear. When journalists purvey information, there are strong considerations of supply,
productions, and consumption (i.e. what is the big news? What is significant and
relevant? etc.).99 Finally, ethnocentrism and nationalism tend to filter out news that
upsets a nation’s collective sense of who they are, and relevant for this research, just as
nationalism can be responsible for filtering news out, it can also provide an effective
reason for filtering it in, making the media a powerful reflection of the nation and
nationalism.100
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The intention of this study is to examine the ways in which media messages were
disseminated to society to reflect the positive benefits of funding placed into high
performance sport, particularly the ability of high performance sport to foster and
maintain national unity. Therefore, the concept of hegemony can help us understand the
dynamics of coercion and consent at play as the federal government, in particular,
perpetuates its ideals through the media.

Delimitations
Delimitations for this study include first and foremost the time period selected
for research, 1988-2010. This time frame was selected because, in 1988, when Canada
played host to the Winter Olympics, we see the early stages of the creation of a form of
Canadian nationalism centred on winter sport success, perpetuated through the
Olympics. Hosting the 1988 Games gave Canada a reason to invest and place higher
importance on the role of sport in creating a national identity. In the aftermath of the
1988 Games, Canada began to reconstruct its high performance system and 22 years
later saw the emergence and development of its current high performance sport system,
Own the Podium, along with Canada’s first Olympic performance under the newly
developed policy, can be noted.

Limitations
The first limitation for this study is that, as Canada is a bilingual nation, a
language barrier exists on part of the author, excluding an investigation of the reaction
and opinions of French-Canadian newspaper articles. In addition, as will any study
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involving newspaper analysis, it is beyond the scope of the study to access and analyze
every newspaper article written in regards to the Canadian Sport Policy development
and implementation, therefore, articles have been selected from three newspapers
insofar as they offer differing perspectives. Once themes and messages from articles
began to overlap, sampling was completed.

Chapter Outline
Chapter One provides an outline of the structure of research. This includes a
brief analysis of the literature, research methods, and methodologies that will aid in data
collection and presentation. Chapter Two analyzes the 1988 Olympic Games and the
early stages of the creation of winter sport nationalism in Canada and how hosting the
Games and the creation of spectacle contributed to this intent. Chapter Three presents an
era of policy development in Canada, once the foundation and legacy of winter sport
supremacy was created in 1988, the Canadian government followed with a generation,
from the 1992 to 1998 Games, of policy development intended to provide athletes and
the sport system with the guidelines necessary to ensure future success. Chapter Four
examines how OTP, Canada’s current high performance sport system was introduced
and represented by Canadian newspapers and what sort of narratives were crafted
around the program. Once the groundwork was laid in the 15 years prior, the new
millennium, 2002 and 2006 Games provided an opportunity to present a new high
performance sport policy to Canadians, serving as an antecedent to when the Games
would return to Canada in 2010. Finally, Chapter Five analyzes the first year of
implementation of the Own the Podium program and the performances of Canadian
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athletes. This chapter overviews the processes and events that led to the development of
the current winter sport nationalism that exists in Canada, and how 2010 served to
punctuate the invocation of a new national identity, based on an accelerated sense of
international competitiveness manifested through its sport policy.
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CHAPTER TWO – The Creation of Spectacle

The purpose of the next four chapters is to analyze newspaper narratives of
developments in Canadian nationalism over the course of two decades of Olympic
Games. This chapter focuses on the Calgary Games of 1988 when Canada played host to
the Olympics for the second time. After failing to win a gold medal on home soil in
Montreal in 1976 and incurring significant long term debt for the nation, Calgary was
viewed by Olympic boosters as an opportunity for Olympic revival. The Canadian
government and Olympic Organizing Committee of course promoted the Games as a
spectacle event of global significance to garner support for investment in these and
future Olympics. It was during the 1988 Calgary Olympics that the notion of spectacle
created through sport as a tool to further promote nationalism became highly apparent.
The purpose of creating a unified version of Canadian nationalism was, for the
COA and Sport Canada, to create a justification for the need for more funding. It was for
this reason that the Olympics were framed for the government and the population as a
means of celebrating ‘Canadianness.’ With a more succinct agenda and understanding of
the role of the Olympics on the part of the government and Canadians, it may be easier
for the COA and Sport Canada to enact policy changes. Due to its symbolic dimension,
i.e. the meanings that it signifies to both participants and spectators, sport has become a
form of culture.1 By articulating this traditional national culture with the culture of the
people (i.e. national identity), new forms of common sense can be created.2
Additionally, as culture or nationalism become ideologies, they are reinforced through
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meaning and language created by the dominant classes, who might then use them to
galvanize populations and, in a political sense, to carry out government business.
The role of the Canadian government and the Olympic Organizing Committee
was to identify historical Canadian nationalism and reinvent the definition of being
Canadian to place higher importance on winter sport success, in order to successfully
garner support for this spectacle. It is here that the media plays a fundamental role in the
reproduction of hegemony, as dominant groups rely heavily on the media, in this case
newspapers, to relay messages to Canadians. Additionally, hegemony theoretically
works to counter any threats to its coherence, making it difficult to challenge the
messages that are being sent to the public. This means that alternative meanings about
the Games and what they represent can be met with criticism and quickly rejected or
recast, as we will see demonstrated in the early stages of the Games. This chapter
presents clear evidence of the role of the media in representing Canadian nationalism
hegemonically so as to create strong support for the Canadian government and Canadian
Olympic Organizing Committee’s version of the spectacle of the Olympic Games.
Further, this chapter demonstrates how, when the spectacle is sold in the right way, poor
performances can actually serve as catalysts to promote future funding.

Recreating Canadian Nationalism
For two weeks in February 1988, hopeful Canadians watched as their athletes
participated in the Winter Olympics in Calgary. At this time, Canadian Olympic athletes
were largely funded by the government’s Best Ever ’88 program. Having been selected
to play host for the Winter Games for the first time in Olympic history, expectations and
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feelings of anticipation reverberated through the entire nation. Of course there were
expectations for the performances of Canadian athletes. Consequently, millions of
dollars were invested in new sporting facilities so the world could see that, when it came
to winter, Canadians were, as one article stated, “Legends made of ice and snow.”3
Newspaper articles in the two weeks prior to the Games reflected high
expectations and positive, hopeful attitudes on the part of Canadians and reporters.
Newspapers devoted entire sections to the biographies of specific athletes, highlighting
their struggles and strengths, and why these athletes were expected to win medals at the
Games. Additionally, the media endeavoured to create nationalist sentiment or national
pride through advertisements and commercials as well. The effectiveness of this was
demonstrated particularly well in an article written by Canadian Stan Laugher from St.
Catharines, to the editorial section of the Toronto Star that was titled, “Tracy inspires
pride in Canada.” The article read, “I have never seen Canadianism illustrated more
clearly than by figure skater Tracy Wilson, who, in a commercial says, “We’ll be
skating for Canada.” It made me realize who I am. I am Canadian. Canadianism is our
cultural inheritance…that’s why win, lose or draw, the Toronto Maple Leafs and
Montreal Canadians are so popular, they’re living, breathing proof that there is Canada,
Canadianism, and a person called a Canadian.”4 The interesting factor here is that, when
athletes are asked to appear in commercials to endorse certain products, their lines are
written by a team of media experts to precisely play on the emotions and interests of the
anticipated audience, to sell a product, in this case the Olympics.
While constructing this nationalism, consider momentarily the hegemonic
process of having the performance of an individual athlete dedicated to an entire nation
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and the influence of language in such a statement. According to Gramsci’s “national
popular,” this is one way in which the traditional national culture is controlled by the
state, and articulated in a way that reverberates with the aspirations of the people,
playing on the emotions of the nation to highlight the positives of high performance
sport, and to justify investment in it.
The media, lending further evidence to hegemonic social processes, continued to
play on the hopes and memories of Canadians to create a national fervour leading up to
the Games, tying together past and present athletes with pictures of past victorious
Olympians and their championship teams. The organizers even inserted reference to
Canada’s sporting future into the ceremonies, having 12-year old Robin Perry, potential
star for the 1992 Olympics, carry the flame into the Olympic stadium.
In 1988, the media predicted, as was headlined, the “Best Ever Winter
Olympics;” it was with no coincidence that this matched the name of the funding
program in Canada.5 The Queen’s representative Governor General Jeanne Sauve
commented that the Games were, “one of the few moments in Canada’s history when
‘pride and enthusiasm’ is felt by all Canadians. These will be days to remember. They
will be carved in the collective soul and memories of Canadians forever.”6 Gellner states
that “nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness, but rather it
invents nations where they do not exist.”7 Over time, society creates a heritage from
symbols, values, and most importantly in this case, memories that have been previously
encoded in history. Having common references and forms of identity foster a sense of
solidarity that characterizes the nation, thus creating a sense of uniqueness that
contributes to its nationalism. A widespread encouragement of the requisite common
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sense thinking buttressed the multi-levelled government investment in elite sport,
influenced by the material structure of ideology, i.e. everything that has the potential to
influence public opinion, in this case evident in the media’s reading of the Olympic
Games.8

Challenges to Hegemony
As discussed, in the creation of hegemony, the role of those in dominant
positions is to eliminate any threat to the cohesion of power. As sport provides a site for
the construction and propagation of hegemony, it is on this cultural terrain where one
can witness a struggle over the meaning of sport and where sport can be used as a tool
for negotiation. However, individuals do not negotiate from areas of equal power and, in
these instances, concessions are made when necessary to limit the threat of alternatives
to the hegemony created by the dominant class. This was the case in Calgary when a
scandal threatened to become the face of the ’88 Games involving the Lubicon First
Nation. The article in the Toronto Star was titled, “An Olympic shame,” and described
the Lubicon’s 40-year wait for land, claims settlement, and illustrated their poverty,
sickness, and despair as they waited patiently for acres of land that were promised to
them, in a nation that claimed to value compassion, justice, and human rights.9 The
Lubicon claimed their land had been stolen, and the resources awarded to large
corporations.10 This article placed a political tone on the Calgary Games, “when the
Olympics begin on February 12 they’ll have a chance to parade their shame before
Olympic television cameras,” and this was exactly what they had planned to do, “what
choice do they have? In a sense, politicians like Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and
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Alberta Premier Don Getty also plan to use the Calgary Games for their own purposes,
having pumped hundreds of millions of taxpayer’s dollars into them.”11 In the end, the
Lubicon made a loud, but peaceful demonstration at the opening ceremonies of the
Calgary Games, though they kept the issue alive throughout, handing out place-cards
reading “Oh Canada, our home ON native land. People say sport and politics don’t mix,
but they’re forgetting what the Olympic spirit is all about,” said Lubicon chief Bernard
Ominayak. The protests were not aimed at the Olympics or the ‘spirit of the relay,’ but
were, “a method of shedding light on this outrageous attempts to stamp out a
community.”12 Immediately following the Games, the Lubicon were offered interim
land settlements and they accepted with the promise of future negotiations. At this time,
they received 66 square kilometres when they were originally seeking 230. This is what
Gruneau refers to as a strategically manipulated concession.13 The Lubicons were only
given a brief mention again at the end of the Games that stated how the scandal had not
affected the Games. By the date of publication, this land dispute remains unresolved.
The second scandal of the Games arose in the form of separate cases of potential
criminal activity surrounding ticket purchases and housing for spectators. Only 10% of
tickets were sold internationally, and the 10% that were promised to dignitaries and
officials became 25% (50% of which were for prime events), while the “leftovers” were
given to the outside community. Similarly, wait lists were scrapped as people were
forced to line up at wickets that were set up in order to buy tickets. As a result,
Calgarians were the only ones with access to primetime tickets and ended up comprising
45% of the spectators at the Games.14 Similarly, only a month after ticket sales began,
the organizing committee’s ticket manager, Jim McGregor, was charged with theft,
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fraud, and mischief in connection with irregularities in ticket order forms that had been
sent to American buyers. The doctored official Olympic order forms sent payments
directly to McGregor’s company, World Tickets Inc., in U.S. dollars, rather than to the
Olympic Organizers.15 When the housing concern was presented, it was the second time
that the police became involved with investigations of potential illegal action
surrounding the Calgary Games. It appeared as though the World Marketing Agency
double booked rooms and held rooms without deposits even though others had made full
payments for the rooms.16 On February 9, the Toronto Star reported Richard Allen, the
company’s local representative missing.17 The scandal that may have left “hundreds of
spectators stranded without rooms” was also never mentioned again.
The point of interest for these scandals is how quickly the issues became nonexistent in the media once the Games in Calgary started. Canadians were forced to do
their own research as to whether the Lubicon received the land promised to them, and no
spectators came forth complaining about sleeping outside. So how did these issues
dissolve from the public interest and what became of the media emphasis, albeit limited,
to any alternative meanings for, or problemitization of the Games? As was the case,
historically, the media, en masse chose to print material related specifically to the
performance aspect of the spectacle. The Olympic spectacle drew all attention to venues
and athletic performance, particularly the performance of Canadians. Best Ever was both
a government funding paradigm and the foundational distinction that Olympic
organizers coveted from the IOC. Since access to Olympic stories and venues depended
upon restricted access to facilities and athletes, these factors were not lost upon
members of the press. Seven years of social, political, and economic concerns raised by
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the press in the lead-up to every Games were soon discarded for a focus on the spectacle
that played out over sixteen days. Historical precedent demonstrated that discrimination,
political controversy, even death, leading up to the Games had to be pushed aside to
ensure what the spectacle demanded – unequivocal attention to the business at hand.
One journalist remarked: “whatever is said [about the Calgary Games] we know that
beyond the fretful jealousies, the scandals and obscene spending, the Games are about
us at our best, about dreams and dedication we wish we ourselves could live out, for the
first time the Winter Olympics are in Canada…there will be cynicism, but there will be
exhilaration too. The beautiful madness.”18 For two weeks, eyes turned to competition
and competitive context and what that would mean for Canada.
On February 13, 1988, after more than 20 years and 4 attempts to host, the XV
Olympic Games officially began and front page newspapers headlined, “Olympic Fever:
Calgary savours the magic moment ‘and all of Canada lights up with pride.’”19
Newspaper articles across Canada raved about the opening ceremony, described as an
opening “worthy of what many are already saying will be the best-ever Games. 60,000
fans spilled affection down on what should be the strongest team Canada ever has
had.”20 Prime Minister Brian Mulroney stated, “the ceremony will live forever in the
memories of Canadians. I have never seen a ceremony more moving or more impressive
than the one we saw here. Today, the world saw the faces of our people.”21 “Let the
Games begin Canada.”22 With the commencement of the Games vanished the doubts
that Calgary could pull it off and forgotten were the controversies surrounding tickets
and land disputes.
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Allocation of Funds in Promoting Canadian Identity
For the next 16 days, the media focused mainly on the competitions and little
else, again playing strongly on the emotions of spectators and the pride that Canadian
athletes instilled in fans and spectators. However, as Canadian athletes began to fall
short of expectations, the tone changed as papers had few alternatives but to label the
Games, and the performances of their athletes as no more than “disappointments.”
Blame was distributed where possible, excuses were frequent, and reports became
monotonous. However, at the core of the problem was one very simple repetitive theme
- money. Had the appropriate amount of funding been available and had it been
distributed in the best way possible? Were the coaches qualified and do they know how
to properly train individual athletes? What would the future look like for the new multimillion dollar facilities that were built in Calgary? Having the power to manipulate these
concerns for their own purposes, sport leaders ensured that these issues proved
paramount for the future of the Canadian sport system.
The amount of money invested in Calgary for the 1988 Games was, indeed,
extravagant. However, expectations were that the Olympics would generate quite a bit
more profit, and that the economy would be stimulated to a greater degree as a direct
result of the Games. Further, in the long term, Calgary would benefit economically from
the development of winter sport programs and facilities, as reflected in a February 8th
headline in the Toronto Star, “Olympics mean gold for Calgary’s economy.”23
Ultimately, the argument for spending was that Canada as a nation would benefit from
the Games economically, but also through recognition as a winter sport powerhouse.
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The contribution of hosting the spectacle and the investment in the facilities then was to
a form of Canadian nationalism centred around success in winter sports.
The Games were anticipated to cushion the collapse of Calgary’s oil economy
and turn at least a $36 million profit, while leaving behind “a legacy of world-class
sports facilities, and the promotion of this city and Canada to television viewers that will
draw visitors into the next century.”24 The federal government wanted the Calgary
Games to be self-funded, estimating that they would further create about “$1.3 billion
worth of economic activity across Canada and a creation of 27,400 jobs (most of them
temporary).”25 A large part of this billion dollar activity was supposed to be generated
from the $565 million spent on other capital projects that had been largely funded by
federal, provincial, and municipal tax dollars, and were not included in the Games’
profit and loss figures.
As with all previous Olympic Games, the Olympic torch was lit in Greece and
began its journey to Calgary, with 6,520 Canadians carrying it one mile each. Once in
Canada, the route of the torch was within a two hour drive of 90% of Canadians and
thousands watched as the aluminum bowl with its maple handle made its way across the
country. The final cost of the torch relay was about $45 million, including promotional
and staging expenses, of which Petro Can sponsored $5.5 million.26 With this
sponsorship, Petro Can’s gas escalated 2% in price, averaging about $280 million more
for the company. Interestingly, with such a slight increase in gas prices, it is unlikely
that Canadians noticed, raised concerns, or more importantly, were even aware of this
cause of this increase in gas prices. Though this cost was not directly imposed by the
government, it begs the question of how cognizant Canadians were about where and
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when their tax dollars were being spent. Also, the organizers spent an additional $4.5
million to have fireworks and laser shows every night at the Olympics, making the total
almost $50 million for this aspect of the spectacle alone, excluding the cost of opening
and closing ceremonies.27 $15 million of taxpayer money went to “Anti-terrorism forces
on guard,” with a plan that included placing RCMP ski squads on the hills and guard
posts in various locations around the Olympic village. Of this $15 million, $9.5 million
was budgeted by the Calgary police ($5.7 million of which was spent during the Games)
and $5.5 million was spent federally.28
Finally, the facilities built and renovated to make Calgary, as one article stated,
the new “Mount Olympus 88,” carried a price tag of $366 million, paid for through tax
dollars and Games revenue, with the intention that they would form a mighty legacy for
Canadian amateur sport.29 By the time the Games started on February 13th, the new $40
million speed skating facility had already seen 13 new world records set in preliminaries
alone, making it a testament to the magnificent ice and likewise the new $18 million
bobsled facility could finally attract a program to Calgary, especially if Canada’s
Haydenluck delivered a star performance.30 However, as the Games commenced, the
facilities proved to be far less suitable than originally expected, frequently delaying
events due to poor location selection that was frequently prone to drastically fluctuating
weather conditions.
The media came to call the Olympics “the artificial Games: handcuffing
nature.”31 Ultimately, organizers added 2,600 seats to the $97.7 million Saddledome,
spent $60 million on the Olympic Park, $25.3 million on the Nakiska site for alpine ski
events (with a $5 million snow making system so events would be held on schedule),
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$40 million on the Olympic Oval to have controlled ice temperatures, and the $15.4
million Nordic Centre was also serviced by artificial snow making equipment.
Additionally, the Calgary Stampeders McMahon Stadium was fitted with $15.7 million
worth of improvements for opening and closing ceremonies. The Olympic Oval itself
was particularly special. The Vancouver Sun described the Oval as a gold medal tribute
to “man’s eternal determination to improve nature.”32 The Oval was approximately the
size of two football fields, with controlled indoor conditions, eliminating the impact of
wind resistance, and at an elevation of 3,691 metres above sea level. “I think this place
makes the rest of the world jealous,” said speed skater Thibault.33
However, even with additional investments to control conditions at almost the
entire venue, the Games schedule was rearranged due to weather conditions. The
Montreal Gazette critiqued that a “gold medal for short sighted thinking has to go to the
organizers for selecting Mount Allan,”34 since the chosen venues created additional
problems for scheduling and accessibility. Federal Olympic Coordinator Gerry Berger
commented, “I knew the bad weather couldn’t last. These were record winds. We had a
16 day schedule and scheduled events that could be affected so they could be moved.”
Ralph Klein avoided the question of the selection of Mount Allan but added that, “you
can always say if I woulda if I coulda…we’ll have to look at those facilities to find out
where improvements can be made. It’s important that we get to the point where they pay
for themselves.”35
The facilities for drug testing added an additional $1.5 million expense to the
budget for the Games. Foothills Hospital laboratory was fitted with advanced equipment
for drug testing and guarded twenty-four hours a day.36 Also, at a significant but
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necessary $1.9 million the lab ran about 500 tests on medalists and randomly selected
athletes, screening for in excess of 200 substances.37
The basic Sport Canada budget since 1985 had been $55 million a year for both
the 1988 Summer and Winter Olympics, which included, an annual expenditure of $9
million for the sports administrative centre in Ottawa, $5 million for the athlete
assistance program, and $3.5 million for other major projects such as the Canada
Games. The Best Ever program provided an additional $25 million over five years, a
substantial amount of which was allocated to development programs for sports with
minimal presence in Canada (for example, luge). The concern here was that, for a nation
of about 25 million people, this was a considerable amount of money in a time when,
justifiably, one could have argued for more pressing needs such as affordable housing. 38
This section reflects on state funding for the 1988 Calgary Games, the decisions
which directly influenced the direction and role of non-professional sport in Canada. For
Gruneau, power is like a resource, a commodity in the system, and the state is the
mediating central bank within which the circulation and exchange of power proceeds,
and in capitalist societies, such as Canada, this power belongs to the state.39 For Canada,
from a hegemonic perspective, current trends in high performance sport place pressure
on the Canadian government to legitimate itself to capital and to align social provisions
with the accumulation of capital since it has the power to distribute public money.40
Ultimately, the construction of new sites and the spectacle of the Games led to money
accrued solely for the benefit of the government. The point is that Canadians were
seemingly unaware of this because, though the media reported the incredible costs that
were met to create the spectacle of the Winter Games in Calgary, they also worked to
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justify this spending. This was done by the media through reverting consumer attention
toward key aspects of investment, the benefits of which would contribute to the
promotion of Canada as a nation, for example tourist attractions, economic gain, future
sporting facilities, and improved athlete performance, and allowing these factors to
overshadow potential current issues that may be facing Canadians, such as affordable
housing. Utilizing media, the Canadian government in 1988 planted the seed for the
development of Canada as a winter sport nation since the media focused mainly on the
construction and improvement of winter sport facilities for future generations of athletes
and Games, rather than on the costs of these ventures. Ultimately, what was promoted
and reported was that future winter athletes would have optimal opportunities and means
to train and continue to create a Canadian nationalism promoted and strengthened
through success at Winter Olympics.

“Winter Sport” Nationalism and Canadian Performances
In order for this winter-sport nationalism to continue to flourish, Canadian
athletes would have to perform at elite levels with regular podium performances.
However, as was evident in the early stages of the Games, athletes fell short of
expectations in Calgary. Consequently, as the roots for Canadian nationalism and winter
sports were already strong, thanks in large part to hosting the spectacle, the Canadian
government would be able to shed positive light on performances, and garner continued
support in the future.
Despite funding and facilities, the final results for Canadian athletes in Calgary
were somewhat unremarkable. In total, Canada only managed to win five medals, the
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first of which didn`t come until February 20th, one week into the Games, and none of
which were gold, placing the country 13th overall in the medal count. Article after article
commented on the embarrassment of less than stellar Canadian performances at the
Games, “Record skate not good enough for Thibault,”41 “Canadian skiers struggle to
explain poor showing in biggest race; blew chance for home advantage,”42 and “Orser
magnificent – but still a loser,”43 suggesting that the results were disappointing nationwide.
As mentioned, failure makes the future promising. For Sport Canada, the results
were precisely the ideal stepping stone for the future of Canadian sport as athletes had
demonstrated improvement over past competitions. For example, though Thibault’s
skate may not have been good enough to place him on the podium, the article went on to
state that, “the federal government pumped in an additional $30 million to boost the
Canadian performances at the XV Winter Olympic Games and, if you look beyond
medals, it paid off in the 500-metre final at the $40 million dollar Olympic Oval….it
was our Best Ever effort in speed skating.”44 Also, with continued support for athletes
from Sport Canada, coaches were convinced that over time, Canada would see the
results it anticipated, “Keep digging” Canadian ski coach Marty Hall urged;
Nothing comes easy in this league. It’s a matter of building a base and
then keep digging and digging until you strike gold. That’s going to
take money and commitment from Sport Canada. We have that from
(federal) Sports Minister Otto Jelinek. And I’ll tell you something
else: We couldn’t have a better guy in the job right now than Otto. He
knows what it take to be successful at this level. Jelinek took the time
to meet with us personally and we have strong indications that we will
continue to receive solid financial support from Sport Canada. Without
that funding our programs would come to a full stop. It’s vital at this
stage to know we can continue to go forward. We have the programs
and the money; now we need the numbers. It’s up to us to go out and
sell our sport.45
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However, though Jelinek seemed quite positive about the future of Canadian sport, he
had stated that participation would be a major factor in future funding. In 1988, Cross
Country Canada had $1.65 million budget with more than $1 million coming from the
federal government and against these numbers the performances of Canadians appeared
unimpressive.46
Indeed, Sport Canada was, reportedly, not concerned with the results of
Canadian athletes. Canadian Olympic Association spokesperson Jack Lynch commented
that, “people shouldn’t be going out predicting gold medals for Canada from here on in.
A realist saw four medals for Canada and the team is on schedule for this expectation.”47
Director of Sport Canada, Abby Hoffman, claimed that:
The Winter Olympics should put to rest the “destructive” theory that
we are a nation of losers. Despite some losses Canada has already
surpassed its goals here. If you take the medals our athletes have won
to date and divided that number into the total cost, you’d say we didn’t
get our money’s worth in Calgary. Medals count, sure, but if you use
medals as the only yardstick to measure Canada’s performance, you’re
going to get a really skewered perspective. In reality, Canada is still a
second-tier nation in the Winter Olympics. Keeping that in mind, our
progress in Calgary has been exceptional and the money was well
spent. At the Winter Games in Sarajevo four years ago, we placed ten
athletes in the top eight in four sports. In Calgary we’ve had 17
athletes in the top eight in six sports. You’re certainly not a loser in
world class competition when you finish in the top eight. We’ve
improved a helluva lot over our entire past history of Winter Olympics
and I see a fighting spirit here that wasn’t apparent in previous
Games.48
Though many questioned the meagre medal collection, Hoffman continued to
endorse the Canadian system for recruiting and training its Olympic athletes as, in
comparison to East Bloc nations that recruited athletes in grade school and trained them
for the sports where they had the highest likelihood of achieving Olympic success,
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Canadians didn’t limit the freedom of their youngsters.49 One critique was that, for
Canada to follow a similar approach would require massive funding from the
government and, instead, Canadian parents were expected to strain their personal,
financial, resources to provide the coaching and training necessary to bring their
children to the level where government dollars would take over. But Hoffman suggested
that identifying the country’s best medal prospects and directing funding to elite athletes
with better medal results would be a “short-sighted and unacceptable approach to high
performance sports.”50 The article concluded by stating that “Canadians can’t have it
both ways, either we make a total commitment or we accept the fact that our system will
produce a certain number of outstanding athletes, but never as many as East Bloc
countries.” The obvious difference in performance between Canada and East Bloc
nations was apparent. Fort Branch Legion 264 former Sergeant Major George Clarke
said, “We’re doing our best under the circumstances. But the lack of training is really
showing. The Europeans are doing well because they are better trained. But all of these
new facilities we’ve built for these Games should help us in the future.”51 However,
there is no escaping the incredible cost to taxpayers of sending 117 Olympians to
compete in Calgary, with few podium victories to show for it.
Minister of Sport Otto Jelinek redirected blame away from Best Ever to the
provincial level, the school system, and the attitudes of athletes:
Physical education in our schools is a disgrace to Canada. There’s no
lack of motivation among our Olympians, but I feel too many of our
younger athletes are being spoon-fed. Some athletes expect everyone
to do everything for them while they’re not willing to make the
personal commitment it takes to be champions. It’s an attitude that
really annoys me. In the past athletes had to take some initiative. It’s a
fine balancing act between government funding and still leaving room
for athletes to make a personal contribution, show the discipline
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required to succeed and be self-motivated. When my sister and I
represented Canada, my parents paid for everything, the travel
expenses, ice time, everything. I’m not saying we should go back to
that system, which caused financial hardships for many families, but I
do think young athletes should realize there’s no free ride. They have
to be willing to make personal sacrifices too.52
Again, since 1985, the minister of Fitness and Amateur sport noted $55 million a year
spent on the Winter and Summer Olympic Games program with an additional $25
million for the Best Ever program aimed at top performances in Calgary. Jelinek went
on to state that, “It is unbelievable that physical education is not compulsory through
grade school and into high school. It has been shown that the fitness of Canadians starts
to deteriorate when they reach their early teens.”53 Interestingly, physical education
teachers have used this argument in the past, but nothing has ever been done about it at
the decision making level.54 However, “[e]very time someone sees something wrong in
society they blame the education system. Every group who wants something done turns
to the schools and we just don’t have the facilities or the manpower to please everyone,”
countered Ann Vanstone, chairperson of the Metro Toronto Board of Education. “An
improved physical education program would depend “totally” on massive funding
increases for new facilities and instructor training,” added Caroline Digiovanni
chairperson of Metro Special School Board. Abby Hoffman commentated that,
“European coaches have been hired who simply cannot believe the lack of discipline
and commitment among a number of their athletes, although they are being funded by
Sport Canada. Like Mr. Jelinek, I’m very disappointed in the attitude of these athletes,
but it is up to the sport governing bodies to identify such athletes and take appropriate
action.”55 Evidently, in cases where the sport system failed to fulfill the needs of the
state, blame was directed to the athletes for not producing. This raised the question of
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athlete accountability in the Canadian sport system, which eventually became policy
focus for the future.

The Future of “Best Ever”
Best Ever was largely called into question following the Calgary Games, raising
the issue of whether funding would be made available for the program to develop
athletes for the 1992 Games. If not, the funds already poured into Best Ever would have
been wasted. Media messages to the Canadian public were saturated with the idea that if
Canada wanted results, long-term funding would be a necessity.56
After the Games, a rift between Sport Canada and the COA surfaced. While
Sport Canada wanted to move away from athletic elitism, directing more funds to grassroots programs, the COA directed its efforts toward quality rather than quantity. When
the XV Winter Games came to an end, both parties claimed a “Best Ever” performance
for Canada (5 medals and 19 top eight finishes). With this said, Jack Lynch of the COA
stated that the future of Canada in Olympic Games wouldn’t be this easy and that Sport
Canada was working on emotions when it claimed that five medals and 19 top finishes
would result in eight or nine medals and 25-30 top finishes in 1992. He argued that the
key to the future of outstanding performances was to examine the performance of
developing athletes who would reach their prime medal potential in four years.57
In the near future, Minister Jelinek was expected to present a reduced budget for
cabinet approval and reiterated that it would cut back on sports lacking mass
participation – certain sports (including bobsled, luge, ski jump, biathlon, and cross
country skiing), did not have the total number of athletes to warrant the support they had
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received for 1988. Abby Hoffman added that money directed to sending athletes from
these sports to World Cup events in Europe could be put to better use building stronger
bases in Canada. Jelinek also commented that, performances were not as important and
that federal government funding for amateur sports would be less dependent on
Canada’s showing, than it would be on participation, stating that “there has been
speculation that there will be a decrease in federal funding after these Games but I can
tell you now future funding will not be tied to our Olympic results.”58
On February 25, 1988, Jelinek promised a dramatic overhaul of Canadian athlete
funding, steering away from dedicating almost all of its amateur sports funding ($50
million annually) to a few gifted athletes and, instead, designing a new program aimed
at getting as many youngsters in to as many sports as possible. This meant federal funds
would be spent on coaching facilities and national development programs and the COA
would be expected to distribute some of the money it earned into sports programming,
particularly for high performance athletes subsidized by Ottawa.59 Additionally, Jelinek
vowed to make high-school physical education courses compulsory. Hoffman added that
studies would be conducted for particular sports to assess whether or not they had
enough competitors to qualify for funding, meaning, programs with no grassroots sports
would receive no Olympic funding.60 Additionally, the success and future of Best Ever,
specifically as Canada’s high performance sport funding program, as well as the
importance placed on performances were largely dependent upon: 1) whether the
Mulroney government remained in office and 2) whether or not Sport Canada’s
emphasis on participation and the COA’s emphasis on medal potential athletes could
become Canada’s combined objective going forward.
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The Legacy of the Spectacle in Contributing to Winter Sport Nationalism
It was all optimism in Calgary prior to the start of the Games. Although 380,000
tickets were still unsold, a record 1.5 million had already been sold. Calgary Mayor
Ralph Klein stated that the Olympics would leave the city with a new industry, and
Calgary would become a world sports centre.61 However, the media commented that
what would be needed to make these Games a glorious happening and not just another
overblown sporting event, was Canadian medal winners, preferably of a golden hue,
“Canada was the first host nation not to win a gold medal in Montreal and a repeat of
that would be humiliating.”62 That gold medal never came. And yet, though the Games
proved disappointing for Canada in regards to medal count, and the major concern for
Canadians was the lack of results by the home team’s athletes, Calgary did set a new
standard for the Games. Most impressively, for the first time in Winter Olympic history,
the spiralling costs and huge deficits that had been the legacy of almost all prior Games
before did not significantly affect these Games, nor did political boycotts and terrorism.
All in all, the Games were a commercial success as Calgary’s Tourist and Convention
Bureau estimates the Games attracted more than 250,000 guests who spent up to $50
million.
While the Olympic Games were widely labelled a success, many opposed both
the large amount of public money that was being spent while social spending was being
cut and the authoritarian ways in which the Olympic Organizing Committee avoided
subjects of debate (particularly in regards to the selection of facility location, which
ultimately proved to be a costly decision).63 Additionally, studies have shown that very
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few small businesses considered the Olympics to have led to opportunities for their
business in the long-run, while other studies found that the impact of the Olympics on
awareness of Calgary as a tourist destination diminished within a few years of the
Games, demonstrating that the hosting of the Games did not necessarily lead to
sustained economic growth.64
In short, total funding for the Games was above what anyone had seen to date
and yet, there were few who protested the amounts of money invested into them because
the government, through the messages propagated through the media, had naturalized
this investment. In terms of nationalism, the sport spectacle created at the 1988 Olympic
Games provided a common reference point for all Canadians, building the notion of
imagined communities as discussed earlier. Imagined communities create solitary bonds
between members of a nation, even though they may never meet one another, through
the emotional ties created by events such as supporting the same Olympic team. In 1988,
the organizing committee played on the historical nostalgia necessary for creating this
bond through the torch relay, opening ceremonies, and the overall spectacle of the
Games, while the media helped to relay the message of common references to a broader
population. In this sense, the Calgary Games were in fact a huge success. The
nationalism the government hoped to generate was clearly evident. Canadians were
encouraged to believe the investment in the Games was necessary, as they contributed to
Canada’s identity as a winter sport nation. In the end, performances were justified
through Sport Canada stating that this was precisely what was expected, and if the
Canadian team was to continue to get better and to be a central component of Canadian
national identity, long term investment was needed. In the case of Calgary 1988, ‘losing’
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simply justified spending more money. Conclusively, not only was the generation of this
spectacle met with praise by the media, but the government and organizing committee
generated support for increased funding in the future.
The subsequent year, in 1989, the Mulroney government was re-elected. After
having displayed what he, and many others, frequently described as the “Best Ever”
Games, it is likely that this became a strong part of his platform. In the end, the media,
through the influence and comments made by organizing officials, Games officials,
sports ministers, and members of the federal government, constructed a version of
Canadian nationalism that, at this point, was not so concerned with winning medals, but
took pride in their successful staging of Olympic Games and playing host to show the
rest of the world what Canada can contribute to the winter sport environment. On
February 22nd, the Vancouver Sun wrote, “Olympic Success is all in the way you count
it. Counting only medals is too mean-spirited, too tough on our athletes, too…unCanadian!”65 Otto Jelinek stated that this had been Canada’s best ever finish and that in
the future, Canada would eventually join the winter sporting elite, which would likely be
attributed to the facilities built in Calgary,66 the expectation was that top eight finishes
would translate to top five by the following year, and top three in subsequent years.
Supporting this narrative, the media had already played its role in ensuring that
Canadians were aware that, due to the facilities, performances by athletes would
gradually improve. On February 28, the Montreal Gazette applauded Canadian efforts,
Take a bow Calgary you did yourself proud, take a bow Canadian
athletes, you did us all proud. The Games were a success on every
count, we showed the world a city with spectacular scenery,
impressive know-how and distinct flavour and friendliness. Canada
was not a big medal winner but the Games are about more than
medals, they bested their personal best, stretched themselves to new

68

limits, and showed they are contenders in the highest levels of
international competitions. Their performance should be an inspiration
to young Canadians dreaming of excellence in winter sports – from
one Canadian city to another, well done Calgary.67
This ultimately lends support to the way in which nostalgia and a sense of community
can be positioned, through media narratives, to garner support for investment in future
Games. The 1988 legacy of Olympic spectacle contributed directly to the hegemonic
function of sport for those in positions of power, influencing the populace into
supporting their ideals. The final message of the Games was clear in this sense,
successfully persuading the nation that decisions were being made in their best interests
and for the long-term benefit of the nation.
However, though it appeared as though the majority of Canadians were in
support of the expenditures of the 1988 Calgary Games, future Olympic spectacles
would not be as easy to sell, as Canada would not be playing host again in the
foreseeable future. Therefore, in order to secure future support, Sport Canada, the COA,
and the federal government would have to approach future Games with caution, as the
medal count would likely become increasingly important when it was not overshadowed
by the spectacle of hosting.
Matti Goksoyr determined various factors that needed to be fulfilled in order for
a link to be created between sport and nationalism for a given nation. One of these
factors in identifying sport as intrinsic to the values and identity of a nation is on the
basis of how well that nation performs in the sport during international competition and
whether the nation has received international merit in that sport(s).68 Ultimately, since
the performances of athletes in 1988 were at best mediocre, in order for a winter-sport
nationalism to thrive in Canada, the power groups, i.e. the government, COA and Sport
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Canada, would have to revert more attention toward the Canadian sport program itself,
in order to ensure athlete success and to continue to build on the nationalism generated
in Calgary. Due to lack of performances, 1988 left Canada with evidence that changes in
the system might be necessary, and although we see the beginnings of this at the end of
the decade, the lack of measurable success in Calgary provided an opportunity for an era
of policy development through the 1990s.

Summary
With respect to emergent themes analyzed throughout this dissertation, the
legacy of the 1988 Games rested in the facilities that were constructed in order to host
the Olympics. These facilities continued to create changes in Canada’s sport system
over the next two decades as they would be accessible to generations of athletes for
training for future Games. With respect to funding and support, the money invested to
host the Calgary Games was the highest Canada had seen to date and there is some
evidence to suggest that this resulted in an increase, albeit temporary, in tourism and the
city’s construction and hospitality sectors of the economy. For nationalism, this era and
the spectacle surrounding the hosting of the Games created the foundation for the
development of a national pride through its organization and extravagant representation
of feelings of “Canadianness” that linked national identity to winter sport. Finally, the
fourth and final theme, challenges faced by Canada at the Olympics, was evident in
1988 with the events that threatened to characterize the Games at its early stages.
However, thanks in large part to the orchestration of spectacle that overpowered these
concerns, the media were quickly able to overshadow these challenges in favour of the
positive effects of hosting the Winter Games.
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CHAPTER THREE – An Era of Accountability

As a result of the attention and excitement generated by hosting the Calgary
Olympics, the decade following was marked by significant changes in Canada’s sport
system. Following the perceived athletic performance shortcomings of the 1988 Calgary
Games, the 1990s were characterized by extensive policy development. Sport
organizations were unified around a single end goal – winning. In the wake of the 1988
Games, sport policy in Canada became a question of best approach and how to
galvanize support for the increased systemic attention to Olympic-related sports,
training, athletes’ needs, and an accountability framework. Canadian nationalism,
expressed through sport, had to be bent in this direction of course to support public
funding. The potential was there in regards to talent of the athletes, the funding was
available, and, thanks in large part to Calgary, the facilities for optimal training were
now also available. Consequently, this suggested that the next step to success in winter
sports was to frame policy development in a way that would ensure that investment was
strategic and distributed. For this reason, the 1990s were an era of increased
organizational capacity, and a reassessment of the positive and negative aspects of the
Best Ever Program. New policies made sport organizations, managers, and athletes alike
increasingly accountable for their performances. Policy-makers sought to improve and
align the various sectors of Canada’s sport system. In the 10-year period following the
1988 Calgary Games, 19 sport-related studies by the Canadian government and other
organizations emerged, highlighted by the 1988 Toward 2000: Building Canada’s Sport
System Report, the 1990 Commission of Inquiry into the Use of Drugs and Banned
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Practices Intended to Increase Athletic Performance which eventually led to the Dubin
Inquiry, the 1995 Sport Canada Sport Funding and Accountability Framework, and the
1998 Mills Report.1 Overall, policy development led to increased importance placed on
the opinions and individual needs of athletes, and the distribution of responsibility for
athletic performances to the various organizations directly responsible for the athletes.
Similarly, though the funding available to support athletes still had its shortcomings, it
was improving, and this resulted in an increased emphasis on winning. The 1990s
became an era of more professionalized, comprehensive sport structures and the media
became the mode of expression for the expectations of an enhanced sport system. Gold
medal performances heralded the success of the new sport policies and the press aligned
medal achievements with narratives of national pride. Journalists supported the new
expectations of sport policy-makers by translating them to Canadian expectations. At the
same time, athletic performance became more tightly woven in such narratives with
national fervour.

Canadian Nationalism in the Aftermath of the 1980s
Although the press characterized the Calgary Olympics as successful in many
respects, the performances of Canada’s elite athletes were represented as a national
disappointment. Canada had four years until the next Winter Games in Albertville,
France to address its Olympic performance shortcomings. Headlines prior to the 1992
Games read, “Sporting Chance - shut out of the gold in Calgary in 1988, the Canadian
Olympic contingent hope – and is expected – to do better at Albertville’s Winter Games.
A heartwarming winter on the slopes, rinks, trails and oval tracks of North America and
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Europe has made Canadians optimistic about the Albertville Olympics.”2 For the press,
hosting the Winter Games without gold medal performances begged the question of
what precisely was Canada’s place in international winter sports. The Canadian
government, the principle public funding source for the Calgary Games, took stock of
the priorities in Canada’s high performance sport system.
In 1988, the government of Canada created a task force, commissioned by
Minister of State for Fitness and Amateur Sport, Jean Charest. The task force report that
resulted, Toward 2000: Building Canada’s Sport System, provided clear
recommendations intended to guide Canadian national sport policy into the next
millennium, which became the most achievement-oriented document for high
performance sport to date.3 Though the document made note that the Canadian high
performance system was still in its infancy, it stated that, in order to be successful at the
level of international sport, a “‘mature high performance sport system’ required
professionalized coaching, improved performances by Canadian athletes, better facilities
and a stronger financial commitment from the private and public sectors.” The report
recommended prioritizing sports, a fully integrated system of athlete development, and
promoting “the concept of sport excellence such that achievements in high performance
sport will be recognized and valued by the Canadian public.”4 Toward 2000, spoke
directly in this instance to engaging the nation, linking the goals of high performance
sport to Canadian spectator interests. Engagement meant promoting a cultural cohesion
of shared interests, connecting international competitiveness and achievement to
national sentiment.

75

Of interest here is the emphasis on better facilities. One can recall the millions of
dollars invested into the facilities built for the Calgary Winter Games and the
justification that improved facilities would lead to improved performances. The
intention of the infrastructure built for the Calgary Games was that they would become
world class training facilities for future generations of athletes. For Canada, this was
accurate for some sports but not others. After winning gold in Nagano in 1998, speedskater Catriona Lemay Doan related her successes directly to the Calgary facilities: “the
oval (in Calgary) has helped to develop our team. It’s brought the level of skating up so
high. The level of skater coming up behind us is incredible.”5 But following the Calgary
Games, skater Gaetan Boucher expressed concerns that other nations were catching up
to Canada’s monopoly in short track speed skating and that the Albertville Games of
1992 might offer one last harvest for Olympic medals for Canada in the sport, “see, the
problem is those other nations are doing a better job of development than Canada is.”6
Additionally, there were sports that suffered through the 1990s. 1992 Cross
country ski coach Laurent Roux commented that, “the government doesn’t seem to
believe in elite sport. They hand out money, but the athletes are still below the poverty
line.”7 Canada entered the 1992 Olympic Games with what was widely considered its
weakest alpine entry in over 20 years, with coaches and athletes alike expressing
concerns about the future of the sport in Canada. Intriguingly, former downhill coach
Heinz Stohl went so far as to blame the Games in Calgary for the shortcomings of the
alpine teams, “I think everybody was gearing up for Calgary. After that, I think
everybody lost their motivation. The money was gone and everybody was sort of burned
out.”8 In agreement, in 1992, Jack Sasseville (who would eventually become the cross-
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country ski coach in 1994), predicted that cross country skiing had reached a crossroads
in North America, and would die out within the next decade.9 Indeed, results for alpine
sports gave Canadians little to be proud of and even less hope for the future. In 1992,
the Canadian ski jumpers did not win any medals and tensions between coaches,
players, and even the COA were evident. In the December leading up to the Games, ski
jumping coach Danilo Pudgar stated that the team didn’t even deserve to compete in the
Olympics and the COA snubbed jumper Colin Capel for making the qualifying
standards three days after the deadline.10 The athletes made it clear that they felt last on
the list of priorities for the Games and felt they were not getting the support they needed
from either their coach or the Canadian Olympic Association: “coach hurt the program
and hurt us as individuals – as for COA? An extra ski jumper isn’t going to break the
COA budget.”11 Ultimately, they were right. For the first time in 66 years, when the
Olympics came to Lillehammer, Norway in 1994, Canada was not represented by a ski
jumping team. After the millions of dollars spent to fund Calgary with the assurance that
this would lead to long-term results, results did not follow for some sports. The press of
course picked up on these tensions and played a role in questioning the strategy of the
sports organizations and the federal government. In fact, one article made it clear that
the COA was not to blame for the lack of representation in ski-jumping in 1994, “Don’t
blame the COA. Blame the officials at Ski Jumping Canada, who ignored development
during the long past glory days of Horst Bulau and Steve Collins.”12 Policy changes
required a narrative of support, the articulation of a new nationalism to shift the focus of
Canadians to support the new policy changes.
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The Dubin Inquiry
Multi-million dollar facilities, funded primarily by federal money and
performance levels that fell well short of expectations pressed the government to address
the national sport system. In the years between the 1988 Calgary Games and the 1992
Albertville Games in France, Best Ever funding patterns were sustained for the most
part. However, it was becoming increasingly clear, particularly as demonstrated through
the Toward 2000 task force report, that the government of Canada’s emphasis on medal
performances was playing a lead role in the push for policy development. In fact, later
that same year, at the Summer Games in Seoul in 1988, the image of Canadian sport
changed drastically on the international stage. Canadian world renowned sprinter Ben
Johnson won the gold medal in the 100-metre sprint, only to be stripped of the medal
after testing positive for performance-enhancing substances. The scandal raised
questions about the pressure placed on athletes to win, and, for Canada, whether or not
the nation had the means to support elite athletes. Following the events of the 1988
Summer Games, the Canadian government, Sport Canada, and the Canadian Track and
Field Association were quick to establish inquiries and punishments for the guilty
parties associated with Ben Johnson’s use of performance enhancing substances. The
1990 Dubin Inquiry, a national apology for the scandal, criticized the policies of both
the Canadian federal government and amateur sports associations. Justice Dubin
asserted,
The use of banned performance-enhancing drugs is cheating, which is
the antithesis of sport. The widespread use of such drugs has
threatened the essential integrity of sport and is destructive of its very
objectives. It also erodes the ethical and moral values of athletes who
use, endangering their mental and physical welfare while demoralizing
the entire sport community. I have endeavored to define the true
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values of sport and restore its integrity so that it can continue to be an
important part of our culture, unifying and giving pleasure to
Canadians while promoting their health and vitality. I have also sought
to protect and advance the interests of Canadian athletes and have
endeavoured to obtain for them a healthy athletic climate in which
they can compete honourably in the future, both nationally and
internationally, in accordance with the true objectives of sport.13
If the lack of success by Canadian athletes at home had not already done so, the
scandal threatened to weaken Canadian sporting identity even more. As a result, the
aftermath of this scandal led to the first important group established in Canada to tackle
drug use in sport. Described in newspapers as probably, “the most outstanding
organization of its type in the world,” the newly established Canadian Anti-Doping
Organization’s board of directors included former Supreme Court Justice Willard Estey,
Dr. Roger Jackson, director of the Sport Medicine Centre at the University of Calgary
and former head of the Canadian Olympic Association, and Dr. Margaret Somerville,
director of medicine, ethics and law at McGill University. Board chairperson Andrew
Pipe stated,
I think when you consider the skills and expertise and sensitivities of
these individuals, one couldn’t hope for a group of more distinguished
individuals. John Wooden, the great UCLA coach, used to say, ‘Be
quick, but never hurry.’ We very carefully recruited the members of
the board and we’re delighted they’ve all accepted. The new antidoping organization, which has a budget of $2 million-plus, plans to
hold its first board of directors meeting in March in Ottawa.14
However, cause for concern was the placement of guilt and burden that came
from the inquiry and subsequent establishment of the Canadian Anti-Doping
Organization, later recast as the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA). Former Olympian
Bruce Kidd highlighted the ways in which the inquiry avoided a discussion of Canada’s
collective responsibility for what happened in Seoul:
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The focus on who did what and knew what in the Dubin Inquiry
served to deflect attention from the extent to which Ben Johnson and
the other Canadian throwers and weight-lifters who had been caught
out on drug tests were products of the system we established and the
messages we consistently gave them…it is not that Ben Johnson is a
victim. Rather, he and his entourage, like the other Canadian athletes
who have been suspended for drug offences, are products of a
Canadian high-performance sport system whose discourse and reward
structures are entirely oriented towards winning.15
Indeed, the Canadian elite sport system was based upon financially rewarding the best
athletes; those on the cusp, received less or no funding, leaving them more vulnerable to
the lure of doping in a highly competitive environment. According to Macintosh and
Whitson, the Ben Johnson scandal opened the eyes of Canadians to the fact that, “what
is good in sport, what we enjoy about sport in our own lives and our own communities,
is distorted by the clear message of ‘win or else,’” and although the inquiry created
resistance to the capitalist aspects of sport by attempting to remove the narrow focus in
winning, the process was still guided towards an increasingly more competitive
trajectory, focusing nationalism on winning and rationalizing the whole highperformance sport system.16 Throughout the second half of the 20th century, the
Canadian sport narrative gradually became so strongly saturated with messages of
winning and the importance of gold medals that those athletes who were not competitive
had few options apart from quitting or doping, particularly when it came to maintaining
the financial support they were receiving from the federal government and private sector
sponsorships. From a theoretical perspective, the Ben Johnson scandal was also an
opportune moment to reinforce the need for high-performance sport funding. The
hegemonic influence of high performance sport managers steered normative values
towards the positive cultural benefits, indeed the national benefits, of winning on the
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international stage. The Dubin Inquiry did not relieve the pressure on elite athletes. If
anything, they required more support to be competitive. Olympic downhiller Podivinsky
captured these pressures, stating: “as an athlete in Canada, you’re making 15 a day,
(referring to the 450 monthly stipend the majority receive from the government) other
than that, there’s nothing. They expect us to be great ambassadors to other countries. I
mean, on 15 a day, you can’t even buy yourself clothes. Hopefully, that will improve.”17
In order to stay competitive, he stated, “we will not only have to devote enormous
resources to high-performance sport, resources which can only come from other areas of
social expenditure. We will also need to go about the production of high-performance
athletes in the ways it is done in those countries that routinely make the top eight, and
we will have to subordinate many aspects of Canadian social policy and many aspects of
Canadian sport culture to this purpose.”18 Macintosh and Whitson wrote that Canadians
were wise enough to be unwilling to pay this price in the future, and that Sport Canada
and the Canadian government should instead favour a system that pays more attention to
equity, personal accomplishment, and ethical issues.19

Inclusion and Cohesion: Necessities for Nationalism
The three Olympic Games that preceded the new millennium lent strong support
to the idea that Canada did in fact have the talent required to make an impact on the
international sports scene. This again provided the federal government with a
rationalization to increase funding for athletes. The impetus for these policy and
spending shifts was the Dubin Inquiry, which had brought the sport system of the 1970s
and 1980s “crashing down.”20 The Inquiry led to policy discussions surrounding values
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in the Canadian sport system, the role that the federal government should play in high
performance sport, and whether a narrower focus on core sports might result in a better
return on government investment while reducing public spending. In 1995, a new
federal government policy was released, outlining criteria for funding eligibility.21 The
intention of the policy was to reduce the number of sport organizations that would
receive federal funding and focus on sports determined to have the greatest value to
Canadians. In 1996, the Sport Funding and Accountability Framework (SFAF) was fully
implemented whereby,
national sport (NSO) and multi-sport\service organizations (MSO) had
to indicate their achievements and specific program objectives as well
as how these aligned with larger social policy objectives established
by government with respect to improving access and opportunity for
underserved groups, an athlete-centred focus, harassment and abuse,
athlete appeals, bilingual policies and anti-doping policies.22
As a result, from 1994 to SFAF to 1997, funding directed to NSOs and MSOs decreased
by approximately $15 million.
Understanding the SFAF provides important context for the introduction of the
Mills Report of 1998. One requirement for eligibility for sport funding stated clearly that
services from sport organizations were to be provided equally in both official Canadian
languages, highlighting a repetitive theme from the 1992, 1994, and 1998 Winter
Olympic Games -- what was the role of Quebec and French-speaking Canadians in the
sport system?
The first Winter Games of this decade, Albertville, France 1992, saw a dramatic
shift in the landscape of the world begging the question in Canada about its own future.
On February 5, the front of the Toronto Star sports pages headlined, “Will Canada have
Quebec at ’94 Games?”23 Since 1988, when the world last gathered for the Winter
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Games, Europe in particular had undergone an incredible transformation. The article
argued that,
The Cold War at the cold Games is dead, and you can’t tell the nations
without a scorecard or a political scientist. The Soviet Union no longer
exists, except on the jackets of some Russian competitors - who are
wearing the old CCCP because the union didn’t break up officially
until Jan 1 and the rubles for the gear were already in the mail. The
Russians have joined with four republics from the Commonwealth of
Independent States to form the Unified Team, which probably won’t
even make it until the Summer Games because Ukraine is hot to strike
out as a solo act. The Baltics, of course, already have. The Unified
Team will march under the Olympic flag and when its athletes win
gold medals, they will be serenaded by Ode to Joy by the old Russian
composer, Ludwig van Beethoven. Speaking of Germany, there is only
one now. The Berlin Wall sits in souvenir chunks on mantelpieces,
and a nation whose vital statistics were 17 million citizens and 43 gold
medals at Winter Games from 1956 to 1988 has been absorbed into
what was the old world order, which shows you how confusing it can
be. There are now three countries representing the one nation that was
host to the Olympics before Calgary, Yugoslavia. Slovenia and
Croatia have sent teams and the husk of the strife-torn country is also
here. To call the XVI Olympic Winter Games is to adopt a cheerfully
western pose, especially considering a Balkan civil war will be
marching in the opening ceremonies Saturday. Of course there is
another referendum to consider. It is pencilled in for October in
Quebec unless Premier Robert Bourassa can slalom around it, which is
his best alpine discipline. He is the most agile of Canadian political
athletes, but one day the people of his province are going to vote on
constitutional options. Given the warp speed with which the world has
transmogrified and the flow of nationalism in Quebec, it is possible
Albertville will be the last time Quebec is part of the Canadian
Olympic Team. By Lillehammer in 1994, Quebec might not only have
its own semblance of a country, but its own national Olympic
committee, its own flag, its own anthem, its own fleur-de-lis
uniform.24
Of course, the separation of Quebec from Canada did not occur; however, the concern
was very real at that time and throughout the 1990s.
The Games of 1992 raised the issue of patriotism in Canada. In a broader
context, the decade after Calgary was an era for defining Canadian society. Amidst the
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international changes and scandals that threatened to plague the nation, the Canadian
press represented a Canada that was very concerned about its image, globally. This was
evident in comments from short-track speed-skater Sylvie Daigle from Quebec, fourtime member of the Olympic team:
I’m not following politics. I suppose that’s a weakness on my part.
Now Quebec is part of Canada, and I’m not going to dump on Canada.
They’ve been paying me for almost 20 years. But I skate for myself, I
don’t think I’d feel differently if it were Quebec or Canada on my
back. I don’t think it would be an additional motivation for me to
compete again if Quebec had its own team. When you go to compete
for Canada, you don’t always feel you’re part of one country. The
States, they see their flag and they go on their knees and place their
hand over their heart. I don’t think many of our athletes, French or
English, feel that way about Canada. Maybe some do. Maybe they feel
they’re going to their countries first of all, but I don’t think we have
the same sense of country Americans do.25
During the 1994 Winter Games in Lillehammer, French-Canadian politician
Pierre Cadieux attracted attention for commenting about the discrimination towards
French athletes in English newspapers and the “flagrant cases of discrimination” on
national sports teams.26 The backlash caused by those comments emanated from both
the newspapers and the COA. Newspaper journalists defended themselves, stating that
any negative comments were directed to both English and French speaking athletes who
did not perform as expected, regardless of background. The Toronto Star on February
21st wrote,
Phony comments not fit to print – Speaking from his hotel suite here
in one of the world’s most exclusive winter resorts, Canada’s minister
of sport called on the nation to rally as one behind our athletes during
the closing days of the 16th Winter Olympics. The fact is that any
Canadian competitor who has given a good account of himself or
herself in France this month has been praised lavishly in print. The
ones who have been panned are professional athletes, developed at no
little cost to Canadian taxpayers, who have failed to perform
respectably. They have not been giving all for their country. Here are
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the matters the honorable minister should be concerned about: whether
Canadian citizens are getting reasonable value for the money they’re
spending on sport – or whether the time is at hand to throw some of
the excess baggage overboard.”27
COA officials also refuted that French speaking athletes were discriminated against on
national teams. Carol Anne Letheran, COA president denied Cadieux’ assertions: “from
a team selection perspective, there is no discrimination against any athlete. The criteria
for selection is set as much as four years in advance of a Games. They are voted on by a
board of directors, and there are representative of all sports.”28 Letheran also said the
“COA seeks a linguistic balance in its Games mission staffs so all athletes are dealt with
in the language of their choice” and Director of Communications Frank Ratcliffe
followed that NSOs “take the best athletes, the athletes who make the selection criteria.
The province the athletes are from or their language are not considered in the least.”29
Following the performances at those Games, the animosity and resentment of
Canadians to what they contrastingly believed was special treatment of French-speaking
athletes was clear. On February 28th, an entire page devoted to letters written to the
Toronto Star expressed anger towards Quebec athletes:
Quebec didn’t have an Olympic Team – On February 22nd The Star
gave a laurel for five ‘Quebecers’ who won medals in the Olympics.
Quebec did not send a team to the Olympics, Canada did, and those
athletes won as members of the Canadian team. Yet no mention was
made by your laurel-writer of Canadian team membership for those
athletes. Until the day arrives that Quebec pays for and sends its own
team to the Olympics, please respect the rest of Canadians by
identifying members of our national team as Canadians30 wrote reader
Richard Lockhart of Toronto.
A closet separatist? - Hey! Did Quebec separate while I wasn’t
looking? On February 22nd you awarded a laurel to the Canadian gold
medal winning short track speed skating team, who set a world record
at the 1992 Olympic Games in Albertville, France. Fair enough. But
you described them as “Quebecers”. As if to emphasize the point, you
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went on to describe our silver medal winner in the men’s 1000 meter
speed skate as a Quebecer. Is there a closet separatist at One Yonge
St?31 wrote Claude Stewart of Toronto.
For Canada, the situation did not improve leading up to 1998. At a Nagano
Games send-off party for athletes, the COA received heavy scrutiny for its lack of
French-speaking representation:
Francophone flap – Quebec athletes lucky to get ‘bonne chance’ at
Canadian send-off party. The Bloc Quebecois has a point. When the
Canadian Olympic Association staged a rousing and patriotic (sort of)
send-off for its athletes here at Canada House Thursday night, the
event of yesterday’s glittering opening ceremonies, French Canadians
probably had a good right to feel insulted. So were people with any
sense of good taste. No more than 5 per cent of the evening was
spoken in French and a good-luck video featured almost entirely
English spoken. The national figures interviewed naturally enough
spoke English. But there was a definite lack of French-speaking
celebrities, particularly when the message was always along the lines
of “Do us proud. We’re all behind you.” In Ottawa yesterday, Heritage
Minister Sheila Copps told the House of Commons she is not happy
that barely any French was used in introducing Canada’s athletes to
the media at the Olympics. Copps agreed with the Bloc Quebecois
when MPs complained English was almost exclusively used and the
French was badly spoken. The Bloc said it shows disrespect for
francophones. Outside the Commons, Copps said francophone athletes
have had great success at the Winter Olympics and that needs to be
recognized in the way such events are handled. “I think it is an
embarrassment for the COC. I think the Olympic committee could do
a better job in representing the country in the same way that the
athletes are doing right now.” Again, some Canadians didn’t seem to
empathize with the situation. Glen Noble of Toronto wrote the
newspapers saying, “Quebec tastes own medicine – So, the Bloc
Quebecois is upset over the lack of French used to introduce the
Canadian Olympic athletes in a good-luck send-off video. This from a
province with language police and no English on traffic and highway
signs? Give me a break!32
Evidently, the separation of French and English athletes required attention as it
posed a threat to national unity in Canada, particularly because French athletes were so
successful in winter-sports and therefore contributed immeasurably to this form of
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Canadian nationalism. Though the SFAF was quick to highlight the concerns over
bilingual sport policy, it was not until the late 1990s and the pre-Nagano ceremony
incident that clear steps were taken to mend the issues and inequalities in the sport
system created through language barriers.

National Pride Re-defined
Between the 1992 and 1998 Winter Games, Canadian performances at the
Games improved. The press took many opportunities to link victory with increased
national pride, simultaneously ramping up expectations for success. Success was not
possible without financial and infrastructural support. At the conclusion of the 1992
Games, the Toronto Star read, “Olympic tally simply the best – 7 medals for Canada
outshine 1932 record – Oh Canada-what a performance! – the Olympic flame faded
yesterday in Albertville, France, but a wonderful glow remains over Canada’s team as it
celebrates this country’s greatest harvest of Winter Games medals ever. Canadians won
seven medals in all-two gold, three silver and two bronze. That matches Canada’s best
Winter Olympic medal haul.”33 Not surprisingly, prior to the 1994 Games, hopes were
high that Canadians could and would perform even better,
Golden opportunity – confident Canadians head for Norway looking
like world beaters – an Olympic trip, like the one currently under way,
used to be a tad embarrassing for a Canadian scribe… Happily,
everything was different this week, as the Canadians arrived in
Norway for the 17th Winter Olympics. There was a spring in their
stride, or maybe swagger would be a better word. They were
brimming with fully justified confidence for this is the strongest and
most versatile team ever to represent the Great White North at one of
these international sporting festivals. – there are 8 world champions
going into these Games – seven medals seems modest – the grand
total: a dozen, maybe a baker’s dozen, putting us where we ought to
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be, among the world’s best in those activities where low temperatures
are a prerequisite.34
In just four years, the national press shifted the athletic performance narrative from
shameful to world-beating swagger. With high expectations came high levels of
patriotism and confidence for the athletes:
Games garb helps spark Olympic fever outbreak – flashy new outfits
fill team members with confidence. ‘I put on the jacket and I didn’t
want to take it off. I didn’t think it would be any big deal just putting
on our colours and stuff. But it was so much of a different feeling than
I’ve felt before. I’ve been at the world juniors. You get that sort of
feeling, but now you’re at the Olympics and it’s a bigger event and
you know everyone is watching. It just sort of ran a chill up my spine,’
said Team Canada goalie Manny Legace.35
Numerically, Canada had never experienced a better Winter Olympic Games,
with athletes winning multiple medals in a day. The 1994 Games concluded with the
following homage on the Toronto Star front page,
O Canada, what an Olympics – Winter Games our best ever – maybe it
wasn’t quite the perfect ending to a perfect WOG for Canada. It didn’t
miss by much, though – on either count. Let those among us who care
deeply about pucks – there are, perhaps, more than a few of you out
there – not get all ferocious or whiny about losing the hockey gold
medal to Sweden in a round of penalty shots. To harp about it is to
lose sight of what is far more important, which is a remarkable
Olympic performance by the whole Canadian team. The silver
necklaces earned by the hockey team should be remembered as a
source of tremendous pride anyway. This team was not tabbed to go
very far, but it overachieved on the world’s largest sporting stage. So
did several other Canadians, who combined to earn 13 medals, three of
them gold and six silver. (Norway) deserves a bow. So, for other
reasons, does Canada.36
This narrative of winning at the Olympics was new for the Canadian press. Policy
followed narrative and narrative followed policy; sport leaders projected better future
performances based on past results and increased funding was linked to improved
performances.
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Considerations of future funding and its importance were not lost upon the media
after the 1994 Games:
Why our athletes glitter at Games – just six years ago, Canadian
athletes failed to win even one gold medal at the Winter Olympics in
Calgary. Today, early in the second week of the Lillehammer Games,
two gold medallions are already in the bank, along with two silver and
two bronze. Star sports editor Dave Perkins examined the reasons
behind the turnaround, including the sporting legacy of those Calgary
Games, the introduction into the Olympics of new medals sports such
as freestyle skiing, and the breakup of the East Bloc. Why is Canada
doing so well at these Winter Olympic Games? It was only six years
ago at Calgary, remember, that Canada suffered the embarrassment of
failing to win even one gold medal, settling for two silvers and three
bronzes. Without getting into the minutiae, let’s credit a few of the
reasons for 1994’s exceptional results… Clearly, for Canada, the vast
amount of money spent on the Calgary Games is paying off. Susan
Auch, to cite one example, has a world-class facility on which to
practice in Calgary. The Calgary Olympics also turned out to be
something of an organizational jumping off point. Strong governing
bodies are in place in most disciplines now, where there might have
been only a handful before.37
The formula for the Canadian sport system in the 1990s was becoming clear: enhanced
infrastructure plus increased financial and developmental support equalled more medals.
The benefits to Canadians remained merely symbolic in the form of nationalism
generated, the benefits to athletes were more material. Additionally, having sport
governing bodies in most sports provided further support for athletes. The resultoriented shift on the part of Sport Canada discussed at the end of the Chapter Two and
the evidence of that implementation through the Toward 2000 report were becoming
apparent.
In the ten years from the Calgary to the Nagano Games, Canada’s Olympic
image had shifted significantly. After consecutively beating their own medal haul in the
past two Games, expectations increased, and athletes delivered. In 1998, within a few
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days of the opening ceremonies, Canada had its first three medals and won six in a
single weekend. By the closing ceremonies, the Toronto Star assigned bragging rights to
Canadian athletes and national pride to the rest of the country:
Before we go back to our normal routines, we owe our Olympians –
those who won medals and those who won our hearts – the nation’s
heartfelt thanks. The two-week display of speed, style and
determination we saw in Nagano was the result of years of arduous
training and countless lonely hours in chilly arenas and on deserted
slopes. Only those driven to excel can fully understand the sacrifices
they made. It was a fine show. It kindled our pride in being Canadian.
It reminded us that winter is our time to shine.38
The discourse of winning, advanced by the press and Canadian sport organizations,
however, shifted attention to those who were supported and did not win. For example,
world figure skating champion Kurt Browning was branded the ultimate disappointment
for Canadians in the press. Canadians had high hopes for Browning after his dominance
in skating as four-time world champion through the seasons leading into the Olympics;
but, he failed three times to reach the podium at the Olympics. The media filled the
pages of the newspapers every four years with harsh remarks about Browning’s
performances, often allowing this news to overshadow medal winners. Similarly, the
increased pressure as well as disappointment that came from poor performances was not
lost on the athletes. Ski jumper Ron Richards had a message for COA Vice-president
Ken Read after he called their World Cup results an embarrassment:
Richards, perhaps fearful of similar comments once Olympic jumping
starts today, says Read should be more supportive of Canadian
athletes. ‘When I was a kid I supported Ken Read. Now that’s what I
think he should be doing for us. That really hurt me when he said that.
If I was some slug along for a free ride I might think that way. But he
should know better. We had good press a few years ago when we were
doing well. That was fine but then along came the Olympics and
everyone expected us to win a medal.’39
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There were some who critiqued the pressure placed on Canadian athletes. One
respondent to the Star wrote that,
Canada’s Olympians are not machines. I fail to understand why The
Star finds it necessary to display humiliating photographs of our young
athletes on the front page. I am referring specifically to pictures of
Isabelle Brasseur and Kurt Browning. Is it not enough that these
athletes, among the finest in the world “failed” before an audience of 2
billion? Must their families, friends, and fans be subjected to these
mistakes over and over? As the daughter of a former Olympian (1948)
and the mother of two former national competitors, I must try to make
you understand that it is vital for this nation to show pride in its young
people. They are not machines. They deserve the encouragement of a
powerful newspaper like The Star.”40
However, in spite of a few commentaries, the policy and promotion in the mid to late
1990s for government, sport organizations, and press alike had shifted to: “lack of
medals…lack of support,” not only financially, but emotionally as well, meaning that as
athletes were failing to win medals, the support of the nation was faltering as well. A
journalist for Toronto Star lamented:
Gold rush tarnishes other magical moments – there is something
happening here to us, to Canadians, and it’s a bloody shame. Gold lust.
The alchemy of victory has become an intoxicant. We have grown
drunk with the thrill of it, the greed of it. We, a nation of reasonable
people, of men and women who have traditionally understood the
inherent nobility of just trying, of doing one’s best. Is that not enough
anymore? We make them cry, these young athletes who carry the
burden of their own aspirations and our impossible expectations. Even
worse, we make them apologize for being imperfect, on one day, in
one moment of miscalculation. We should be happy for them.”41
By the late 1990s, Canadian athletes were competing and winning on the international
stage and anything less than outstanding performances were branded a national shame.
Moreover, between 1988 and 1998, the focus of the sport system and the national
narrative became much more focused on the Winter Games.
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The Mills Report
The final influential sport policy of the 1990s was Sport in Canada: Leadership,
Partnership, and Accountability. Everybody’s Business, also referred to as the Mills
Report of 1998. The document was centred on social, cultural, economic, and political
roles of sport for Canada, eventually becoming the basis for Canada’s first official
Canadian Sport Policy document. The Mills Report of 1998 was an all-encompassing
report that highlighted the major concerns that had emerged for Canadians throughout
the 80s and 90s. The first recommendation of the report came directly from the Dubin
Inquiry, namely, that “the government should maintain a substantial commitment to and
support for sport in Canada over the long-term due to its overall benefit to Canada.”42
The report stated further that any commitment to funding should be tied to specific
ethical standards, including drug-free sport, and more importantly, inclusion (i.e., “the
development and delivery of services and programs in both official languages).”43 This
was exceedingly important for Canada when the intent of the report itself was to clearly
establish the role of the government in sport as well as sport’s contribution to national
unity. The effect of the Mills Report was more substantial in the next decade, however,
particularly following the incident at the Canadian Olympic Association’s ceremony
prior to the Nagano Games. It was imperative that the government address the concerns
of both French- and English-speaking Canadians. The report intended to incorporate
French-speaking athletes into the sport system and more closely align policies to their
needs. Quite likely, the issue surrounding the exclusion of French athletes had much
broader roots outside of sport and the role of Quebec in Canadian nationalism. However,
the strong effort of the sport system was one of the first and just a single step in mending
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the tense relationship between the province and the rest of the nation. While the Mills
Report served to simply highlight discrepancies in the system, in the early 2000s, studies
to implement official languages in the Canadian Sport System had a greater effect on
policy changes.

Narrowing the Scope
Due in large part to the policy changes, the 90s were a decade of accountability,
leadership, inclusion, and fusion of the various sport organizations and systems that had
existed to this point and the system itself was beginning to have some level of direction
leading into the 21st century. Through the various policies, inquiries, task forces, and
documents that emerged throughout this era, Canada strived to unify its sport system,
interestingly at a time that the nation struggled to unify itself more broadly. Arguably,
steps were being taken to provide structure and a frame of reference for sport programs
in Canada and the performance results of Canadian athletes were evidence enough to
political and sport boosters that it was working. This in turn had an impact on national
unity and its connection with sport in Canada. Additionally, the sport system was
making attempts at fostering inclusion for athletes with the addition of bilingual
services. For this reason, at the intersection between English-French improving relations
and gradually improving performances, international results lent support to the idea of
Canadian winter-sport nationalism.
As the new millennium approached, Canada’s place on the winter sport scene
had evidently become more strongly defined. However, with weaknesses still existent in
various sports and a lack of complete dominance in any one sport in particular,
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Canadian winter-sport nationalism was still in its infancy. The facilities and conditions
for training were available, athlete accountability for performances was being enforced,
and communication between sporting organizations was gradually becoming more
cohesive, with policies to provide direction and guidelines for future success. However,
for nationalism to flourish in this paradigm of performance, athletes had to win with
some regularity. In 1998, the IOC elected to allow professional hockey players to
participate in the Olympics for the first time and, by the next quadrennial, the Canadian
sport system witnessed the ability of sport success to generate a rabid nationalistic
sentiment across the entire nation. For this reason, the early 2000s were characterized by
the introduction of a new sport funding program, further narrowing the scope to a select
few athletes with pre-determined medal potential.

Summary
The theme of nationalism throughout the 1990s was characterized by a focus on
pride as Canadians gradually began to outperform previous generations of athletes.
Additionally, with the introduction of Towards 2000, the Canadian sport system had
presented its first document that was solely sport excellence and achievement oriented,
setting the tone for the way Canadians would view and criticize athlete performances in
the future. Congruently, the challenges faced by Canada in regards to the Games
demonstrated in this chapter through the separation and concerns of French and English
athletes were also addressed by policy changes, as Canadian sport organizations were,
under the Sport Funding and Accountability Framework, now required to offer
programs in both French and English languages. The theme of funding and support in
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this decade became apparent as the new policy structures created had the intent of
placing a high priority on athlete and organization accountability. Between the Dubin
Inquiry and the SFAF, there were various criteria to be met and fulfilled in order to be
eligible for funding. Ultimately, these three themes are encompassed by the broader
theme of legacy, changes, and development in Canadian sport as this era of policy
development served to provide increased structure for Canada’s high performance sport
system. The legacy of these Games, therefore, is that with the enactment of various
policy changes, future athletes, organizations, and officials had the necessary guidelines
to help set the tone and direction for performance results in the future.
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CHAPTER FOUR – The Introduction of a New Sports Program

Sport policy development and the attendant promotion of nationalism which
characterized the 1990s in Canada presented new opportunities for Sport Canada and the
COA in the 2000s. Having been supported by the Best Ever program for the better part
of 15 years, Olympic athletes could benefit from a further development of the sport
funding program. Canadian athletes had gradually climbed on the medal count through
the previous ten years and winning Olympic medals became increasingly more realistic.
As a result, representations of nationalism reflected through the newspapers detailed a
strong Canadian pride that was developed alongside, and dependent upon, the winning
of medals. Successful athletes gave sport bureaucrats and boosters greater leverage to
lobby the Canadian government for more funding. The newspapers relentlessly reported
on the victories, or in some instances, disappointments of Canadian athletes, making the
connection to their effects on Canadian nationalism and demonstrating a gradual shift in
the emphasis on winning over the previous appreciation for the best efforts of Olympic
athletes. The narrative on winning, invoked by the newspapers linked Canadian
nationalism directly to sporting victories, at once legitimizing government spending and
expanding sport programs. In a phrase, victory was good for Canada.
Within these new narratives, the Best Ever funding program, developed in the
early 1980s, was no longer sufficient to support Canada’s aims within international
sport. The increasing emphasis on the development of sport policy in the 1990s, held
accountable by medal victories, led to an opportunity for a new, overarching, highachieving plan – Own the Podium, which justified further investment from the Canadian
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government and corporate partners to steer Canadian athletes to ever-higher
achievements. From the years 2000 to 2002, Sport Canada developed the nation’s first
official sport policy, the Canadian Sport Policy 2002. Alongside this, there were
changes that came within the COA that affected the direction of future sport in Canada,
with the election of a new Chief Executive Officer. By 2003, with the bid for hosting of
the 2010 Games won by the city of Vancouver, expectations for Canadian athletes were
exceedingly high. Own the Podium provided a roadmap for Canadian success in
Vancouver, which became part of the comprehensive funding package which the
Canadian government committed in the long term to the Olympic project. In addition to
supporting infrastructure, the importance of winning medals for the host nation was
positioned by Sport Canada and the COA as an issue of historical and national
importance. The fact that Canada did not win a gold medal in Montreal in 1976 or
Calgary in 1988 became a focal point for the shaming narrative advanced through the
press. The massive economic and human resource investment for 2010 had to be
accompanied by returns in Canadian athlete performance. As such, through the press,
Canadian spectators and taxpayers were also being prepared to host the Olympic Games.
At stake was national pride.
Without question, the most important gold medal for Canadians at the Winter
Olympic Games, one that had eluded them for 50 years, was in men’s hockey. Though
the newspapers reflected an increase in narratives of nationalism for sports overall, there
was no doubt that hockey was the most important. Since 1988, it was difficult to make
any strong link between hockey and Canadian nationalism, given that teams had not
won the hockey tournament in any of the Olympic Games since 1952. However, since
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hockey represented the impetus for Canada’s national sporting pride, the 2002 Winter
Games were an important igniter for the development of Own the Podium.
Consequently, after the 1990s provided some structure and acknowledgment of
the core problems in high performance sport, the new millennium brought with it an
opportunity to focus away from issues and concerns, towards the simplicity of pure
victory, which newspapers claimed was becoming increasingly and solely more
important to Canadians and to Canadian nationalism.

2002 Salt Lake City Games
The Canadian Olympic team entered Salt Lake City in 2002, after its best Winter
Games performance ever in 1998 in Nagano with a count of 15 medals. Prior to the
Games, the COA experienced a major structural change with the election of new COA
Chief Executive Officer Jim Thompson. The Toronto Star reported that Thompson’s
new goal as COA chief was to develop a new direction for Canadian high performance
sport, building, “a more efficient system to develop elite athletes in this country and
[Thompson] will talk to as many athletes, coaches, federations, training centres, and
government officials as he can.”1 Thompson stated that Canada is “at a crossroads in
high-performance sport in Canada. The COA has to work with the rest of the Canadian
sport community, with government and with the private business sector to make our
Canadian sport system as good as it can possibly be. We owe it to the athletes. My job is
to put as many athletes on the podium as I can and to fund them properly so they can do
that.”2 During a period of economic instability in the early 2000s, the Canadian
government reduced support for amateur sports. However, though the COA’s revenue
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dropped 10 percent, it reduced grants to athletes by only one percent. Canadian IOC
member Paul Henderson added that he would like to see the COA “return to its core
business, which is producing elite athletes. I think they’ve gone too far into what
governments do, which is participation…”3 The new CEO wanted people to be realistic
about Canada’s medal hunt in the Winter and Summer Games: “I want more Olympic
success for Canada…but sometimes we’re too obsessed with results and we don’t
celebrate the successes we have. Be patient; other (athletes) will come to the fore” said
Thompson.4 That same day the Toronto Star reported the following:
Thompson’s task will be to wade through all that bureaucracy to come
up with policies to accomplish what he said yesterday is the COA’s
main goal - supporting athletes in reaching the Olympic podium…. It’s
one thing for Thompson to say, as he did very eloquently yesterday, that
the athletes are the stars of the show and everything he and the COA do
will be to support them. It will be quite another thing to put that into
practice…The COA is a tired and ineffective organization. They never
come up with innovative programs to help or promote the athletes. They
do the bare minimum and they do so many things at a bush-league level.
Thompson needs to turn it into a professional organization.5
Additionally, newspapers reported that with the appointment of Thompson to
COA chief, there was an opportunity for the COA to take a leadership role in an amateur
sports community.6 Taking into account the earlier comments made by Canadian IOC
member Paul Henderson, the press echoed these sentiments, calling upon the Canadian
government to support young athletes not just for participation but, rather, to target them
as future Olympians. This new policy emphasis on the Olympic podium required an
early detection of potential Canadian athletes, enhanced developmental support for these
athletes, and a major shift on the importance of winning for athletes and spectators alike.
To be fair, although Canada’s sport system had been slowly shifting towards a greater
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focus on athlete performance, this early millennium focus was significantly different and
the press was not initially onside with the shift.
As the 2002 Olympics opened, the Canadian team began strongly as it had in
previous Games, particularly during the first few days. However, by the end of the first
week the medal count was lower than projected. Just before the Winter Games began,
the Toronto Star reported on the expectations that the COA had for its Canadian
athletes:
Grandstanding COA places unnecessary pressure on athletes – the
Canadian Olympic team has been set up for failure. And by its own
association to boot. There has been an undercurrent of grumbling
about the Canadian Olympic Association’s proclamation that the
team is gunning for a third-place finish at these Winter Games…If
you do the math – and the COA obviously hasn’t – it doesn’t make
any sense at all to project that the Canadian team can finish third at
the XIX Winter Olympics. – with 10 new events it would take about
23 medals to place third – that is out of Canada’s reach unless it has
the Games of a lifetime, and most of those athletes considered to
have medal potential fulfill it…The thing is the COA really has no
business putting those type of expectations on the athletes, especially
when it has so little to do with producing and preparing them for the
Games. It really amounts to nothing more than grandstanding. But
Canadian chef de mission Sally Rehorick defends the COA’s stance,
“You’ve gotta be ambitious. We make no apologies for that…if we
didn’t aim so high, we might be criticized for making it too modest.7
The COA’s emphasis on winning brought criticism. However, failure to achieve these
expectations created ideal circumstances for the COA in the year prior to the
introduction of a new sport funding program. Former Olympian Ken Read stated that a
low medal count was in fact better for Canada because it served to highlight some of the
underlying problems in the sport system and it is arguably from this juncture that Own
the Podium drew its support. When COA official Mark Lowry was asked about the low
medal count early on in the Games, he said one problem was the lack of targets for
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athletes, and admitted that his association was responsible for that.8 The 1990s were a
period of realizing the shortcomings in the Canadian sport system and identifying those
programs and individuals that should be held accountable for those ‘weaknesses.’ The
COA utilized the turn of the millennium to mark a change towards correcting the
Canadian sport system.
Ultimately, the path was straight and narrow and the options for future direction
seemed clear. On February 19, halfway through the Games, the Star reported the COA’s
opinion that setting priorities would be the secret to success for Canada:
The COA said it hoped Canada would do even better in Salt Lake City
than it did in Nagano. We got 15 medals in Japan 1988, good for 5th
place in a pretty big world. The COA said it hoped we’d finish third
this time. If we want to win at these Games – and we do despite all the
talk about just being happy to send someone and have them set a
personal best, yada yada yada – we need to set some priorities. Find
the things we are best at (there’s a cheap laugh there somewhere) and
put the money into developing athletes in that sport. Take the things
we are marginal at – and there are plenty of those – and flush. It’s an
easy concept to understand, but the choices would be painful to make,
as the COA is finding as it tries to steer its limited money – about
15million a year – to the sports in which we are most likely to hit
paydirt. “That’s dead on what we’re trying to do. We don’t want to kill
any sports, but we want to link access to the gas tank to the chances of
success.” (Mike Chambers COA president). If Canada really means
business we should skimp on summer sports and invest in the winter
variety, this being a nation of ice and snow and all, at least until global
warming turns all of North America into the everglades. …There’s a
danger in cutting sports funding, of course. But it’s a tough world that
demands tough choices. And we’d better start now if we want to have
the Winter Games in Canada in 2010 and not embarrass ourselves in
the medal standings the way we did in Calgary or Montreal. It’s either
that or forever find Canada buried in the standings between Belarus
and Argentina.9

Although not initially onside, the press chose to highlight the changes that the COA had
already considered, and to convince Canadians that this was the most realistic way of

102

achieving sporting success. Additionally, through the early 2000s, the newspaper
representations of the link between winter sporting excellence, specifically, and
nationalism were becoming stronger, and became an important theme after Vancouver
was awarded the 2010 Games in 2003. It was not a stretch to link nationalism to winter
sport success, given Canada’s long history of competitiveness in hockey, skiing, and
curling. However, a simultaneous lack of support for sports on the margins of success
was a turn in policy.
As discussed in Chapter Three, Canada’s successes resulted only in increasing
expectations for greater success going forward. Newspapers repeatedly invoked the
narrative connection of international athletic victory as both contributor to, and evidence
of, national pride. At the same time, journalists played the role of ensuring that
enhanced expectations unrequited did not result in decreased levels of national pride. In
the press, Canadian athletic successes demonstrated the merits of a functioning high
performance sport system; lack of success was blamed on the COA setting expectations
that were considered too high.
Appealing to a sense of Canadian nationalism to sell newspapers was achieved
through the positioning of nostalgia and a fantasy-based link between past and present –
in this case winter sports, as evident in this Toronto Star article:
Plenty of reasons for optimism – The Games are finally underway and
Canadians are optimistic, many expecting Canada’s best-ever Winter
Olympics. For the past few years, Canadians have done extremely well
in winter sports on the international stage. Not just in the glamour
sports but also in sports that we in the media tend to focus on only in
Olympic years, sports such as skeleton, cross-country skiing and, of
course, both long- and short- track speed skating. Thus, the feeling
shared by many that Canadian athletes could surpass their best-ever
medal total of 15 from Nagano four years ago. Medals bring me to the
debate over support for amateur sport in our country. Should the focus
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be on participation or high-performance? My long time skiing partner
and former Olympian Ken Read puts it best. He says the Crazy
Canucks were inspired as were other young men and women when
Nancy Greene stood on the podium at Grenoble, which wouldn’t have
occurred if she had finished 20th. His point is that excellence on the
international stage encourages participation at all levels. These are
indeed the Games of snow and ice and as such hold a special attraction
for Canadians. To excel in the glamour sports of the Summer Games,
our young men and women have little choice but to head south for
coaching and facilities. However, when the snow flies, Canadians need
to look no further than the back yard, down the street, or the nearest
hill. For that reason, the level or participation in winter sports is far
higher. And when the athletes show Olympic potential they can stay
home in Canada where the facilities and coaching exist that can take
them to the top. These facilities exist in Calgary, a legacy of the 1988
Games. They’re not only used by Canadians but by athletes from all
over the world.10
Here the Toronto Star familiarized the shifts in current policy by invoking the past and
links to the past – at the same time building national sentiment simultaneously as a
calming but inspirational influence. Defining the nation was never old news and sport
always offered a ready-made source of information to inspire the cultural elements of
nationalism: “Collective imagination is fuelled by the media representations that define
a nation inwardly in terms of its own history, invoking familiar, indigenous cultural
traditions.”11 Ultimately, nationalism required a capacity to cut across generations.

The Role of Hockey
Before 1956, Canada had won every Olympic hockey gold medal but one.
Between 1952 and 2002, the men’s team did not win any gold medals, a fact not lost
upon Canadian fans, sports administrators, and the Canadian government. Indeed, it was
the failure of the Canadian men’s teams to win hockey gold which arguably led to the
development of the Canadian sport system in the 1960s. Winning international hockey
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matches was pivotal to Canadian identity. The longer the medal drought, it seemed, the
more desperate the tone of the newspaper articles. On Feb 13, 2002, the Star reported:
Hockey stars have chance to save our pride. As if trying to win gold
in men’s hockey for the first time in 50 years wasn’t quite enough.
With every passing day, however, it becomes clearer that Canada’s
success or failure at these 19th Winter Olympics will be measured by
the final result of Wayne Gretzky’s collection of millionaire hockey
players. The sense of national expectation is becoming a sense of
national need.12
As narrow as such a perspective may appear, in the Canadian press, this was particularly
accurate. For sixteen days of the Olympic Games, the coverage of the successes of other
athletes remained at the margins of the men’s hockey team. The Star additionally
reported that “Hockey is still central to the mentality of Canadians, but it’s somewhat
hidden because of all the defeats we have suffered over the years.”13 The newspapers
repeatedly insisted that the only way for Canada to realize its national pride was through
the victory of the men’s hockey team at these Olympics.
When the 2002 Games closed in Salt Lake City, Canada again came home with a
record medal haul. Though sights were set on third place, Canada finished fourth in the
medal total with 17, but, most importantly, gold medals in men’s and women’s hockey.
As represented in the media, this success was a testament to and justification for the
“proper,” albeit unequal, distribution of funding for athletes. The COA’s Podium 2002
program, awarded $1.25 million to Canada’s top 93 athletes some eight months before
the Winter Games began. Other athletes not considered medal hopefuls received their
regular funding but nothing extra. However, the COA claimed that every athlete who
won a medal at the 2002 Games was on the list of Podium 2002 recipients: “We could
count heads and give a little bit to everyone. In the past we would’ve given equal
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amounts. But then you don’t give enough to anyone. We wish we didn’t have to do this,
but that is going to be the experience.”14 The 2002 Games set the stage for the
introduction of a new sports program in Canada. Administrators directly equated athlete
success to funding, rendering an opportune moment for Sport Canada and the COA to
lobby for more funding. To this end, administrators rationalized the uneven distribution
of funding as fair and necessary to support podium athletes. In addition, newspapers
ensured that Canadians were saturated with feelings of euphoria and national pride after
the Games, and with Vancouver on the horizon, what better time to introduce a new,
enhanced funding program?

2002 Canadian Sport Policy and Own the Podium
In addition to Canadian success at the Salt Lake City Games, in the latter part of
2002, Canadian policy experienced another major change, the creation of the first ever
Canadian Sport Policy. The 2002 Canadian Sport Policy was the federal government’s
formal acknowledgement that Canada, as a sporting nation, had to focus on both sport
participation and sporting excellence. The pillars of the policy centred on enhanced
excellence and participation, along with enhanced capacity and interaction. As noted by
Thibault and Harvey, according to Sport Canada, “the priority of capacity and
interaction provided support to participation and excellence. Capacity referred to putting
in place the necessary systems (e.g. leadership, infrastructure, sport science and
technology) to support participation and excellence, while interaction referred to
increasing collaboration and communication among all stakeholders in sport.15 The
eventual outcome of the 2002 Canadian Sport Policy and its practical uses were
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somewhat unrealized in its early stages. The argument that was frequently made was
that hosting major sporting events, such as the Olympics, in combination with the
international success of Canadian athletes inspired average Canadians to participate in
sport. The trickle-down effects of elite sport on mass participation were widely utilized
to justify increased spending on high performance athletes. This was precisely the
purpose that the 2002 Canadian Sport Policy served at the time of its creation. The
hosting of international competition in particular became an important foundation for
Own the Podium which emerged from the 2002 Policy.
In July of 2003, Vancouver was awarded the 2010 Olympic Winter Games.
Immediately, Canadians were reminded in the press that Canada was the only host
nation not to win a gold medal. To ensure that this wouldn’t happen for the third time in
Vancouver, key stakeholders collaborated in an effort to ensure that, in 2010, Canada
would “own the podium” and finish first in the medal table. Own the Podium included
collective efforts from Sport Canada, the Canadian Paralympic Committee, the
Canadian Olympic Committee, winter National Sport Organizations, and the Vancouver
Organizing Committee. Key actions for Own the Podium were to “establish targets to
assess athlete and sport system performance, enhance the use of sport science, and
establish the role of national sport centres.”16 The hope was that a more unified
approach with specific targets would result in increased co-ordination and
communication between key stakeholders in the sport system. This subsequently meant
that focus would need to be directed to those athletes and sports with the greatest medal
potential, in order to ensure that performance targets would be met. In 2004, key
stakeholders met to review the most ideal strategy for achieving the goals set through
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OTP. In the same year, the Canadian Olympic Committee set up a Task Force, coordinated by Cathy Priestner-Allinger, to review and analyze the best way to implement
OTP. Though no final decisions were made prior to the 2006 Olympic Games in Turin,
by this time, OTP was beginning to take shape and particular strategies were slowly
being put into practice for those Games.

2006 Turin Games
As discussed, an integral and strategic part of the OTP campaign was first to
identify potentially successful athletes, second to support them and, third, to ensure
those athletes won medals. As a result, there was a surge in scientific and technological
support in sport that prepared Canada’s winter Olympic athletes for Turin. Turin became
the test case for the Vancouver Olympics. It was no longer simply enough to identify
medal potential athletes; the program needed to provide optimal training conditions for
the realisation of this potential:
Olympic head games – 12 sports psychologists join Canadians – Hopes
of averting our habit of choking. – A study conducted by 13 major
sports groups concludes that the country’s Olympians have a history of
choking on their big days, meaning Canada consistently returns home
with a medal haul well below targets. Judy Gross, athlete’s services
coordinator for the COC and a trained sport psychologist, said the
increased presence of sports psychologists at the Turin Games isn’t a
magic pill to put athletes on the podium but it’s part of a long-term
strategy. All 12 psychologists have been working extensively with the
athletes and teams leading up to the Olympics, a change from the past
when they were often brought in just for the Games.17
In regards to science and technology, the Star reported that
…officials put funds toward technology – everything from new ski
wax compounds to lightweight, aerodynamic hockey jerseys and
special video recording software – have Turin-bound nations
scrambling to keep pace. Or in Canada’s case, catch up. ‘We’ve never
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had a technology program for high-performance sport that is wellorganized, centrally led and well-financed,’ says Roger Jackson, CEO
of Own the Podium and a former Olympic rower. By this time, 15 to
20 percent of Own the Podium’s annual budget was distributed into a
“Top Secret Program” to fund the sporting equivalent of the arms race
– the laboratory battle for a competitive edge.18
Ultimately, in order for the OTP campaign to gain momentum and support from
Canadians, it would have to be well-represented in the press and, ultimately, based on its
premises, produce results. And the only results that were acceptable were podium
finishes, announcing a distinct cultural shift for Canadian sport. Over the years,
Canada’s ski program was highly criticized for the lack of results it was producing;
however, by 2006, finishing off of the podium was nothing short of a promise for the
future: “Fourth a sign of progress – next step to go from medal hopefuls to favourites –
hat-trick of fourth places finishes for Canadian skiers – a sign of progress as Canada
heads to the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympics.”19
As the Toronto Star justified results of the ski and bobsled teams, and the
performances of other athletes, its most interesting position came early on February 9.
For almost 20 years, papers reported on the success of hockey and what that would
mean for Canadian nationalism and for the overall success of Canada’s sport system.
And though the hockey team fell short of expectations at seemingly every Olympic
Games, hopes were never diminished during the following quadrennial. As a result, it
would seem that four years after winning its first hockey gold medal in 50 years,
expectations were for a gold medal, and a disappointment even if the team did finish
anywhere else on the podium. However, the difference between 2006 and the Olympics
of 1988 was enhanced public funding and the accompanying expectations of success.
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Yet in 2006, with Canada on the brink of the inception of a new sporting program, the
following article was printed in the Toronto Star:
Puck pursuit shortchanges others, but falling short of men’s hockey
gold could be good news for Vancouver 2010 – win this time and we
will have won two straight….then to lose on home ice would be a
disaster – but lose this time and the run up four years hence is totally
different. The (undoubtedly) new coaching and management team will
have a new style and outlook. The players will be focused on
regaining the prize somehow swiped from them in Turin. Plus – and
this is the key – by the time 2010 rolls around, Canadian taxpayers
will have been asked to lay out between $2 and $3 billion for the
Games, whose costs already are skyrocketing. Organizers will want
the focus not on the destruction of the public purse but on our hockey
intelligentsia pulling together to regain our lost national prestige, etc.
Right there on Canadian ice, too. So it won’t be the end of the world if
we lose that one big medal – this time. And, regardless of the hockey
team’s fortunes, there will be plenty of other good stuff to celebrate.
There always is.20
For the Turin Games, newspapers highlighted the positives of losing hockey gold before
the Games began. Having spent the majority of the 2002 Games building Canadian
nationalism around the hockey gold medal, this was an odd way to approach the 2006
tournament before it even started. And although blatantly stated that taxpayers would be
expected to support the new system, it was overshadowed by the idea of redeeming
Canadian hockey supremacy, before it was even lost. Perhaps journalists viewed the
2002 victory as an aberration or perhaps manipulating the Canadian public into
supporting the new sport system was intentional.
Ultimately, Canada did not win the hockey gold medal. In fact, the team did not
advance past the semifinals, and so Canadians had been prepared for that potential
disappointment by the press. However, newspapers reminded Canadians that the nation
had other sports, and that it wasn’t (for the first time in at least 50 years) all about
hockey. The narratives focused upon other Canadian successes: “these are ‘our’ athletes
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Canada!” The positive sentiment around losing hockey was evident, “Failure in hockey
clouds great day – it was a day when all Canadians could be justifiably proud of our
Olympic athletes, especially after Canadian women won four medals, including two
golds. Indeed, it was our best day in Winter Games history.”21 And so, even with the
failure of the men’s hockey team, there was no shortage of Canadian pride.
By the end of the 2006 Games, Canada had again exceeded its medal haul from
the previous Winter Olympics with seven gold, ten silver, and seven bronze for a total of
24 medals. Though 2006 is not typically characterized as a year during which the
athletes were supported through the OTP Campaign, it was a year of evaluating which
OTP components were successful to date and how to improve upon those aspects that
needed fine-tuning before the Games came back to Canada for the third time. At the
surface level, the most obvious critique of OTP was that, in order for the program to
retain this name, athletes actually had to “own the podium.” Ultimately, 24 medals were
wonderful for Canada, but with less than a third of those being gold, were Canadians
really ‘owning’ winter sports? In order for the program to be successful in the future,
standing on the highest part of the podium was a must. The COC, according to CEO
Chris Rudge recognized that the kind of medal would need to be factored into
consideration sooner or later. “You can’t “own the podium” with bronze medals while
hearing someone else’s anthem. There’s a reason the official medal standing lists
countries by gold medals won,” he opined.22
Yet, the Turin Games were positive for those who viewed Olympic success as
Canada’s success. The Toronto Star played upon this narrative: “These, though, in
Turin, were terrific Games for Canada, competitively, the best ever and spot-on in
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building towards the ‘Own the Podium’ crescendo of Vancouver 2010.”23 This was
precisely the finish that the sports organizations needed to push Own the Podium to
success and to gain public, private, and government support for the program. The
estimated costs for the 2010 Vancouver Games, (and it is important to note that rarely
do costs end up below budget, in fact, the costs oftentimes end up significantly higher)
were reported by the Star in early February,
Pound optimistic about 2010 cost – Vancouver’s Winter Olympic
budget woes shouldn’t make Canadians worry that they’re in for a
replay of Montreal’s 1976 fiscal fiasco, IOC member Dick Pound said
yesterday. Vancouver officials recently announced their capital budget
for the 2010 Winter Games is now $580 million, up from $470 million
they had estimated in 2002.”24
With such extensive funds being put into a sport system, the press encouraged
Canadians to expect great success at the Olympics, which was precisely the role that the
Turin Games played.

The Next Generation of Canadian Winter Sport Nationalism
Following the early 2000s, Canada’s continued success and growing
achievements in winter sports had generated a significant momentum shift in support of
Canadian winter sport nationalism. The Toronto Star led its readers to believe that the
changes in high performance sport funding toward a merit-based approach for athletes
was optimal for success on the international stage. This in turn rationalized increased
spending, which Canadians were seemingly on board with, in the creation of a policy
centred around early identification of podium potential athletes in conjunction with
increased spending on technology and science research. It appeared as though the
newspapers were in support of the idea that a policy directed toward owning the podium
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and the medal count was the most opportune approach to fostering Canadian
nationalism.
However, though the implementation of some aspects of OTP was already
beginning to bear fruit in the early millennium, the only real testament to this new
system would be the 2010 Games of Vancouver. When the Games were being brought
back to Canada, Vancouver presented an opportunity to showcase Canadian culture, the
most important aspect of which would be winter sport supremacy.

Summary
The clear legacy of the early millennium was the introduction of science and
technology to Canada’s high performance sport system. Though there had been efforts
made in various ways to provide Canadian athletes with a competitive edge in the past,
the 2002 and 2006 Winter Games were the first Olympics where significant amounts of
funding were invested into these specific endeavors. As a result, funding and support
was increased significantly throughout the early 2000s, and a new sport funding
program, Own the Podium was also introduced, although athletes were still not formally
competing within that framework. However, it was an opportune time to begin preparing
athletes with the Own the Podium program because, in 2003, the city of Vancouver won
the bid to host 2010 Winter Olympic Games. This would be the third time that Canada
had the opportunity to host and it was imperative to meet the challenge of having a team
strong enough to finally win a gold medal at home again. In regard to nationalism, the
early implementation of OTP, a program dedicated to medal count, combined with everimproving performances by Canadians seemed to bring the reality of possible winter-
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sport supremacy to the forefront for Canadians. For the first time in over 50 years, the
men’s hockey team won the gold medal and athletic potential appeared to be higher than
it had been for previous generations. As a result, winter sport nationalism received a
significant boost from the media throughout this era.
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CHAPTER FIVE – Own the Podium

By the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver, the third time that Canada played
host to the Games, Own the Podium was the main Olympic funding program for
Canadian athletes. Following the first decade of the twenty-first century and gradually
improving medal results for Canada, these Games served as a testament to the success or
failure of the program, not only in terms of winning medals, but in whether or not it
would subsequently be able to strengthen Canadian nationalism, and, if so, would an
evident increase in Canadian pride be enough to sustain future support for OTP?
The amount of funding invested in Own the Podium had far exceeded the
programs that preceded it, including Game Plan ’76 and Best Ever ’88, responsible for
funding the Montreal and Calgary Games respectively. As a result, this raised public
pressure and expectations for both officials and athletes to produce results. Ultimately,
the Own the Podium program ushered in a new understanding of Canadian athletic
“excellence,” defined solely by the athletes’ ability to win medals. This was in
opposition to past programs directed toward uplifting athlete performance at a more
individual level, which included achieving personal bests and setting Canadian records.1
Funding became less evenly distributed and those with podium potential were given
significantly greater support than other athletes, coming not only in the form of
monetary benefit, but also through access to elite coaches, doctors, and facilities:
With the final sprint to a Games comes the need to laser focus on the
optimization of medal opportunities and conversion at the coming set
of Games. As a result of this narrowing of focus, it is inevitable that a
number of longer term, potentially more sustainable system lifting
projects may be paused in the short term.2
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These inconsistencies were met with strong criticism in early newspaper
representations. Ultimately, the Own the Podium program created three concerns in its
inaugural year. Firstly, the title given to the program, Own the Podium, was perceived as
arrogant and altogether un-Canadian. Second, the original funding initially promised
towards the program was significantly increased in the preceding quadrennial. And
finally, the structure of the program itself created a notion of ideological excellence that
seemed to dominate the new sport policy and put tremendous pressure on athletes in
order to ensure that they earned the financial support of the government prior to and
throughout the Games.
However, particularly toward the conclusion of the Games, as the Canadian team
gradually rose in the medal chart, the message of “owning the podium” was distilled
into everyday common sense, garnering very strong support in the newspapers by the
end of the Vancouver Olympics. The newspapers from 2010 demonstrated a sharp surge
in representations of this new brand of Canadian nationalism during the Vancouver
Games.
This chapter provides an overview of the program’s objectives and approaches to
sport funding as presented through the policy itself, followed by newspaper
representations of the program to the public during the Games, at which point there is an
evident shift from criticism to praise as the Games progress. This overview outlines the
intent and mission of the program, alongside a breakdown of the distribution of funds,
which leads to a discussion of the athletic elitism existent in the Canadian sport system.
The second section discusses in detail first the expectations and secondly the results of
the implementation of Own the Podium through its first full quadrennial. Furthermore,
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the chapter clearly defines the role of the program in establishing and building a new
brand of Canadian nationalism through sport, punctuating a bolder and brasher winter
sport nationalism for which elite sport leaders had lobbied for decades. Finally, the
chapter draws some conclusions about this shift in the role of the high performance sport
system in Canada, overall, and the concerns raised by an enhanced focus on elite sport.

The Program
In 2010, the Canadian city of Vancouver played host to the Winter Olympic
Games, 22 years subsequent to the Calgary Games. The title for the OTP program was
represented in the newspapers as a slogan for Canadians, once again, placing a large
emphasis on winning medals and portraying Canada as not only a competitor, but a
winter sporting powerhouse internationally. The mission of OTP was and is for Canada
to be a “world leader in high-performance sport,” with the hope that it will rank supreme
in podium performances during both Olympic and Paralympic Games. The vision of this
funding program was to increase integration and develop research in the broader sport
infrastructure in order to enhance opportunity for excellence in coaching, training, sport
medicine, and various other techniques that would contribute to improving Canadian
performances. Long term, the goals set for the Canadian Olympic team by OTP have
remained the same since its inception in 2005. Similarly, as mentioned, OTP distributed
funding explicitly based on athlete potential and the performances leading up to the
Olympics, rather than being divided equally among the provinces as it was for the
Calgary Olympic Games. Ultimately, the new program was
…primarily a service provider, albeit one with resources to target
those areas (athletes, coaches, programs and strategies) where results
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are most likely to be obtained. This method is meant to operate on the
basis of contributions (expertise, partnerships, human and financial
resources) that stakeholders wish to align or pool together with the
new organization in order to achieve common goals directed at the
shared vision of being the best in the world.3
OTP assumed responsibility for assessing the potential of individuals and teams in
Canada’s high performance sport system, determining podium targets for Olympic and
Paralympic Games, and for making recommendations regarding the allocation of funds
from national funding sponsors.4 Its main initiatives were enhanced coaching and
technical leadership, training and competitions, sports science and medical support, and
organizational capacity, in order to create a more results-based high performance
system. One component of the program, Innovations 4 Gold (I4G) is “Own the
Podium’s applied sport research program to support cutting edge/competitive advantage
initiatives in proactive sports medicine, human performance and sports engineering. I4G
supports research projects, which are helping Canada win more medals at the Summer
and Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games.”5 Canada’s Minister of State for Sport
claimed that, “From learning more about how sleep can help an athlete’s recovery to
working on head-injury prevention screens, this cutting-edge research is going to
provide lasting benefits to our athletes.”6
Currently, “Own the podium, a not-for-profit organization, prioritizes, and
determines investment strategies to national sport organizations in an effort to deliver
more Olympic and Paralympic medals for Canada...[to] advance the excellence goal
highlighted in the Canadian Sport Policy.”7 The Government of Canada is the largest
contributor to the funding of OTP.
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In 2010 at the Vancouver Olympic Games, Canadian athletes achieved an alltime record 14 gold medals, what sport leaders argued proved the success of the OTP
campaign that had been implemented years prior. Additionally, the Canadian team
finished third overall in medal count, nine positions higher than Calgary in 1988, and
brought home both the men’s and women’s gold medals in ice hockey. Between the
Olympic and Paralympic sports of that season, OTP invested almost $80 million in the
pursuit of Olympic medals.
The most important objective for the 2010 Games was victory in the form of the
medal count, facilitated through a partnership between the winter National Sporting
Organizations and the funding partners. A Task Force established by the Canadian
Olympic Committee had determined how many medals in which sports Canadian
athletes were expected to win. Sport performance became an equation ensured by a
tiered funding plan for NSOs based on cost effective analysis of the sports in which
Canadians were most likely to succeed, and a plan for implementation of the program.8
The final report identified a “hierarchy of funding based on each sport’s
contribution to Canadian culture, past performances at the three previous Olympic
Games, potential for success at the 2010 Games, and sustainability of success past 2010.
The resulting tiers are as follows: Flat Ice Sports (ice hockey, curling, long track speed
skating, short track speed skating, and figure skating); Snow Sports (alpine skiing,
freestyle skiing, snowboarding, and cross-country skiing) and Sports Requiring
Specialized Facilities (bobsleigh, luge, skeleton, biathlon, ski jumping, and Nordic
combined).”9

119

Finally, the Own the Podium Task Force estimated that an additional $10.1
million per year in direct athlete funding was needed to secure 35 medals at the 2010
Games supported by $11 million per year in recruitment and Top Secret research in
sport technology. Own the Podium was, by far, the most extensive of the Olympic
athlete-funding programs in Canadian history, dwarfing Game Plan ‘76 and Best Ever
‘88 by comparison. As was the case, however, with earlier programs, taxpayers
supported most of this latest Olympic funding endeavor. In February of 2005, the
Canadian government agreed to provide half of the required $110 million needed to
fund Own the Podium, the British Columbia provincial government contributed $10
million to the program, and over seven other corporate partners were expected to share
the remaining cost. Therefore, with public money contributing over half of the program
costs, the over $3 million spent towards supporting winter athletes through the federallyfunded Athlete Assistance Program, and the $13.5 million provided annually to the
winter NSOs each year, Canada spent $147.5 million in public money to secure medals,
in addition to the more than $620 million committed to hosting and the billions of
dollars provided for tertiary infrastructure projects for the 2010 Games.10
Donnelly’s critique of the decision to spend over $6 billion plus an additional
$120 million of Own the Podium funding for the five years preceding the 2010 Games,
which far exceeded the usual levels of pre-Olympic athlete funding in Canada,
accurately depicted the outright purchase of medals: “its purpose is to prepare a select
few of our high-performance athletes. The premise for this additional funding is that
medals can be bought, but they cost a great deal of money.”11 With expectations for the
medal count leaping from the 24 achieved in Turin, to 35 in Vancouver, this additional
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funding meant that, after five years of OTP funding, the extra medals expected cost an
extra $92 million. Beyond the money, critics questioned both the national arrogance that
was implied by the Own the Podium program title and the shift in performance pressure:
“It is appropriate to support our athletes, to ensure that they know they are as well
prepared as their major competitors and to engender a quiet confidence. It is not
appropriate to put extra pressure on our athletes, or to potentially set ourselves up to fail
by claiming that we are going to beat the world and win 35 medals.”12

Shifts in Criticism of Own the Podium
The Own the Podium program, first introduced to Canadians in the early
millennium, was named such with the intent of generating a new attitude of winning,
historically atypical for Canada. The new approach created a major shift from,
“wouldn’t it be nice to win a gold medal at an Olympics that we are hosting” to “we are
going to invite the winter sports world to Vancouver, and we are going to Own the
Podium.”13 While the new program and the name attached to it seemed to exude an
attitude of arrogance, some felt that it was merely a supportive approach that should be
taken, while others perceived it as downright, unjustified, uncharacteristic, and arguably
unnecessary:
Meek inherit the Olympics – the New York Times is right. We’d
hate to actually win anything. Too embarrassing, eh? – “(Canada)
is a vast country that in many ways is run like a small town, with
small-town values, and it has a highly developed culture of
modesty, if not a collective inferiority complex. The athletic record
in general is a little underwhelming, and some Canadians think that
is because their countrymen prefer that, considering a good effort
just as valuable as a trunkload of trophies, maybe better.”14
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Additionally, the initial claim that Team Canada would win 35 medals, when it had won
only 24 in the Olympics prior, was viewed as a major, premature assertion: “As almost
every serious athlete knows, pronouncing medals or victory before they actually occur
flies in the face of Mental Training for Sports 101, and all too often proves to be a fatal
mistake.”15
Setting expectations for the medal count that were significantly higher than those
Canada had achieved at any other Games was controversial and raised the ire of some
Canadians. Letters to the Editor, initially blamed precisely those officials responsible for
Own the Podium, as expressed by reader Richard Green of Thornbury who wrote:
I fervently hope that I am not alone in deploring much of what
surrounds these Vancouver Olympic Games. The incredible arrogance
of our “Own the Podium” program, augmented by the boastful
posturing in “It’s our mountain,” “it’s our game” style messages, as
provided our country with a new and very unflattering image – that of
unfettered braggadocio. Where did we lose our perspective on the
meaning of sport? I certainly hope we return to quietly displaying our
many talents and asses in a more Canadian way.16
Early ‘failures’ during the first events gave weight to this criticism. The Toronto Star
opined that, “leaders of the COC and Own the Podium are now reaping the fruits of such
a flawed and arrogant tact. If they were managing any other large business operation,
they would be fired.”17
The silver lining of the first week of events, for the OTP officials came when
Team Canada broke the curse of having never won a gold medal on Canadian soil. On
day three, Montreal skier Alexandre Bilodeau won the moguls event, releasing some of
the immense pressure that had built in anticipation of Canada’s performance. It also
provided the first measure of legitimacy for the program and generated the intrigue and
excitement that it was designed to foster for the upcoming events: “it’s too good to be
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true. There’s so many golds to come. Canada is so strong right now…the party’s just
starting for Canada.”18 As the Games progressed, this proved to be true, and, by the end
of the Games, Canada had seemingly made great progress in defining its winter sport
supremacy. In the reported opinions of athletes, the $120 million OTP program, was
worth every penny.19 This, in conjunction with the home team advantage created an
attitude of certainty and determination among athletes, “There is a different sense about
this Canadian team, a confidence – never cockiness – that they are well prepared and
ready to get the job done. For all the extra resources that have been poured into this
effort through Own the Podium, its Canada’s sixth man – and woman – that the athletes
are looking at to help put them over the top.”20 Athletes and journalists were speaking a
new language of Canadian sporting excellence.
OTP was framed in the newspapers to suggest that the program was the
collective effort of the entire nation and that, as Canadians, the results were a reflection
not only of federal government investment and the Canadian Olympic ingenuity but,
more importantly of a new Canadian sporting nationalism:
Join in celebration of Canada’s Games – Canadians across the country
should be proud for their contributions – as taxpayers (1.23 billion for
the Games came from federal coffers, about half of that for security
alone), as athletes (the Canadian Olympic team includes
representatives of eight of the 10 provinces), and as fans (300,000
people are expected to pour into Vancouver and Whistler for the
Games, most of them from the rest of Canada) – we should not be
embarrassed to cheer on our athletes, despite American scolding.21
Having Canadians collectively embrace and endorse Own the Podium in this way, as a
reflection of the nation and its national strength was a victory for the network of sport
administrators and government officials who had sanctioned this significant public
investment in sport. With a security budget of $900 million, the opening and closing
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ceremonies alone with a price tag of $40 million, and an athletes village that rose in cost
from $100 million to $1.2 billion, and the additional tax dollars invested in the five
years prior, officials were under scrutiny that could only be alleviated with Canadian
success.
Additionally, Canadian Olympic officials argued that in view of the amount of
tax dollars and public spending allocated to the athletic program, results would not only
generate Canadian winter-sport nationalism, but would secure the OTP approach,
ensuring its sustained success in the future. For this reason, the Games were approached
cautiously and Roger Jackson, head of OTP was adamant about reassuring the Canadian
public that these results would require hard work and patience:
Own the Podium head Roger Jackson says Canada will win most of
its medals toward the end of the Winter Games. ‘As you watch the
medal totals day by day, what you need to know is we don’t expect
Canada to challenge for the lead until the last few days of the
Games,’ Jackson said Tuesday on a conference call. “Almost half
of our medals will come in the last five days of the 16 days of the
Games.”22
Evidently, from the outset, officials hoped that Canadians would abandon the
“roll-over” attitude in favour of a more assertive and optimistic approach. What was
being promoted through OTP was a newly competitive Canadian nationalism, and
Toronto Star played a significant role as its promotional arm:
Canada’s Medal Quest: Gold, and Lots of It. Organizers of the
Games want to rewire the national mind-set and come away with
not just a couple of golds but the most medals overall. They have
dedicated roughly $118 million to enhancing the performance of
Canadian athletes, and have financed something called the Top
Secret project, in which teams of scientists have been studying the
various winter sports in hope of gaining a technological edge. The
organization in charge of improving Canada’s medal performance
has the un-Canadian sounding name Own the Podium, and its chief
executive, Roger Jackson, said: “we’ve never been pressured before

124

to perform to a stated goal. Thirty medals or more is what we’re
hoping for this time. I think we can get those.” Talk like that, so
nakedly ambitious, makes some Canadians uneasy. The Canadian
writer George Woodcock once said: “Canadians do not like heroes,
and so they do not have them. They do not even have great men in
the accepted sense of the word.”23
However, this proved to require some flexibility on the part of both the officials,
and other Canadians, as the Games progressed. While Canadians would have to adjust to
the air of cockiness that had settled over the nation, officials had to adjust their
commitment from most medals overall (initially projected at thirty or more), to the most
gold medals overall, as the former became increasingly less likely.
In regards to adjustments in Canadian attitudes, the Games were approached
with a degree of assurance and almost cockiness that had not existed before, yet slowly,
alongside the lack of results, the Canadian Olympic Committee, Vancouver Organizing
Committee, and other officials shifted their vision, claiming they hadn’t really expected
to “own” the podium. By this time, Canadians had already settled on the likelihood that
Canadian athletes would not win the most medals of any country. “Does Canada own
the Olympic podium? Of course it does! Canadians have paid more than $500 million
for it. It’s just too bad that Canadian athletes are hardly ever on it” wrote Steve Zajac of
Toronto.24
With this challenge towards the newly emergent ideal of Canadian nationalism
centred on competition and winning, officials and newspapers searched for alternative
reasons as to why the Vancouver Games were such a success:
Why this Olympics is already a winner – Ain’t we got fun? Oh yes,
yes we do. Not since Expo 67 or the Canada- Soviet Hockey Summit
in 1972 has this country been in such a good mood: Engaged,
celebratory, convivial and, in our fashion, sweetly patriotic. All that
Own the Podium rhetoric, and the now modified downward
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expectations, doesn’t really amount to a hill of beans. In a gorgeous
city, in an enviable country, and for anyone paying an iota of attention
to what matters, these Games – only halfway through – have been an
astounding success: Intensely competitive, dramatically decided in
teensy fraction of scores and times, as inspirational and breathtaking
as only sport can be, memorable.25
And though podium victories were not nearly as frequent as expected, some Canadians
lauded the program and supported the athletes: “Shame on the Star for the depicting the
Vancouver Winter Games as a disappointment. Canadian athletes are performing better
than in the past. We are winning more gold medals. Own the Podium has had an effect,”
wrote Don Hughes of Bancroft.26 “Whether we “own the podium” or not…I’m proud to
be Canadian regardless of how many medals we earn. I’m proud of the efforts of all of
our team members… These Games couldn’t have been more Canadian – a few glitches,
handled classily and with a little humour. A sea of red at every event,” wrote Martha
Cruikshank of Niagara Falls.27 It is this method of newspaper reporting that ultimately
overshadows concerns and issues in society. Since it was unavoidable that the Star had
to report on the failures of Canadian athletes and the weaknesses in the OTP campaign,
these articles were strategically placed alongside editorials and letters from readers that
highlighted the positive experiences of hosting the Games.
By week two of the Games, there was a second shift in Canadian attitudes, back
toward the confidence that had existed prior to a fruitless first week. It was caused by a
sudden upsurge of the medals, giving officials a new wave of success to ride. And
though the expectations to win the most medals of any nation evidently weren’t going to
be fulfilled, Team Canada was in a position to win the most gold medals of any nation.
For reporters and Own the Podium officials, the shift in narrative was easy – OTP was a
success. By the end of the Games, with a total of 14 gold medals, Canada topped the
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medal table, depending on how one ranked the nations, of course. However, this was
more than enough for OTP officials and Canadians, providing the opportunity for the
Star to capitalize on this success and rationalize the new performance program:
Games give us golden glow – in the final analysis, we brought our EhGame. As a country, as a host, and most of all on the podium, where
“O Canada” enjoyed Hit Parade deejay play, most-spun-anthem at the
medal ceremonies…it may have cost $1.76 billion, not including the
mega sums for mega infrastructure projects, but the legacy is priceless,
far beyond permanent new venues built for the purpose. With these
Games, Canada came out of its shy and insecure shell. Suddenly, it
was cooler than ever to be Canadian. It felt good to be us….Most of
all, of course, it was about the athletes and all the wow moments of
sport. Here’s to you, Vancouver. Here’s to us, Canada. As Neil Young
sang it: “Long may you run.” Could have added, as an encore: “Heart
of Gold.” And now, show’s over folks. So take off, eh.”28
This article demonstrates the shifting narrative of winter sport nationalism. Most
importantly, it highlights how the nationalism generated and fostered through the 2010
Vancouver Games eased concerns of the $6 billion Olympic price tag.
Arguably, one of the primary factors in generating the support of Canadians was
winning the gold medal in men’s hockey. This raises the question of whether Canadians
would endorse the multi-million dollar investment in OTP if Canada did not win the
gold medal in men’s hockey. And if so, would the new winter sport nationalism be
diminished as a result? According to the Toronto Star, “Team Canada: No pressure,
but… Canadians expect hockey gold, and nothing less. Anything less than gold and you
will be responsible for a tsunami of national mourning.”29 On the last day of the Games,
Canada’s men’s hockey team won the gold medal game, defeating the U.S. team 3-2.
The question of whether or not the rest of the Games would have mattered without that
medal can never be answered; the simple fact that it is posed should raise concerns
about the ultimate value of OTP to Canadians, since a very small portion of the funding
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is distributed to the men’s hockey team. Can the program sustain Canadian winter sport
nationalism in the event that the men’s hockey team does not win a gold medal and, as
the $6 million in additional spending was not put towards hockey, could the medal have
been won without increased funding, particularly as long as NHL professionals are
permitted to compete?

Winter Sport Nationalism
For more than twenty years, like other governments worldwide, the Canadian
government has been using the Olympic Games to generate political support and
endorsement. From the creation of spectacle to policy development, the late twentieth
and early twenty-first century was an era of developing an identity for Canada based
around winter sport supremacy. Having equipped the Canadian team with the facilities,
policy goals, scientific research, and financial support up to this point, success at the
Vancouver Games of 2010 served to punctuate this development for Olympic and
Canadian officials as well as securing the role of winter sports in invoking Canada’s
national uniqueness. Without question, the 2010 Olympics generated national pride,
signalled clearly by Star reader Clara Rubinstein Thornhill:
I have never been a fan of the Winter Olympics, even though my
husband and my son love them. To be perfectly honest, I have never
been a screaming cheerleader for Canada either. It is wonderful to see
how athletes responded to more funding, to more sponsors. It is
wonderful to see these young athletes competing not only for
themselves, but also for Canada. And it is electrifying to see how the
public’s support is so heartfelt and complete.30
However, it is important to understand why and how this was possible. For Canada, as
a nation of several million with diverse ethnicities, religions, cultures and races,
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nationalism can be more difficult to achieve than in nations where identities are more
singular. For this reason, spectacles such as the Olympics provide ideal opportunities
for the creation of unique, and more importantly for Canada, more cohesive, identities.
Historically, the concept of nationalism has been broken down into two forms, ethnic
and civic, the former based on nature and bloodline while the latter is based on nurture
and choice. For a multicultural nation such as Canada, it is necessary to classify the
existence of most forms of nationalism as civic, meaning that citizens of the nation
have made the conscious decision to pledge themselves to representations of that
nation. Smith states that, “a genuine multiculturalism can only exist in the framework
of a ‘plural’ nation, which celebrates the diversity and includes its different component
cultures within the overarching political institutions and symbols of the nation state.”31
This means that, while recognizing this diversity, members of the nation still pledge
themselves to the core values and beliefs of that nation. This civic type of nationalism
is very much the case in Canada.
For this reason, it is difficult to find a single cultural form with which members
of the entire nation can identify. For example, flags, national anthems, and historical
events struggle to generate nationalism and communal passion in a nation such as
Canada, as opposed to other nations where the ethnic background is more uniform.
Therefore, in Canada, it is the responsibility of the government to generate a form of
nationalism with which a majority of the population can identify.
Hobsbawm discusses the role of the government in engaging in conscious and
deliberate ideological engineering.32 This is not to say that the winter sport nationalism
existent in Canada was created from nothing; however, the government capitalized on
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the opportunity to link nationalism to the already powerful cultural realm of sport. Since
Canada is a northern nation, an ideal geographical location for winter sport training, and
had historically experienced success in various winter sports, it was not so much a
creation of winter sport nationalism as it was elevating already existing sentiments for
Canadians. Interestingly, the goals for OTP in 2010 differed between Winter and
Summer Olympic Games with the hope of finishing first overall and top three in gold
medals for the winter count, and finishing top 12 overall and top eight in gold medals
for the summer count, providing evidence of the acknowledgement of a long-lasting
legacy of success in winter sports.
Additionally, the value placed on sport victories is highlighted in a panel
discussion that followed the 2010 Vancouver Games:
Sport is a human construct that is designed to make us better – as
people, as communities and as a nation. High performance is that part
of sport that celebrates excellence – that helps us fulfill our human
potential. It is in this respect that high performance sport is, in and of
itself, a public good…As noted in the Road to Excellence Business
Plan (2006) Canada is a sophisticated enough society to be able to
participate on the world stage and excel. Doing so in sport reminds us
of our ability to do well in other areas. It reminds us of who we are as
a nation as we display our values and our character to the rest of the
world.33
This was a strong message being sent to the public about the cause and effect
relationship between international sport success and the betterment of that nation as a
whole. The message of supporting athletes and sport in Canada was relayed to the public
through the media throughout the Games.
At the commencement of the Games, then Canadian Prime Minister Stephen
Harper encouraged Canadians to be supportive of not only Canadian athletes, but of the
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Own the Podium program, for the sake of perceived pride that it would bring them, and
in spite of what it may have cost to get to this point:
I know that thoughts of grandeur and boisterous displays of
nationalism we tend to associate with others, and over the centuries
things have been done around the world in the name of national pride
or love of country that would have been better left undone, (but) there
is nothing wrong, and there is much that is right, in celebrating
together when our fellow citizens, perceiving some splendid star above
us, willingly pay the cost and take the chance to stretch forth their
hands to try to touch it for that one shining moment.34
Ultimately, this nationalism was realized. With the success that Team Canada
experienced in the 2010 Vancouver Olympic Games, the funding and efforts of the
government and the Own the Podium program created positive association from
members of the nation. National sporting achievements are imbued with certain
integrationist properties because they can contribute to a nation’s perceived sense of
‘greatness,’ while simultaneously transcending differences among members of the
nation.35 This was the case for Canada, winning gold medals in 2010 generated a
cohesiveness and unity in the nation by offering a common reference point around
which people could identify. This in turn created a shared sense of belonging and
community, further contributing to nationalism.

Athletic Excellence
As discussed, the OTP program was framed around an ideal of athletic
excellence as supremacy, making it an elitist merit-based support system. Those with the
potential to win were given access to the best resources the country could provide,
between training facilities, scientific and technological advancements, funding, and
coaching, there were significant discrepancies in athlete support. What resulted from
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this structure was the creation of a hegemony of excellence in Canada. Kidd defines this
promotion of the Canadian variant of “excellence” as a “recent project of a fraction of
the male upper middle class, enabled by the absence of any effective challenge to that
class and gender’s leadership within the Olympic sports, the federal state’s response to a
deep crisis of legitimacy and the simultaneous development of neoconservative idea.”36
Through the meritocracy created by OTP, in most cases, those athletes with the potential
to win medals are those who, financially, have had access to the best resources
throughout their careers. Therefore, the hegemonic result of this sport system is a classstabilizing effect as it encourages individuals to accept and even celebrate this
meritocracy. Additionally, the philosophy of excellence reinforces state capitalism as it
provides additional funding to those who have already had better opportunities, and
blocks other athletes from further development.
In 2010, this is reflected in the funding for the both the Canadian ski jump team
and the biathlon team. For example, the alpine team was receiving significant more
support from OTP than the ski jump team, due to successful results in the past:
There’s been pitifully little money for nurturing a new generation of
jumpers. Its share of Own the Podium funding was only $410, 000
over the last five years, compared to $10 million for alpine skiing.
Without carding, the athletes essentially carry their own freight.”
Jumper Brent Morrice commented, “We compete against countries
that have 1.5-2 million annually invested.”37
In regards to biathlon, the road to Vancouver was full of obstacles. Before the
Games, the Toronto Star reported:
When the necklace requirements of Own the Podium were established,
the money and support flowed to a select crop of high performance
athletes, with the expectation they repay the investment with a
combined medal count second to none. But how does the other half
live? What about those sports that have sent their best and brightest
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here, with nothing but long-shot podium dreams and even less in their
pockets? “It’s a little frustrating, not having a sponsor,” said Rosanna
Crawford, one of the Olympic rookies on this young but promising
team. “What about the up-and-comers in winter sports? We need to
focus on some of the younger athletes for 2014. You can’t build a
medal winner in two or four years in biathlon; it takes 10,” said Zina
Kocher, a World Cup podium finisher in her second Olympics. It’s a
chicken-and-egg thing, this business of results and funding. This team
needs results, or even the strong threats of them, to pry loose corporate
dollars.38
This leads to the most important concern posed by critics of the Own the Podium
campaign. What is the likelihood of sustainability for a program that, as repeatedly
mentioned, relies heavily on future funding from both public and private sectors?
Additionally the program’s biggest flaw is focusing on in-the-moment medal potential
athletes, which, while it produces a more experienced team, puts the future of Canadian
sport into question. Without providing the resources to develop future generations, on
the basis that they do not have medal potential, the nation may be jeopardizing the
likelihood that Canadians will continue to produce podium performances in the long
term.
Ultimately, due to the projected nationalism that was produced and reflected by
the newspapers as a result of the gold medals won by Canada, such concerns receive
vague, if any attention. Alongside the encouragement of the media towards the end of
the Games, Canadians were influenced with continuous messages relaying that the OTP
campaign was the best approach to high-performance sport for Canada. However,
though nationalism was strengthened to a degree, another lingering question on the
minds of Canadians and officials should be the effects of OTP beyond nationalism.
For example, one article reported that in 2010, Canada was facing a problem
with childhood obesity and an increased incidence of diabetes, linked to inactive
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lifestyles. Unfortunately, Ottawa’s funding for excellence in sport amounts to just a
couple of dollars per Canadian per year. However, as Canada’s Olympic Ambassador in
2010, Nancy Raine stated:
The pride we get when our athletes compete and win against the best
in the world is worth every cent of all the money that’s been invested.
I’ve often thought broadcasters should run a 900 number across the
TV screen during Olympic medal ceremonies and ask people to send
in donations. I’m sure people would be very supportive at that
moment. Many of the Olympic sports have few financial rewards, and
the costs to athletes and their families make it really difficult for the
average family. We definitely need to find a way to make it more
affordable, especially in the development years. When the Games are
over and we ask, “Did we win?” We shouldn’t measure it simply by
the number of medals our athletes take home. We should ask, “Have
we inspired participation in active and healthy lifestyles in people all
across Canada? Did we change the way Canadians value excellence in
sport? Are more kids interested in pursuing excellence? Did those
medals ignite kids to get involved? If we do that, Canada will
undoubtedly have won the Olympics.39
Evidently, there is major concern over Canada’s consideration of the long term goal of
OTP. However inspired and motivated future generations of Canadians are to participate
in sport upon seeing their athletes win, it won’t matter when the cost of such
participation exceeds the financial resources of the families supporting those children.
Peter Donnelly writes that, “Ideally, a value-added version of OTP would have had a
capacity-building component, whereby Canadian winter sports took responsibility for
the consequences of the inspiring performances of their athletes by nurturing the
enthusiasm of new recruits. As it stands, we are unlikely to see any increases in sport
participation as a result of OTP funding.”40 Has OTP then made some forms of sport
inaccessible to the majority of the Canadian population? And does, as OTP might claim,
investing in the top of the pyramid broaden the base?
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However, did the Olympic officials in Canada leverage a home Games with the
shame of never having won a gold medal at home? The twenty year period that led to
the 2010 Vancouver Games progressively built a foundation for the Canadian federal
government and Canadian Olympic officials to push their agenda of the importance in
investment in elite sport. From 1988 to the present, high performance sport development
in Canada has taken a new and success-centred approach, with contributing aspects and
incredible expenditures ranging from facility development, to policy improvement, to
science and technology research, and, unfortunately, as presented, the fulfilled wintersport nationalistic ideal has curtained the concerns that this raises.

Summary
The theme of funding is particularly important in this chapter. As previously
discussed, funding for the 2010 Winter Games was significantly beyond what the high
performance sport system in Canada had received until this point. The combination of
funds spent on facilities, science and technology research, training and coaching
combined to create Canada’s most complex and encompassing sport program ever. For
Canada at these Games, early challenge criticized the arrogance of titling Own the
Podium so aggressively, however, Canadian athletes did ultimately own the podium,
winning the most gold medals ever in history and more than any other nation at the
Games. This in turn proved beneficial in the development of Canadian winter sport
nationalism as athletic performances punctuated the pride that had already existed.
Additionally, alongside this winter sport nationalism emerged the ideology of excellence
and the support of a program directed solely toward supporting athletes with the
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potential to win medals. Therefore, the final theme of legacy for this chapter and of the
2010 Vancouver Olympic Games was a full meritocratic sport system, where winning
became the dominant ideal in the eyes of the federal government, Olympic officials, and
a significant portion of the media.
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CHAPTER SIX - CONCLUSION

The twenty-two year period from the 1988 Calgary Winter Olympics to the 2010
Vancouver Games was defined by major shifts in both policy and the funding of
Canadian high performance sport. Canadian nationalism, expressed through sport
became focused on winter sport supremacy, which developed specifically into a sport
system with a narrow focus on winning winter Olympic medals. This research analyzed
the development of the Canadian high performance sport system and Canadian sport
policy, to examine how each winter Olympic Games have influenced and affected the
Canadian nationalism that has been promoted in sport, through the lens of the media.
Ultimately, the twenty-two year period examined was characterised by significant
increases in public and private spending for the Olympic Games. The intent of this
research was to demonstrate how media representations of Canadian nationalism related
directly to the importance placed on high performance sport promoting the capitalistbased sport model in Canada.
In 1988, the Canadian government invested over one billion dollars into the
creation of a winter sport legacy, coming only 12 years after the Games in Montreal, the
debt from which had still not been paid off. Over $366 million of this money was spent
solely on the building of facilities for the Games, with the intent of creating a legacy of
training facilities for future generations of Canadian athletes. Additionally, $50 million
was spent on the torch relay and fireworks shows, simply in the creation of an
experience. The Games of 1988 in Calgary provided a foundation for a future
characterized by winter sport nationalism. The carefully orchestrated spectacle and the
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extravagant representation of the Games to the public through the media promoted
feelings of nostalgia and the reintroduction of an historic Canadian winter sport
nationalism. For this reason, though athletes showed poor performances at the 1988
Games, rarely were the Games labelled as a failure. On the contrary, the elaborate
production of the Games served to garner support for increased funding in the future.
The legacy of the 1988 Olympic spectacle then was a clear demonstration of the
hegemonic function of sport by beginning to naturalize, and thus gain support for,
investment in it. By hosting and presenting the event in such a grand way, the Canadian
government set the necessary parameters for future Olympic Games funding.
The poor performances of Canadian athletes in 1988 led to an era of policy
development throughout the 1990s aimed at structuring the Canadian sport system in a
way that would foster future success for athletes. For winter sport nationalism to be
further promoted, various policies were created from the 1992 Albertville Games to the
1998 Nagano Games. The reason for these policies was to develop cohesion among
government departments, national sporting organizations, and high performance
athletes, and aligning the needs and intentions of various sectors of the Canadian sport
system. A significant component of this approach was the priority placed on athlete
accountability. In regards to talent, the athletes had the potential for better performances,
the funding was available and, following Calgary, facilities for optimal training were
now also available. This suggests that the subsequent step to winter sport success was to
develop policy in order to ensure that funds were being strategically invested and
distributed. Through this decade, policies also began to identify the functional role of
national unity and uniqueness in the pursuit of international sporting success. For this
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reason, newspaper representations of the increasing success of athletes became more
deeply saturated with messages of national identity. With the increased policy and
organizational structure of the past ten years, the increasing identification of the
influence of nationalism, and the legacy that preceded the 1990s, efforts in the new
millennium became concentrated toward athletes with podium potential and in sports
where Canadians were likely to win medals.
By the time of the Olympic quadrennial 2002-2006, Team Canada had been
supported by the Best Ever funding program for the better part of 15 years; however, the
development of sport policy in the 1990s and the increasing accountability placed on
athletes to win medals set the stage for a new program. Own the Podium, which justified
increased investment from both Canadian government and the private sectors, aimed at
guiding Canadian athletes to higher achievements. During the early stages of the
program, it is important to highlight the involvement of major key players, identified
earlier, such as COA Chief Executive Officer Jim Thompson, COA official Mark
Lowry, Own the Podium CEO Roger Jackson, and program pioneers Cathy PriestnerAllinger and Todd Allinger, who were central in pushing this shift toward a winningoriented high performance sport funding program. The winning narrative, promoted
through the Canadian media, linked Canadian national identity directly to sporting
victories, thus legitimizing government spending and the propagation of a new high
performance program ideal. With increased funds, the new program expanded to include
research and technology components that would work to provide scientific advantages
to Canadian athletes. In addition, funding was distributed based solely on an athlete’s
potential to win medals. The message relayed through the media was that a policy that
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directed funding toward early identification of athletes with the ability to win medals at
the Olympics, coupled with advanced research, was the ideal approach to ensuring
success and therefore strengthening Canadian nationalism.
Ultimately, the 2010 Vancouver Olympic Games served as a testament to the
new Own the Podium program as athletes won more medals than ever to date and the
most gold medals of any participating nation. 2010 also punctuated the development of
winter sport nationalism that had been reinvented in Calgary 1988, as Canadians were
becoming increasingly more dominant on the podium. The success garnered further
support for investment in high performance sport and a narrative rationalizing such
investment, for the promotion of not only national unity, but of Canada as a nation. In a
twenty-two year period, the Canadian government had finely structured Canadian sport
in such a way that the media was able to shed positive light, through a national unity
lens, on what had become a distinctly monetized sport system.

Emergent Themes
As mentioned, throughout this research, there were four themes that emerged
that lend support to the characterization of this twenty-two year period as a time when
Canadian winter sport nationalism developed and strengthened: Legacy, Changes and
Developments in Canadian Sport; Funding, Support and Structure; Expressions of
Canadian Nationalism, Pride and Identity; and finally, Challenges Facing Canada at
the Olympics. Though some in a more prominent sense than others, each theme has
contributed to the understanding that this period was paramount for Canadian sport and
identity.
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Legacy, Changes, and Developments in Canadian Sport
In the first theme, Legacy, Changes and Developments in Canadian Sport, the
contribution of sport changes and legacy to Canadian identity was that each era served
to create a stronger link between Canadians, athletes and fans alike, and winter sport. As
this theme emerged throughout this research, it was evident that distinct shifts in
Canadian high-performance sport occurred in each era in the twenty-two year period
analyzed. In 1988, the legacy of the Calgary Games came in the form of the facilities
that were built to provide training grounds for future Canadian athletes. It was apparent
in generations following that athletes attributed medal victories to having these facilities
available to them. By the 1990s, developments in sport policy and shift towards a
priority on excellence left a legacy of accountability, cohesion, inclusion, and structure
that shaped the future of high performance sport funding. For this reason, the legacy of
the early millennium led to the introduction of a new sport funding program and the
implementation of science and technology research to high performance sport
investment, which would provide athletes with additional resources to improve athletic
excellence. Finally, the legacy of the Vancouver 2010, one which still exists today was
the full development and administration of the Own the Podium Olympic sport funding
program. The development of this new program has resulted in a meritocratic sport
system whereby athletes that receive support from it are those who are identified to have
the potential to win medals at the Olympics. Ultimately, this theme serves as evidence
that each era served a purpose in creating a more central role for winter sport in
Canadian identity.
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Funding, Support and Structure
In regards to the theme of Funding, Support and Structure, without the financial,
organizational, and structural resources provided by the public and private sectors over
the course of this research, the ability to create and promote the developments of the
sport system would not have been feasible. With each quadrennial, the Canadian
Olympic team received increasingly higher levels of investment. In 1988, these funds
were directed toward the orchestration of spectacle of hosting the Olympic Games and
building the necessary structures to successfully do so. In the following decade, funding
was again increased, but under stricter guidelines whereby policies were enacted to
ensure that funds were being strategically distributed. The introduction of these policies
ensured that athletes and organizations being funded were following criteria standards
set by government and Olympic officials, some of which included; setting program
objectives, improving access and opportunity for underserved groups, having an athletecentred focus, bilingual policies and anti-doping policies. The initial introduction of
Own the Podium occurred in the early 2000s, when sport funding was increased to
include science and technology research. However, this funding program was not fully
implemented until 2010 at the Vancouver Olympic Games where funding reached an
all-time high and combined to include money invested into facilities, science and
technology research, training, and coaching endeavors. It was in 2010 that Canadian
athletes received the highest financial and resource support that the federal government
had ever provided to Olympic athletes. This theme demonstrates how the development
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of Canadian winter sport nationalism was made possible through the organization of a
stronger and more aligned Canadian sport system.

Expressions of Canadian Nationalism, Pride and Identity
For Expressions of Canadian Nationalism, Pride and Identity this research has
argued that over the twenty-two year period analyzed here, there has been a gradual
development of winter sport nationalism in Canada. As with the other themes, each era
has had an impact on generating and strengthening Canadian winter sport nationalism.
The 1988 Calgary Games laid the foundation for the creation of this nationalism. In
1988, the strategic manipulation of spectacle linked feelings of Canadian identity to
winter sport both past and present. Through the use of historical representations of
“Canadianism,” these Games generated feelings of nostalgia and pride in sporting
spaces. In the 1990s, the introduction of new sport policies saturated Canadian
representations of winter sport with messages of winning and excellence, therefore
strengthening what had already begun to become a significant aspect of Canadian
identity. With performances by Canadian athletes gradually improving through to the
new millennium, the early 2000s showed the potential for winter sport success in
Canada. Following this decade then, the only missing component for the solidification
of winter sport nationalism in Canada was significant medal victories by athletes that
would place Canada ahead of other nations in regards to success in winter sports. In
2010, Canadian athletes won 26 total medals and a record 14 gold medals, the most of
any nation. For the media, this was the ultimate realization of winter sport supremacy
and was represented as such in newspaper articles, as they were officially in arm of the
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Own the Podium program. The importance of this theme is more apparent than the
others and its development over this period came from both the gradual realization that
Canadian athletes had increasingly higher potential to win medals and the dominance of
Canadian athletes in the 2010 Vancouver Games.

Challenges Facing Canada at the Olympics
For the fourth and final theme, Challenges Facing Canada at the Olympics, the
importance is to understand that the creation of the winter sport nationalism ideal was
not met without challenges and criticisms. It is necessary to understand how these issues
were controlled and treated by the federal government, Games officials, and the media,
so as not to threaten this nationalism. Each quadrennial brought concerns and issues that
would have to be addressed in preparation or throughout the Games. In the early Games
of 1988, the threat was not so much to the winter sport nationalism specifically, but
instead to the Canadian image that was being reflected as hosts of the Games. Between
the Lubicon land rights concerns and the ticket scandals that threatened the early stages
of the Games, the media worked to emphasize the values, importance, and positive
effects of hosting Olympic Games, while simultaneously minimizing attention on these
issues. The challenge proved manageable as any concerns that arose early on were
quickly forgotten among the hype that came with the Games. Similarly, in the 1990s, the
uncertainty of the role of French athletes on Canada’s Olympic Team generated
significant media attention and brought to the forefront the importance of creating an
inclusive environment in Canada’s high performance sport system. Transversely, the
government, through policy changes, made some steps toward amending this issue with
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the enactment of the Sport Funding and Accountability Framework which made
suggestions toward equal opportunity for French and English athletes. In chapter four,
challenges faced at the Olympics Games were, as represented in the media, brought on
by Canadian athletes themselves, with their lack of significant results. Though athletes
had gradually improved over time, the threat of hosting an Olympic Games and not
winning a gold medal for the third time was realized in this era, as Vancouver won the
bid for the 2010 Winter Games. As a result, this created favourable circumstances for
the federal government and Olympic officials to introduce a new funding program, Own
the Podium, leading directly to challenges presented in chapter five. The title of the new
Own the Podium campaign was criticized for being both arrogant and premature in the
anticipation that Canadian athletes would actually “own the podium” at these Games,
particularly since they hadn’t quite done so in that past. From the outset, it seemed as
though critics had a strong argument for their disdain for the program name. However,
by week two of the 2010 Games, Canadians were the most decorated gold medal
athletes. For the duration of the Vancouver Games, the Canadian anthem played more
than any other anthem had and what had initially begun as an anti-Own the Podium
attitude became one of encouraged competitiveness and confidence. However,
particularly important to note when considering the increasing success of the Canadian
team is the increasing availability of gold medals at the Olympic Games. From 1988 to
2010, the number of events at the Winter Games rose from 46 to 86, respectively
providing almost twice the number of opportunities for Canadian athletes to place on the
podium:
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Table Five: Gold Medals Available at each Winter Olympic Games
Games
Calgary
Albertville
Lillehammer
Nagano
Salt Lake City
Turin
Vancouver

Number of Events and
Gold Medals Available
46
57
61
68
78
84
86

Implications
In order to understand the importance and relevance of this research, it is
necessary to first understand the value of nationalism to those in power. When analyzing
the classification of nationalism in Canada, as discussed, modern civic nationalism is an
ideal way to characterize this sentiment, as its role is both politically and socially
constructed, rather than being a natural phenomenon that arose as a result of existent
ethnic values. As Canada is a multicultural population, the creation of national identity
is reliant on the creation of national institutions by the state. Hegemonic relations reveal
how the state in Canada has constructed nationalism for Canadians, through institutions
such as sport, and the value of such constructions. In this way, sport shaped society in
ways that articulated the interests of those in positions of power.
Nationalism, as an ideology has been defined as the “attainment and
maintenance of identity, autonomy and unity on behalf of a population.”1 Oftentimes,
the use of a national sport team can be a viable way of doing so, as following a national
team can underline a sense of identity. Throughout the latter part of the twentieth
century and into the twenty-first century, the winter sport nationalism created in Canada
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was a strong means of promoting this solidarity and identity among Canadians. Through
the promotion of successful winter athletes, the state coordinated and unified individuals
around the common belief in Canadian winter sport supremacy, and the value of this to
Canadian identity. Therefore, the role of high performance sport in promoting and
constructing national identity is specifically relevant. Sport offers an important
contribution to this idea of solidarity and belonging because it creates an environment of
emotionally-charged interaction, and this was particularly evident in the Games when
Canada hosted, in 1988 and 2010.
This research has concluded that the result of the twenty-two year period
between the Calgary and Vancouver Games was the development of Canadian
nationalism centred around success in winter sport. The support for this argument is
that, as summarized, each quadrennial served a purpose in creating and supporting this
ideal. From the building of facilities and a winter sport legacy in 1988, to policy
development, and finally to the introduction of science and technology research, sport
funding was strategically allocated to prepare Canadian winter athletes in every aspect
of training and development, to garner the eventual success that came in 2010.
Ultimately, the most crucial component of the development of this nationalism
came at the level of civil society through the media. The importance of success in winter
sport would only go as far as the perceived importance that society placed on these
victories, making media representations of winter sport success increasingly important.
Throughout this research, there were vast amounts of evidence of nation building, unity,
and nationalism being perpetuated through media stories about the Olympics. For
example, while victory and podium performances shed light on the value of high
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performance sport, there were many instances, particularly in the early years, of the
media’s ability to positively reflect on poor performances as well, and to make an
argument for continued support and increased funding for athletes. It was through the
media that the promotion of Canadian icons and symbols were created and that
messages about the meaning of being “Canadian” were disseminated.
In addition, political leaders have historically used the “invention of traditions,”
as discussed by Benedict Anderson and mentioned in Chapter one, to, in Foster and
Hyatt’s words, “build, create, and maintain loyalty within the citizenry.”2 Ultimately, the
purpose served by the media was to strengthen the bond between the Canadian Team
and Canadian citizens. One method of creating invented traditions is through their link
with a historic past, evident in Canada through the period covered in this research. The
state has made the necessary historic association between past and present Canadian
sport history, recreating and capturing specific values associated, in this case, with
winter sport success.
Furthermore, the power of the statements and symbols represented in the media
rests in their ability to become naturalized as common sense. This can help to explain
how, in Canada, the state has developed nationalism over such an extended period of
time that the belief in its value and the centrality of winter sports to its existence have
become a part of Canadian common sense thinking. Ultimately, this makes this ideal
difficult to challenge and, as a result, the government in Canada continued to invest
significant amounts of public and private funds on high performance sport with minimal
objection. Congruently, these conditions created by the high-performance sport system
and the media representation of it created a power dynamic that allowed the state to
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make choices on when and where public funding would be distributed, also without
challenge. Since the government legitimates and institutionalizes sport, the control over
sport stays in the hands of those already privileged, while limiting resources for those
without influence.3 Since 1988, billions of private, but more importantly public
taxpaying dollars have been invested into supporting the Canadian Olympic Team,
including funds spent on the building and maintaining of facilities, science and
technology research, coaching and training programs, and significant city infrastructure
to support the hosting of the Olympic Games. To continue this point, not only are there
members of the working class suffering on an economic scale, but the argument has
been made that a focus on high performance sport has diverted attention and funding
from grassroots and sport for development. These are the sport and activity programs
that service the working class.
As reviewed earlier, Canada’s 1961 Fitness and Amateur Sport Act (Bill C-131)
was the earliest foundation of sport policy discussion in Canada. The Act was Canada’s
first acknowledgement of the importance of sport and recreation in public policy.
However, the Act at the time was created to focus mainly on hockey and international
sport performances in Canada, rather than on the general health and fitness of the
population.4 The reason for this is that:
federal government involvement in mass sport and recreation was
always considered to be problematic in two ways: first, mass sport,
recreation and health/fitness were considered to be matters of
provincial jurisdiction; and second, there was little political gain from
promoting mass sport and recreation participation.5
Unfortunately, the former part of this argument demonstrates the ways in which the
federal government has avoided having to regulate mass sport participation for lower
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classes, while the latter is, quite frankly, from a financial standpoint for the federal
government, the blatant truth.
This further demonstrates structures of inequality and unequal power distribution
as the working class are lacking the opportunity, resources, programs, and commodities
necessary to stay active, participate in sport, and most importantly stay healthy. In
comparison, millions of dollars are being invested to a small group of select athletes
whose talent has been recognized and pre-determined as having medal potential. Equally
important to note is that, due to the failure of the federal government to provide sport
opportunities to the rest of the population, any existing opportunity to participate in
private sport schools, clinics, and academies are limited to those children with the
financial means to do so. Therefore, in the future, we will likely see an increasingly
smaller pool of medal potential athletes receive additional funding to that which they
can already afford, and the talent and skills gap between those individuals and ones from
lower classes become nearly impossible to overcome, particularly without the
appropriate resources.
Interestingly, the justification given for the importance of investment in high
performance sport over sport participation at the grassroots level is that the federal
government is taking a top-down approach. This means that the expectation is that
Canadian success at international sport events will influence future generations of
Canadians to participate in sport. However, a 2010 study conducted by Donnelly
demonstrates that the opposite is actually true. The data shows that from the 1992
Summer Olympics to the 2010 Winter Olympic Games, as Canadian athletes began
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increasingly winning more medals, participation rates showed the inverse results with a
20% decrease in participation.6
The ideology of excellence that exists in Canada is another characteristic of the
winter sport nationalism that was developed at this time and further demonstrates that
sport is, historically, created and controlled by the state which exercises control over
events such as the Olympics and express their own ideals as common sense. This
ideology in and of itself strongly reinforces state capitalism, because, though seemingly
self-empowering and socially-validated, there are evidently strong inequalities within
Canada’s sport system. To revert back to the notion of common sense, this research also
demonstrates how the structure of capitalist societies have become naturalized as the
interests of those in power are continuously reinforced through ideological
constructions, of which sport excellence is an example. In this research, the state and
ruling class have clearly used sport success, its contribution to nationalism, and the
value that society places on it to mobilize support for government and its choices. The
value of nationalism, then is to service those in power.

Future Research
Future research might examine how this brand of nationalism may have
continued to flourish beyond 2010 and whether or not the OTP campaign has had
continued success in further promoting Canadian winter sport nationalism. Additionally,
future studies may consider an analysis of local sport programs that have developed over
the past thirty years, to examine whether or not there has been an influx of winter versus
summer sport participation. This may suggest that, although participation rates in sport

152

in general have declined in the past ten years, winter sports are a strong contributor and
determinant of Canadian identity beyond the level of fan support.
Furthermore, at the 2014 Olympic Winter Games in Sochi, Canadian athletes
experienced less success than they had in Vancouver. It is difficult to interpret the
reason for this as these have been the only Winter Games since, however, if prolonged
research reveals a continued decline in Canadian athlete success, it supports the claim
that investment in OTP over grassroots sport has ultimately weakened Canada’s highperformance sport system.
As already mentioned, analysis of newspaper articles from across Canada was
beyond the scope of this study, as was the incorporation of French newspaper articles.
Future research then may find that analysis of newspapers from Quebec may offer
further support for or an alternative viewpoint to the value and role of winter sports in
promoting Canadian identity.
The 22-year period analyzed in this research demonstrates the gradual
development and contribution of various components of the high performance sport
system that led to the creation of Canadian winter sport nationalism. Ultimately, the
OTP sport funding program that exists today to support high performance athletes serves
as evidence of the success of the federal government in creating, promoting, and
utilizing this nationalism. According to an official OTP report conducted following the
Games, 83% of Canadians view the Games as a source of national pride.7 Then Prime
Minister Steven Harper stated, “mark my words, some day historians will look back at
Canada’s growing strength in the 21st century and they will say that it all began right
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here, on the West Coast, with the best Winter Olympic Games the world has ever
seen.”8
By creating a nationalistic sentiment surrounding the Olympic Games, the
concerns raised here are curtained by the perceived benefits of investment and
participation in high performance sport. For fifty years, the federal government has
involved sport policy on the public agenda and, as most Canadians recall, winter sport
has stood at the forefront of collective memory, nostalgia, and experience. As a
population, Canadians recognize and believe in the value of winter sport success as an
inherent component to their national identity. Furthermore, if the legacy of success that
Canadians have experienced in the past twenty continues, the winter sport supremacy
ideal will become more difficult to challenge. This ultimately means that, as long as
Canada remains a capitalist economy, underpinned by the ideology of excellence,
nationalism will continue to serve its hegemonic purpose in diverting attention away
from broad-based or popular cultural opportunities where funding can be invested, for
the sake of high performance sport.
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